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1 Introduction 
1.1 General Motivation 
Listed real estate companies represent, especially in the case of institutional investors, a 
worldwide growing asset class. The market capitalization of listed real estate investments has 
increased intensively over the last two-decades. For example, in 1995, the FTSE/NAREIT US 
REIT Index had a market capitalization of $57,541m and in 2016, $1,018,730m (NAREIT, 
2017). A Similar pattern of increasing market capitalization can be found for the FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Developed Europe Index, as in 1995, the total market capitalization represented 
€44,351m and in 2016 €197,885m (EPRA, 2017). Earning money from direct real estate 
investments can be quite challenging, which leads to an increased demand for indirect real 
estate vehicles. However, in general, investing in direct real estate has several advantages 
from which investors in listed real estate benefit, such as the inflation-hedge capability, 
compared to other investment opportunities (Fama and Schwert, 1977; Liu et al., 1997; 
Hartzell et al., 1987) or a low correlation with other asset classes, such as stocks and bonds 
(Ibbotson and Siegel, 1984; Quan and Titman, 1999).  
Within the growing indirect real estate market, investors have the choice of investing in real 
estate investment trusts (REITs), listed real estate operating companies (REOCs), or open-end 
or closed-end funds. What all these investment opportunities have in common is that they 
overcome the challenges of direct real estate investment. First, indirect real estate investments 
simultaneously solve two inherent real estate issues, illiquidity or fungibility and long-term 
investment horizons, by providing a publicly accessible platform for daily trading. Second, by 
issuing shares to shareholders, the divisibility of properties and its value is enabled. Hence, 
each investor has the opportunity to create a risk-return portfolio in accordance to his/her 
preferences and expectations. Third, listed real estate companies help to overcome the 
normally substantial intransparency in the real estate sector through disclosure requirements. 
Additionally, listed companies provide standardized products (shares), which are professionally 
managed and therefore attract investors around the world. 
Furthermore, investors have the choice between investing in existing and already listed real 
estate companies, and new real estate businesses. In the case of investing in newly listing real 
estate companies, investors have the unique opportunity to participate in a successful initial 
public offering (IPO). Assuming that investor’s aim is to make profitable and lucrative 
investments and earn money from the very beginning, a new placement might be a good 
choice. Hence, the phenomenon that the IPO offer price is systematically below the closing 
price on the first trading day – called underpricing –occurs widely and contributes an 
alternative return for IPO investors. In the real estate sector, the issuing company has the 
choice between a non-restricted REOC and a legally regulated REIT. In order to create an 
understanding of IPO performance in the real estate sector itself, a detailed examination of 
the specific and differing characteristics of the two different business forms is required. Most 
current research studies on IPO performance in the real estate sector examine either REOCs 
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(Braemisch et al., 2011; Freybote et al., 2008) or REITs (Brobert, 2016; Chan et al., 2013) 
samples, thus lacking an intra-sector comparison. 
After a successful IPO, the shareholders claim their share of financial performance announced 
in the IPO prospectus. However, the definition of how investment professionals assess 
corporate success has changed over the last few years. According to the PWC global survey of 
438 professional investors and 1,409 CEOs from 2016, 63% of investment professionals and 
76% of CEOs agree that corporate success cannot be reduced to financial profit alone. (PWC, 
2016) Both parties confirm that financial return is not just about generating good numbers at 
the end of the fiscal year. Generating sustainable returns in a socially responsible context 
should also be considered. (RIA, 2017) As a well-developed corporate governance mechanism 
can be a deciding factor in evaluating overall corporate success such aspects are emerging 
topics attracting equal attention from politicians, practitioners and researchers. Two major 
topics in this context, which are already being addressed by certain countries, are gender 
diversity on the board and compensation arrangements at the management level. For 
example German policy makers have designed a new legal framework, which obliges listed 
companies with more than 2,000 employees to increase the female presence in the 
supervisory board up to 30% (FüPoG, 2015). Similar regulations can be found in France, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway and Belgium. In order to control for appropriate management 
compensation packages, the German government enacted a law in 2009 for 
“Angemessenheit der Vorstandvergütung” (VorstAG, 2009), and the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) amended its disclosure rules to provide shareholders with an 
advisory vote on executive compensation (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011). 
Unfortunately, research on these two upcoming topics is scarce in the real estate context. 
In sum, all kinds of investors desire a certain level of performance, either exclusively financial 
or from an overall perspective, including sustainable returns. As listed real estate companies 
help investors overcome certain specific challenges associated with direct real estate 
investments, this dissertation examines corporate performance and its influencing factors, 
primarily from the investor perspective. The three research studies comprising this dissertation 
shed light on the different performance facets of and interactions between listed real estate 
companies, starting with the commencement date of public listing and continuing with 
essential relationships in emerging corporate governance topics. In particular, the first paper 
provides insights into IPO pricing in a comparative framework for the real estate sector. The 
second paper applies an innovative approach by firstly identifying the determinants of the 
proportion of female board members and secondly investigating the gender diversity / 
financial performance relationship by controlling for potential endogeneity. The final paper 
examines whether temporally distinct compensation packages are determined by company 
performance or rather by CEO power mechanisms. 
  
Introduction 
3 
1.2 Research Questions 
The following section contains the superordinate research questions addressed in the 
respective papers of this dissertation. 
 
Paper 1: REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market 
Performance: a European Perspective 
 
• Is REIT-status a transparency factor which is negatively linked to the initial return at 
the IPO? 
• Is REIT-status still an influencing factor during different timeframes and economic 
crises, such as the global financial crisis of 2008? 
• Can this REIT-transparency status be proven by using different empirical 
methodologies, such as OLS regression and propensity score matching? 
• Does the issuing volume impact the initial return negatively? 
• Do firm characteristics influence the initial return? 
• Which specific IPO characteristics explain the level of initial returns in the real estate 
sector? 
• Are there intra-sector-specific differences in the IPO pricing? 
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Paper 2: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence 
from US Real Estate Companies 
 
• What is the impact of an increased percentage of women on the board of directors 
on financial performance? 
• Is there a different impact on financial performance for women in executive as 
opposed to non-executive positions? 
• What constitutes a critical mass of females in top management? 
• Is there an optimum gender diversity distribution in the group of executive and non-
executive directors? 
• Are there property sector differences concerning gender diversity? 
• How can the endogeneity problem be controlled for when investigating the gender 
diversity / firm performance relationship? 
 
 
 
Paper 3: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US 
REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
• Is there a link between CEO /executive director payment and firm performance? 
• Which board of director characteristics influence CEOs and executive directors’ 
compensation levels? 
• Do powerful CEOs negotiate pay arrangements which are less sensitive to firm 
performance, that is, a higher base salary and lower incentive-based compensation? 
• What are the critical determinants of monitoring the company’s management and 
their compensation packages? 
• Are long-term compensation packages adequately structured in accordance to 
corporate success? 
• Do new disclosure rules introduced after the global financial crisis strengthen the pay-
performance link between manager remuneration and firm performance? 
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1.3 Course of Analysis 
This section provides an overview of the three research papers in chronological order, with 
regard to their purpose and research design, authorship, journal submission and current 
status, and conference presentations. 
 
Paper 1: REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market 
Performance: a European Perspective 
 
This paper examines pricing differences between the two real-estate-specific business forms, 
namely REOC and REIT, by using a sample of 107 European real estate companies over the 
period 2000-2015. Applying a cross-sectional analysis, this paper examines whether the REIT-
status exhibits a transparency bonus, resulting in a lower IPO underpricing. 
 
Authors: Claudia Ascherl and Wolfgang Schaefers 
Submission to: Journal of European Real Estate Research (JERER) 
Submission: October 11, 2016 
Current Status: published in Volume 11 Issue 1 
This paper was presented at the 2015 Annual Conference of the European Real Estate Society 
(ERES) in Istanbul, Turkey. The paper won the price for the Best PhD-Paper at the ERES 2015. 
The paper was also presented at the 2016 Annual Conference of the American Real Estate 
Society (ARES) in Denver, USA and the 2016 ERES in Regensburg, Germany.  
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Paper 2: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence 
from US Real Estate Companies 
 
This paper investigates whether gender diversity, as a component of corporate social 
responsibility, has an impact on the financial performance or firm valuation of real estate 
companies. We used a panel dataset of 116 US listed real estate companies over the period 
2005-2015, to answer the abovementioned question.  
 
Authors: Liesa Schrand, Claudia Ascherl, Wolfgang Schaefers 
Submission to: Journal of Property Research (JPR) 
Submission: April 12, 2018 
Current Status: under review 
This paper was presented at the 2017 ARES in San Diego, USA and as well at the 2017 ERES 
in Delft, Netherlands.  
 
Paper 3: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US 
REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
The main aim of this paper was to investigate whether financial performance or CEO 
entrenchment mechanisms are the essential influencing factors on CEO and executive director 
compensation packages. Using panel data comprising 830 firm-year observations over the 
period 2006-2015, this paper demonstrated the importance of linking C-level compensation 
to temporally- and appropriate performance measures and changes in compensation 
arrangements during and after the financial crisis. 
 
Authors: Claudia Ascherl, Liesa Schrand Wolfgang Schaefers 
Submission to: Journal of Real Estate Research (JRER) 
First Submission: April 12, 2018 
Current Status: under review 
This paper was presented at the 2018 ARES in Bonita Springs, USA. 
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2 REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market Performance: a 
European Perspective 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine the differences between initial public offering (IPO) 
pricing in the real estate sector and to provide insight into how REIT and Real estate operating 
company (REOC) IPOs perform in a comparative framework.  
Design / methodology / approach 
The sample consists of 107 European REIT and REOC IPOs from 9 European countries over the 
period 2000-2015. The initial returns are examined by creating subsamples based on the two 
business forms, countries and specific timeframes (before, during and after the Global 
Financial Crisis). A multiple regression analysis is applied to identify the ex-ante uncertainty 
factors, IPO and firm characteristics, which may impact on the different underpricing levels of 
REITs and REOCs. 
Findings 
European property companies are on average significantly underpriced by 4.63%. The results 
also reveal that REITs provide a significantly lower underpricing of 2.02% than REOCs, with a 
positive initial return of 5.69%. The causal treatment effect of the legal form of the company 
and the underpricing is confirmed by propensity score matching. Among the most influencial 
factors for a lower REIT underpricing, besides the REIT-status itself, are the volatility, offer size 
and market phase of the IPO. During the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) (2008-2010), 
underpricing exceeds the initial return for the total sample by approximately 70%. 
Originality/value 
This is the first study investigating differences in the underpricing level of REITs and REOCs in 
a European setting, including the GFC as an extraordinary market phase. The authors provide 
evidence that REIT IPOs compared to REOC IPOs “leave less money on the table”. 
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2.1 Introduction 
For real estate, a popular adage is “location, location, location”. In the context of potential 
listed real estate companies, it is “equity, equity, equity” (EPRA, 2015). The capital demand of 
real estate companies, combined with their relatively high dividend yields during a time of low 
yields on fixed income investments, leads  to an ongoing popularity of real estate initial public 
offerings (IPOs) in Europe (EPRA, 2015). 
Listed real estate companies have the choice of going public, either as a listed real estate 
operating company (REOC), or as a real estate investment trust (REIT). With the introduction 
of REITs in Europe, e.g. France 2003 and UK and Germany 2007, the supply of indirect 
investment vehicles was augmented. Currently, EPRA is still involved in setting up two new 
REIT-regimes in Poland and Sweden (EPRA, 2015). As listed real estate companies are geared 
towards further growth in Europe, IPOs are an important and primary source of raising equity. 
From an investor perspective, it is important to assess how REIT and REOC IPOs perform 
within a comparative framework. 
For firms, the primary aim of IPOs is to raise as much money as possible. For potential IPO 
investors, the primary aim is to make a good investment and earn an alternative return. In this 
context, the literature identified two contrary phenomena for the short- and long-run IPO 
returns. In the short-run, the initial return is mostly positive, whereas highly underpriced IPOs 
underperform in the long-run (Brobert, 2016). The phenomenon that the IPO offer price is 
systematically below the closing price on the first trading day is called underpricing and is the 
main focus of this study. The paper provides new insights into the underpricing phenomenon, 
by focusing explicitly on the unique performance of listed real estate companies. Especially 
REIT IPOs are often excluded from consideration, due to the specific regulations1, which may 
provide higher transparency for investors compared to other equities. Therefore, this present 
study provides insight into the IPO pricing differences of European REOCs and REITs by testing 
hypothesis derived from existing theories. Furthermore, this study attempts to answer the 
question of whether the GFC, as an extraordinary market phase, had an impact on the 
underpricing level. 
Previous studies on listed real estate companies have investigated either initial returns of REIT 
IPOs, mostly from the North American or Asian-Pacific markets, or the performance of REOC 
IPOs, predominately from the European market. The few European studies focus exclusively 
on REOC IPOs, using various methodological approaches. For example, Braemisch et al. 
(2011) examine the relationship between the yields and total returns of direct property 
investments, which can be assigned directly to an IPO. Freybote et al. (2008), focus 
predominantly on the cyclicality of European property IPOs. We extend these previous studies 
by differentiating between REIT and REOC IPOs in particular. We assume that the REIT-status 
itself and the strict pre-fixed requirements associated therewith may impact on the initial 
                                                 
1 The legal requirements of REITs mostly refer to the distribution rate, shareholders’ limitation, an activity test and 
conversion into the REIT status. 
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return on the first trading day. The objective of this study is to assess whether the REIT-status 
in general has a significant impact on the underpricing level in different countries and market 
phases, by explicitly investigating IPO pricing differences between REOCs and REITs. This gap 
is addressed by utilizing a sample of 107 REIT and REOC IPOs from 9 European countries over 
the period 2000-2015. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the 
European REIT-regimes. Section 3 summarizes previous studies on underpricing of REITs and 
REOCs. Section 4 describes the methodology with the resulting hypotheses. In Section 5, the 
sample design and descriptive statistics are presented. Section 6 includes the method used to 
test the hypotheses and shows the results of the regression models and robustness check. 
Finally, Section 7 concludes and provides an outlook for further investigation. 
 
2.2 REIT background in Europe 
Exhibit 2.2 provides an overview of the broad legal and business characteristics of nine 
European REITs. The European REIT market started 1969 in the Netherlands and the 
development is still in process, given that in 2013, the youngest European REIT regime was 
introduced in Ireland. 
The nine European REIT regimes have in common that either their incomes, part of their 
assets or the real estate developments themselves, are restricted. Additionally, all of these 
REITs have to be listed on a stock exchange. A further similarity is the distribution obligation, 
which ranges from 50% of the profits in Greece to 95% in France. The disadvantage of this 
requirement is that a REIT which is incorporated in a country with a high distribution rate 
cannot fund its growth via retained earnings. Hence, such REITs have to refinance on the 
capital market, in contrast to property companies or REITs with no or a lower distribution 
rate. Another consequence of this high distribution rate for REITs is the tax-exempt status, 
which is the main difference between REITs and REOCs, and may affect the underpricing level. 
The distribution requirement for REITs in all European countries, in combination with the 
narrow focus on real estate assets, can imply that each potential investor could form, with 
greater certainty, an individual opinion about the true value of the REIT. For a REIT investor, 
whether institutional or private, purchasing a unit of a REIT is attractive and certain, hence 
providing stable cash flows with future long-term growth opportunities. (Dimovski, 2016) By 
investing in a unit of REIT or REOC the investors acquire a long-run perspective a real estate 
investment and in the short term, REITs or REOCs act like equities (Schaetz and Sebastian, 
2009).  
In six European countries, REIT-shareholders are limited in their participation, resulting in a 
high free float. This can be a problem for REITs; hence the free float cannot be controlled. The 
limit of 10% shares ownership by one investor (Finland, Germany, Ireland, UK) may have the 
consequence that fewer institutional investors are interested in REIT IPOs in such countries. 
Thus, the shareholder participation restriction may affect the IPO pricing negatively. 
R
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 Belgium Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Spain Turkey UK 
Enacted (type) 
1995 / 2014 
(SICAFI / SIR) 
2009 
(FINNISH REIT) 
2003 
(SIIC) 
2007 
(G-REIT) 
1999 
(REIC) 
2013 
(REIT) 
2009 
(SOCIMI) 
1995 
(REIC) 
2007 
(UK-REIT) 
Listing mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory mandatory 
Share capital 
(min.) 
EUR 1.25 
million 
EUR 5 million EUR 15 million 
EUR 15 
million 
EUR 25 
million 
EUR 25,000 EUR 5 million 
TRY 30 
million 
GBP 50,000 
Activity test 
Max. 20% of 
total assets in 
one real estate 
project 
80% of net 
income have 
to constitute 
renting 
activities; 
developments 
on own 
account 
Developments 
are not 
allowed to 
exceed 20% of 
gross book 
value 
75% of the 
assets must 
be immovable 
properties; 
75% of the 
income must 
be derived 
from real 
estate sector 
80% of the 
assets must 
be real estate 
assets and at 
least 80% in 
in Greece or 
in EEA 
75% of 
market value 
have to be 
real estate 
related; 75% 
of income 
must be 
derived from 
rental 
business 
80% of the 
assets must 
be real-estate 
related; 80% 
of income 
derived from 
qualified 
assets 
51% of the 
portfolio must 
be invested in 
real-estate-
related assets 
75% of assets 
must be 
immovable 
properties; 
75% of net 
profit must be 
derived from 
real estate 
assets 
Distribution 
obligation 
80% of net 
profits 
90% of net 
income 
95% of tax-
exempt profit 
90% of net 
income 
50% of net 
profit 
85% of 
property 
income 
80% as a 
general rule 
No obligation 
90% of the 
rental profits 
Shareholders’ 
limitations 
No 
Direct 
participation 
<10% of share 
capital 
60% free float 
Shareholder 
participation 
< 10%; 15% 
free float 
No 
Shareholder 
participation 
<10% of the 
shares 
No 
Only for 
company 
founders 
Shareholder 
participation 
< 10% of 
shares 
Conversion 
into REIT 
status 
16.995% tax 
on capital 
gains 
“Entry 
Charge” of 
20% on 
unrealized 
gains on all 
assets 
19% on 
unrealized 
capital gains 
on real estate 
assets 
50% tax 
benefit on the 
eliminated 
hidden 
reserves 
Tax benefits 
provided by 
Law 
2166/1993 
No No No No 
Notes: The requirements of European REITs are summarized from the EPRA Global REIT Survey 2016 (EPRA, 2016). 
 
   
                                                  
 
E
x
h
ib
it 2
.1
: O
v
e
rv
ie
w
 o
f le
g
a
l ch
a
ra
cte
ristics o
f E
u
ro
p
e
a
n
 R
E
IT
s 
REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market Performance: a European Perspective 
13 
2.3 Studies about REOCs and REITs 
The underpricing issue became a subject of early academic research, for instance Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975) or Chalk and Peavy (1987) besides others, and has been widely investigated 
for common equities in the finance literature. In recent years, researchers have examined the 
underpricing from various points of view, including variability over time or cycles in the IPO 
market (Lowry et al., 2010; Colak and Wang, 2008) or different information levels across IPO 
participants (Engelen and van Essen, 2010; Brau and Fawcett, 2006). 
However, there is a growing number of studies focusing on the real estate sector concerning 
the initial return. Exhibit 2.2 provides an overview of recent research on underpricing within 
the real estate sector. Most of the studies refer to the North American and Asian-Pacific REIT 
market, empirical finding on the European REIT market remain scarce. 
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Exhibit 2.2: Overview of related literature in the real estate sector 
Study Country 
Sample 
size 
Avg. initial 
return (%) 
R²/ 
Adj. R² 
Time 
period 
Company 
type 
Chan et al. (2013) Global 370 3.24 -/- 1996-2010 REIT 
Brobert (2016) Global 445 3.94 -/0.06 1996-2014 REIT 
North America       
Wang et al. (1992) USA 87 -2.82 -/0.31 1971-1988 REIT 
Ling & Ryngaert 
(1997) 
USA 85 3.60 -/0.23 1991-1994 REIT 
Londerville (2002) Canada 13 1.71 -/- 1993-1998 REIT 
Hartzell et al. 
(2005) 
USA 49 0.27 -/0.48 1980-1998 REIT 
Dolvin & Pyles 
(2009) 
USA 209 3.72 -/0.29 1986-2004 REIT 
Bairagi & Dimovski 
(2011) 
USA 123 3.18 0.21/0.18 1996-2010 REIT 
Gokkaya et al. 
(2015) 
USA 126 5.23 0.37/0.18 1993-2005 REIT 
Asian-Pacific       
Chan et al. (2001) Hong Kong 56 16.21 -/0.02 1986-1997 REOC 
Dimovski & Brooks 
(2006) 
Australia 37 1.20 0.26/0.09 1994-1999 REIT 
Kutsuna et al. 
(2008) 
Japan 40 5.11 -/0.18 2001-2006 REIT 
Ahmad-Zaluki & 
Abidin (2011) 
Malaysia 144 26.24 0.45/0.41 2005-2007 
REOC & 
REIT 
Wong et al.(2013) 
Japan, Hong 
Kong, 
Singapore & 
Malaysia 
78 3.10 0.24/-  2001-2008 REIT 
Europe       
Brounen & 
Eichholtz (2001) 
Europe 83 3.43 -/- 1990-2000 REOC 
Brounen & 
Eichholtz (2002) 
UK, France & 
Sweden 
54 2.55 0.65/- 1984-1999 REOC 
Freybote et al. 
(2008) 
Europe 105 7.26 0.52/- 1994-2006 REOC 
Braemisch et al. 
(2011) 
Europe 120 6.00 -/0.12 1997-2007 REOC 
 
Chan et al. (2013) was the first study to examine REIT underpricing in a global sample, 
including 370 IPOs from 14 countries covering the four continents of Australia, North 
America, Europe and Asia during the period 1996-2010. Using a mean comparison test, they 
demonstrated, that newly-established REIT regimes all over the world exhibited similar low 
initial return patterns, as they had found in the early stages of the now well-established U.S. 
REIT market. Precisely, they found a raw initial return of 2.78% for the U.S. REIT market and 
3.48% for other international REITs. As an explanation of the similar underpricing level for 
new- and well-established REIT markets, Chan et al. (2013) argue in favor of the fund-like 
structure of REITs in general and the underlying asset (real estate) in particular. Following 
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Chan et al. (2013), Brobert (2016) also investigated the initial return of 445 REIT IPOs in 26 
countries during the period 1996-2014 and found a raw initial return of 3.94%. In contrast to 
Chan et al. (2013), Brobert (2016) analyzed variables proven to explain REIT IPO initial return 
in a multivariate regression analysis. He showed that in a global context, the issue size has a 
negative influence on the initial-day return, and that the impact of the debt level is dependent 
on the prevailing market conditions. 
One of the first studies about the IPO initial return in the U.S. REIT market was documented 
by Wang et al. (1992), who reported, in contrast to the general evidence, an overpricing of 
2.82% for 87 U.S. REIT IPOs during the period 1970-1988. This result was invariant to a 
number of influencing factors, such as the offer price, issue size, distribution method, offer 
period or underwriter reputation. Accordingly, Wang et al. (1992) explained the overpricing 
by means of the ignorance of non-institutional investors, who are predominantly the buyers 
of overpriced REITs. Reconsidering the U.S. REIT market, Ling and Ryngaert (1997) provide 
contrary evidence by finding an average underpricing of 3.60% for 85 U.S. REIT IPOs during 
1991-1994. As a proxy for uncertainty, they used the reputation of the underwriter, and 
show that the initial-day return drops as the underwriter has a better reputation. 
More recent studies on the U.S. REIT IPO market, such as Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) and 
Gokkaya et al. (2015), showed an underpricing level which is in line with previous studies. 
Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) examine 123 U.S. REIT IPOs during the period 1996-2010, which 
includes the GFC. They documented an average underpricing of 3.18% and a value-weighted 
underpricing of 4.67%, which indicates that the underpricing level is influenced by the factor 
of offer size. This study supports the finding of Ling and Ryngaert (1997) about the reputation 
of the underwriters, by using an OLS multivariate regression to determine factors influencing 
underpricing. For a similar time period, Gokkaya et al. (2015) investigated 126 REIT IPOs with 
a focus on primary (offer-to-open) and secondary market (open-to-close). With an average 
underpricing (offer-to-close return) of 5.23%, they argue that the lower secondary market 
returns for REIT IPOs, compared to non-REIT IPOs, may be caused by a higher relative 
transparency of REITs. All other studies refer either to North America, the Asian-Pacific or the 
European market, and primarily calculate the underpricing as an offer-to-close return, and do 
not distinguish between detailed calculation variations of IPO returns. 
Research on the IPO initial return in the Asian-Pacific market yields a homogeneous pattern of 
a positive initial return, but the spread of the return varies from an underpricing of 1.20% 
(Dimovski and Brooks, 2006) to an underpricing of 26.24% (Ahmad-Zaluki and Abidin, 2011). 
Dimovski and Brooks (2006) found this insignificant low underpricing for 37 Australian REIT 
IPOs during 1994-1999. They explained their result with the absence of valuation uncertainty 
in the Australian REIT market, which is caused by the high information transparency in the 
valuation process of the underlying real estate assets. Compared to other studies in the Asian-
Pacific market, Ahmad-Zaluki and Abidin (2011) found a very high underpricing of 26.24% in 
a sample of Malaysian REOC and REIT IPOs. The latest investigation in the Asian market was 
published by Wong et al. (2013), who investigated the relationship between the fraction of 
shares retained by the sponsor and the underpricing level, by applying a 2SLS estimation with 
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both of these as dependent variables. Their key finding was that both variables impact on 
each other, which supports e.g. their hypothesis that real estate developer tend to hold a 
huge part of the issued REIT shares in order to pay off investors for potential moral hazard 
problems in the aftermarket. 
In contrast to the abovementioned studies, which mostly examined the underpricing of the 
REIT market in various countries, the European studies focused mainly on the underpricing of 
REOCs. Compared to those REIT studies, the two recent studies of Freybote et al. (2008) and 
Braemisch et al. (2011) yielded higher underpricing at 7.26% and 6.00%, respectively. 
Freybote et al. (2008) investigated 105 IPOs of property companies during the period 1994-
2006, with a focus on different market phases during the IPO cycle. In almost the same 
sample period 1997-2007 Braemisch et al. (2011) tested signaling models and found that 
company-specific ex-ante uncertainty proxies impact on the underpricing level of 120 REOC 
IPOs in Europe, and that property-specific proxies did not help explain the underpricing 
phenomenon. 
The previous literature on IPOs in the real estate sector investigated either the initial return of 
REITs or REOCs. There is just one study on the Malaysian market, comparing the underpricing 
level of both business forms. However, as is shown in Table 2, there is a difference in the 
underpricing level of REITs and REOCs, specifically the average underpricing level of REITs is 
significantly lower. The focus of this study is on differences in the underpricing levels of REIT 
and REOC IPOs in Europe. Accordingly, the following methodology was developed to test 
several proxies for uncertainty, transparency and information asymmetry in the underpricing 
context of REIT and REOC IPOs. 
 
2.4 Methodology 
Theoretical approaches, such as Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986) or Welch (1989) tried 
to explain the reasons for, conditions and influencing factors of the underpricing 
phenomenon.2 Most explanations are based on the asymmetric information theory between 
the key participants of an IPO process (Ritter and Welch, 2002). However, the underpricing 
puzzle is not solved yet. 
Besides the information level of the participants, underpricing may be affected by the industry 
sector itself or the business model in which the IPOs take place. Industry sectors such as the 
financial sector and business models such as the REIT-status are strictly regulated and 
monitored. Therefore, they may be perceived as less risky, due to the stringent legal 
requirements, resulting in a lower initial return. Empirical evidence for that theory was given 
by Buttimer et al. (2005), who compared the underpricing level of non-REIT and REIT IPOs 
and found that the initial return of REITs was significantly lower. In addition to inter-sector 
comparisons, such as Buttimer et al. (2005), an intra-sector investigation might provide 
                                                 
2 Ljungqvist (2007) provides an overview of several theories, which tries to explain the reasons for, conditions and 
influencing factors of the underpricing phenomenon. 
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additional information on the differences in the initial return for the real estate sector itself. 
This information is important for potential investors. Precisely, an intra-sector investigation 
concerning the underpricing phenomenon provides a detailed analysis of the differences in 
REIT and REOC pricing. Especially the variances between the short-term initial return of the 
two business sectors can be decisive for specific real estate investors, when considering a 
listed property investment. 
In general, stricter legal requirements and controls imposed on specific sectors or business 
models imply more certainty for investors, due to a specified business and legal framework. 
This argument of the regulation hypothesis is consistent with the asymmetric information 
hypothesis. Beatty and Ritter (1986) showed that greater ex-ante uncertainty about the “true” 
value of the issuing company leads to increased underpricing. Therefore, if this legal certainty 
is positively linked to the REIT-status, the underpricing level might be lower for REITs. 
Uncertainty before an IPO can be caused by the key participants in the IPO process, but it can 
be dealt with a number of different ways. First, Beatty and Ritter (1986) assumed that the 
underpricing level is the result of information asymmetry between potential investors and the 
issuing firm and that this uncertainty can be reduced by voluntarily providing as much 
information as possible about the upcoming IPO. In contrast to REOCs, the catalogue of 
requirements for REIT-status provides potential investors with a framework of basic 
information about the general business model, for instance the distribution rate, shareholder 
restriction or activity tests. Furthermore, the basic model for REITs is similar in all countries, 
due to an ex-ante fixed distribution rate, tax advantages at the company level and the publicly 
available catalogue of requirements. For potential investors, the fixed distribution rate may 
imply a certain stability in future cash flows and hence a lower valuation uncertainty. In sum, 
as a legal business form, the REIT-status may have a transparency bonus, which affects the 
initial return negatively. This relative transparency of REITs in comparison to REOCs may raise 
confidence in the valuation process of a REIT IPO and result in a more precise company 
valuation and lower initial returns. In addition to the fixed distribution rate, the stable 
business form or rather portfolio may have an impact on the ex-ante uncertainty at the IPO. 
Most REITs must have a fixed proportion of their portfolio invested in real estate and a fixed 
proportion of the portfolio can be restructured during a given time frame. Thus, REIT investors 
set to legal and economic continuity and stability, affecting the initial return in a negative 
way. 
Additionally, potential investors require information on the real estate sector and its unique 
characteristics, the company’s market segment and properties of the portfolio. Assuming that 
REIT investors are highly informed, through spend sufficient time and money on the 
information gathering process, their estimated value for the issuing company might be close 
to the market value. Further, underpricing is used as risk compensation for IPO investors (Brau 
and Fawcett, 2006). Since REIT investors have a certain information advantage and therefore 
a smaller risk buffer in comparison to REOCs, IPO REIT underpricing might be accepted to be 
lower. 
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In this present study, we investigate intra-sector differences in the underpricing level of the 
real estate sector. As the abovementioned REITs are a special type of property entity within 
the real estate sector, which is assumed to be more transparent. Due to a lower ex-ante 
uncertainty, we expect the following relationship. 
H1: The REIT-status is negatively linked to the initial return at the IPO. 
 
Control variables influencing the underpricing level 
The main focus of this study is on an intra-sector comparison of underpricing in the real 
estate sector, with the hypothesis that REIT IPOs are less underpriced than REOC IPOs, due to 
the regulatory nature of the REIT business model. In order to test for the difference between 
the underpricing level of REITs and REOCs, we control for ex-ante uncertainty factors, and 
IPO-specific and company characteristics influencing the IPO initial return. 
Influencing factors derived directly from the ex-ante uncertainty theory are the offer size and 
the age of the issuing company. Larger IPOs are more likely to be managed professionally. 
Therefore, the IPO process entails more publicly accessible information, which is necessary to 
estimate the true value. Consequently, ex-ante uncertainty declines with increased size, which 
is approximated by the IPO gross proceeds (Beatty and Ritter, 1986). The second proxy 
directly linked to ex-ante uncertainty is the age of the company. The track record of a 
company is documented in their annual reports. Established firms can provide potential 
investors with a long operating history, which might simplify the information gathering 
process and consequently the search for true value. 
H2: The IPO size and age of the company are negatively related to the initial return. 
Additionally, we control for a characteristic concerning the offer price and the risk of 
aftermarket returns. The offer price itself is used to calculate the initial return as closing price 
less offer price divided by offer price. Therefore the characteristic that the offer price is in 
whole dollars or in fraction of dollars is controlled for. Harris (1991) argued that the 
negotiating partners, here the underwriters and issuing firm, wish to reduce the discussion 
time or negotiation costs, respectively, associated with the offer price and therefore, 
frequently agree on an overall price. Integer values might imply that the offer price is based 
on a possible price range rather than precisely calculated price after a holistic valuation. 
The aftermarket standard deviation of the returns for the first 20 days after the IPO is applied 
to measure the volatility, which is often used as a risk measure in the finance literature. As the 
underpricing can be interpreted as risk compensation for potential investors, the volatility of 
the return is a good proxy for the IPO risk. If the market participants agreed with the pre- and 
after-IPO pricing, the volatility is low and consequently, so too is the underpricing. 
Accordingly: 
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H3: An overall offer price and high volatility in the aftermarket returns are positively linked to 
the underpricing level. 
In general, another important factor influencing the underpricing are the overall stock market 
conditions (Brau and Fawcett, 2006). This present study controls for both general stock 
market conditions and the specific listed real estate market. As an extraordinary market 
phase, the GFC is part of the sample period, which is dominated by a high level of uncertainty 
and distrust between market participants. Market phases of greater uncertainty can impact 
on two groups of participants, the potential investors who demand higher risk compensation, 
and potential issuer who would rather “leave less money on the table”. Additionally, each IPO 
sector displays specific cycles, with hot and cold market phases measured by the number of 
IPOs each year. Buttimer et al. (2005) provides evidence that the underpricing level is 
negatively related to the supply of IPOs. Following Buttimer et al. (2005), hot market phases 
in the real estate sector are defined as those in which ten or more real estate IPOs take place 
per year. 
H4: In times of economic crisis, like the GFC, underpricing level increases and in hot market 
phases the underpricing level decreases. 
A unique characteristic for the real estate sector is the specific investment focus, which 
represents the properties in which the company is invested. In the context of IPO 
underpricing, the investment focus of a company impacts the valuation process. Thus, a 
company with several business segments might be more complex to evaluate (Freybote et al., 
2008). Estimating the value of a diversified real estate company requires advanced knowledge 
on different property types, such as office, retail, residential or hotels. This complexity 
constitutes a greater number of uncertainty factors in the valuation process, requiring a 
higher risk compensation for potential investors. Accordingly: 
H5: A diversified investment focus is positively linked to the underpricing level. 
 
2.5 Sample and Summary Statistics 
2.5.1 Sample design 
In order to obtain a unique dataset with numerous details about the IPOs of European 
property companies and REITs, the SNL list “completed offerings” is used. In addition, the 
data sources SNL Real Estate Research, Thomas Reuters Datastream, IPO prospectus, IPO lists 
of national stock exchanges3 and annual reports are used to complete the dataset4. 
First of all, we gather firm and IPO characteristics like the international securities identification 
number (ISIN), date of issue, initial offer price, number of issued shares, legal company form 
or REIT-status and the investment focus of each company. In the second step the closing price 
                                                 
3 Information about the issuing company is provided by the Vienna stock exchange, Frankfurt stock exchange, 
Euronext Fact Books, OMX Nordic Exchange and London stock exchange. 
4 As most of the needed information is not published in a systematic form or from one source (Rummer, 2006). 
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on the secondary market was collected. The last variable of interest was the foundation year 
of the issuing company. After these three steps, twelve companies of the SNL list “completed 
offerings” were excluded from the analysis, because of divergent information across various 
data sources or a lack of information.  
The criteria for inclusion in the sample can be summarized as follows: 
• REITs and REOCs from Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Spain, 
Turkey and United Kingdom are included. 
• It has to be the first initial public offering of a company. Therefore, spinoffs, 
secondary listings or changes in stock exchange segments are excluded. 
• All important information for the analysis has to be from independent sources and 
consistent across various data sources. 
The final sample consists of 107 property companies and REITs of 9 European countries over 
the period 2000-2015. REITs make up 29% of the sample. Precisely, one REIT each from 
Germany, Finland and Greece, two REITs each from Belgium and Ireland, three from Spain, 
four from Turkey and five from France, as well as twelve from the UK, are incorporated into 
the sample. 
 
2.5.2 Summary statistics of subsample REITs and REOCs 
Exhibit 2.3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the sample, divided into the 
subsamples REITs and REOCs, except for the initial return, which is also represented over the 
whole sample. 
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Exhibit 2.3: Descriptive Statistics 
  REITs REOCs 
Initial return whole sample (in %) 
Min -6.09 
Max 29.94 
Mean 4.63*** (0.00) 
Std. dev. 6.87 
Initial return subsamples (in %) 
 
Obs. 31 76 
Min -5.00 6.09 
Max 11.73 29.94 
Mean 2.03*** (0.00) 5.69*** (0.00) 
Std. dev. 4.00 7.51 
Gross proceeds (in million €) 
 
Min 1.258 0.60 
Max 1,291.52 1,165.20 
Mean 209.20 207.16 
Std. dev. 250.35 213.25 
Volatility (in %) 
 
Min 0.24 0.00 
Max 6.74 8.26 
Mean 1.54 1.69 
Std. dev. 1.31 1.59 
Age at IPO 
 
Min 0.00 0.00 
Max 54.00 87.00 
Mean 6.77 7.33 
Std. dev. 11.74 13.60 
Hot 
 
Min 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.00 1.00 
Mean 0.71 0.80 
Std. dev. 0.46 0.40 
Integer 
 
Min 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.00 1.00 
Mean 0.27 0.29 
Std. dev. 0.45 0.46 
Diversified 
 
Min 0.00 0.00 
Max 1.00 1.00 
Mean 0.48 0.63 
Std. dev. 0.51 0.49 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The p-value is reported between 
brackets. 
 
The average initial return on the first day of trading shows a significant underpricing of 
4.63%. The underpricing level of this mixed sample is higher than the initial return of the pure 
REIT study of Bairagi and Dimovski (2011), and lower than Braemisch et al. (2011), who only 
investigated listed property companies. The initial return varies from an overpricing of 6.09% 
to an underpricing of 29.94%. This present sample includes REOC and REIT IPOs. Looking at 
the subsamples a clear conclusion can be drawn. It is obvious that the average initial return of 
REITs (2.02%) is less than half of the initial return of REOCs (5.69%) and both are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The underpricing level of the REOC subsample is in line with the 
result of Braemisch et al. (2011). Buttimer et al. (2005) reported similar findings and explained 
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the lower underpricing level of REITs by their transparency compared to other stocks. The 
transparency may originate from the fact that REITs have an obligation to fulfill the legal 
requirements, in order to retain their tax-exempt status and thus potential investors achieve a 
higher information level. The subsample result of the initial return supports H1 in general, that 
the REIT underpricing is lower. 
European property companies raised on average EUR 207 million through their IPOs and REITs 
raised on average slightly more at EUR 209 million. This finding may support H1 & H2, that 
REIT-IPOs combined with higher gross proceeds yield a lower underpricing level. However, the 
spread of the gross proceeds of REOCs from EUR 0.60 million to EUR 1,165.20 million is much 
higher than the gross proceeds by REIT IPOs. Additionally, the volatility in the aftermarket 
returns is 0.15 percentage points lower for REITs than for REOCs. In contrast to the results of 
the gross proceeds and the volatility, REOCs are 0.56 years on average older than REITs when 
they realize the IPO. This result indicates that the initial return of REOC IPOs is lower 
compared to REIT IPOs, as we hypothesize that older companies with a longer track record 
are less underpriced (H2). 
The data suggest that 71% of the REITs and 80% of the REOCs realized the IPO during a 
“hot” market phase, which is defined as a year with more than ten real estate IPOs. An IPO 
during a “hot” market phase indicates a lower initial return. The fact that during “hot” market 
phases, it is more likely that a REOC IPO will take place compared to a REIT IPO, the initial 
return of REOC IPOs may decline. Contrary to this finding, the result of overall IPO offer prices 
indicates that REOC IPOs have a slightly higher probability of higher underpricing compared to 
REIT IPOs. 29% of the REOC IPOs have a fixed offer price in whole dollars. 
About 63% of the REOCs have a diversified business model, in contrast to only 48% of the 
REITs, implying that REITs have mostly a specialized investment focus. One reason for a 
majority of diversified REOCs could be that the business segments of the company can 
balance each other out in times of crisis. Thus, it can be assumed that diversified companies 
are more resistant to a crisis and therefore less risky for investors. However, uncertainty in the 
valuation process before an IPO may be higher for diversified companies, due to the greater 
complexity of their business model. Therefore, the IPO investors have a preference for higher 
underpricing to cover the higher uncertainty level. This finding might support H5 and H1, that 
REITs with a specialized investment focus are less underpriced. 
In order to investigate the difference between REITs-regimes in various European countries, 
Exhibit 2.4 presents the number of REITs and REOCs, the average returns of the first trading 
day and the standard deviation. 
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Exhibit 2.4: Initial return of subsample REITs and REOCs 
  REITs REOCs 
Belgium 
 
Obs. 
 
2 
 
2 
Mean 4.44 (0.29) 3.17 (0.50) 
Std. dev. 3.03 4.55 
Finland 
 
Obs. 1 - 
Mean 0.00 (-) - 
Std. dev. - - 
France 
 
Obs. 5 5 
Mean 1.89 (0.33) 4.32 (0.41) 
Std. dev. 3.80 10.46 
Germany 
 
Obs. 1 16 
Mean 0.00 (-) 3.93* (0.05) 
Std. dev. - 7.38 
Greece 
 
Obs. 1 2 
Mean 0.00 (-) 5.65 (0.50) 
Std. dev. - 8.00 
Ireland 
 
Obs. 2 3 
Mean 5.35 (0.16) 11.65 (0.34) 
Std. dev. 1.91 16.04 
Spain 
 
Obs. 3 4 
Mean -1.00 (6.35) 1.01 (0.70) 
Std. dev. 3.12 4.72 
Turkey 
 
Obs. 4 - 
Mean 0.53 (0.90) - 
Std. dev. 7.58 - 
UK 
 
Obs. 12 44 
Mean 2.90** (0.01) 6.62*** (0.00) 
Std. dev. 3.38 6.84 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The p-value is reported between 
brackets. 
 
It is obvious that in most European countries the average initial return of REITs is lower than 
the initial return of REOCs. On country level perspective the only exception can be found in 
the Belgium subsample. In this case, the underpricing of the REITs exceeds the underpricing of 
the REOCs. This situation may have been caused by the introduction of a new REIT-form in 
Belgium in 2014. 
Investigating the number of REITs in each country, it is striking, that the highest number of 
REIT-IPO are in countries where the conversion to REIT status is not restricted or not high-
priced with tax payments, e.g. UK, France, Turkey or Spain. A better performing REIT-market, 
reflected in a low underpricing, is characterized by an increased number of market 
participants (e.g. REIT markets in France, Turkey or the UK). Another factor leading to a higher 
underpricing can be the maturity of the REIT regime. As the Irish REIT regime is the youngest 
in Europe and has the highest underpricing of 5.35% in the REIT subsample. Additionally, the 
second highest REIT underpricing of 4.44% was found in Belgium, which can also be 
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attributed to the introduction of a new REIT-regime named Société immobilière réglementée 
(SIR) in 2014. The REIT-regime SIR differs from the old Société d’investissement en immobilier 
à capital fixe (SICAFI) in the business model, to the extent that it allows a SIR company to 
invest in properties, develop and manage them (EPRA, 2016). Counter-intuitively, the Spanish 
REITs have an overpricing of 1.00%, which cannot be tracked back to any specific legal or 
business characteristic of Spanish REITs. 
The initial return on the first trading day is a short-term valuation, which is not predominantly 
influenced by market movements on this one day. However, the market phase in which the 
IPO takes place, as well as the overall market environment (e.g. interest level, yields of fixed 
income investments) may have an impact on the underpricing. Therefore, a consideration of 
the initial return in different time frames can increase the explanatory power of the 
underpricing phenomenon in the real estate sector. 
 
2.5.3 Initial return over different timeframes 
The sample period covers fifteen years, which includes the GFC as a significant market 
movement. Exhibit 2.5 provides an overview of the number of IPOs per year and the time 
sequence of initial returns during the sample time frame. 
 
Exhibit 2.5: Initial return and number of IPOs 
 
Most IPOs in the European real estate sector took place from 2005-2007. Clearly, 2006 is the 
year with the highest number of IPOs in the sample, and after 2007, the number of IPOs 
declines dramatically. The reason for this decrease is probably the GFC, which was caused 
primarily by the bursting of real estate bubble in the U.S. Interestingly, the underpricing level 
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and number of IPOs reveal a development in opposing directions. In 2008 and 2009, the 
highest average underpricing level is observed in the sample, simultaneously with the lowest 
number of IPOs. Investors may have claimed a high initial return, because of an increased risk-
level due to both the GFC and distrust between capital market participants during these two 
years. In order not to “leave a lot of money on the table” fewer issuers conducted an IPO in 
the crisis years and the few who offered shares accepted a high underpricing. 
During the GFC, 13% of the REIT-IPOs during the whole sample period took place, whereas 
only 4% of the REOC-IPOs. The reason for the higher percentage of REIT-IPOs during the crisis 
period (2008-2010) may be that in 2007, the REIT-regime was introduced in Germany and 
UK, which represents large European capital markets. 
For a detailed investigation of initial returns in different timeframes, Exhibit 2.6 shows the 
sample period divided into the four sub-periods, labelled as before the GFC (2000-2004), 
beginning of the GFC (2005-2007), during the GFC (2008-2010) and after the GFC (2011-
2015). The crisis period is defined in accordance with the following events: the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008, nationalization of Hypo Real Estate in October 2009 
and the active financial support of European banks until mid 2010. The average initial returns 
are positive over all sub-periods and show mostly statistical significance at the 10% or 1% 
level, with the exception of the time period 2000-2004. In chronological order, underpricing 
continuously increased until the GFC between 2008 and 2010. Over 2000 to 2004, real estate 
IPOs were priced by an underpricing of 4.15% and in the second sub-period, the initial return 
rose a little bit to 4.94%. Accordingly, considering the crisis, higher uncertainty can explain an 
underpricing of 7.89% in the third sub-period. This result implies, as hypothesized in H4, that 
the GFC had a significant impact on the underpricing of European REITs and REOCs. 
Exhibit 2.6: Initial return in different timeframes 
Time periods No. Min (%) Max (%) Median (%) Mean (%) 
2000-2004 6 -1.40 18.34 0.34 (0.37) 4.15 (0.24) 
2005-2007 70 -6.09 29.94 3.08*** (0.00) 4.94*** (0.00) 
2008-2010 7 -1.99 27.90 2.94* (0.08) 7.89* (0.09) 
2011-2015 24 -5.00 11.46 2.70*** (0.00) 2.87*** (0.00) 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The p-value is reported between 
brackets. 
 
In summary, an underpricing is shown for the whole sample, both business forms, in different 
European countries and various timeframes. However, the level of the underpricing in the 
European real estate sector is quite moderate. 
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2.6 Method and Results 
2.6.1 Method 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, a multiple linear regression model using 
ordinary least square (OLS) is conducted. The models are as follows: 
 
 =	 + 	
 + 

 + 
(1 + ) + 
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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 + ! + " 
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
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  + 	  + 		 + 	 + " 
 
The natural logarithm is used, in order to minimize the influence of outliers and reduce 
asymmetry (Chatterjee and Price, 1995). ε' is the error term, and we assumed ~ N(0,σ). 
The dependent variable initial return (IR) is calculated as the percentage change between the 
closing price on the first trading day and the offer price. (Beatty and Ritter, 1986, Freybote et 
al., 2008, Gokkaya et al. 2015) Additionally, the abnormal return, measured as the difference 
between initial return and the market return of the corresponding FTSE EPRA/NAREIT index 
for the IPO date, is considered. As the market return, the country-specific FTSE EPRA/NAREIT 
index series are used.5 These index series are available for most European countries, and if 
there were no country-specific index series available, the FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Europe Index was 
applied. 
Equation (1) is the base model. In equation (2), the variable DIVERSIFIED is replaced by those 
controlling for the specific investment focus in the sample. Equation (3) is an extension of 
equation (2) with REIT-interaction variables. The primary variable of interest is REIT. This binary 
variable equals 1, if the property company has REIT-status. In all three model specifications, 
various firm and IPO variables are included to control for their influence on the underpricing 
IR. With regard to the IPO characteristics of a company, LNPROCEEDS represents the issuing 
volume, which is measured by multiplying the offer price by the number of issuing shares. As 
a risk measure, the variable VOLATILITY is included, measured as the standard deviation of 
the aftermarket return for the period of 20 days after IPO. LN(AGE+1) represents the age of a 
company, measured by the year of going public minus the foundation year plus 1. In order to 
control for the different property sectors in equation (1), the binary variable DIVERSIFIED is 
                                                 
5 For the classification to the corresponding country-specific FTSE EPRA/NAREIT index series, the IPO-listing at the 
stock exchange is decisive. The following FTSE EPRA/NAREIT index series were available on a daily basis: FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Belgium/Luxembourg Index, FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Finland Index, FTSE EPRA/NAREIT France Index, FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Germany Index, FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Greece Index, FTSE EPRA/NAREIT Ireland Index, FTSE 
EPRA/NAREIT Spain Index. 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
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included. This binary variable equals 1, if the company has a diversified investment focus. For 
an in-depth analysis of real estate companies in equation (2) and equation (3), specific 
investment focuses are controlled for, such as RESIDENTIAL, OFFICE, INDUSTRIAL, RETAIL, 
OTHERS. The variable HOT is equal to 1, if the IPO takes place in a year with more than 10 
IPOs. The years 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2014 are defined as hot market phases. A proxy for 
the offer price is the variable INTEGER being equal to 1, if the offer price is in whole numbers. 
The variables REIT*LNPRO, REIT*VOLA and REIT*HOT represent the interaction variables in 
equation (3). 
 
2.6.2 Regression model of initial return on the first day of trading 
In addition to these descriptive results, a multiple linear regression is used to verify the 
isolated impact of control variables and the REIT-status on the initial return. Thus, the 
regression controls for IPO-specific variables, company characteristics and the market phase in 
which the IPO take place. In Exhibit 2.7, four alternative regression specifications are 
reported, in order to explain the expected initial return. Additionally, the regression results 
with REIT-interaction variable are reported in Exhibit 2.8. As dependent variable, the absolute 
initial return is used for the results in Exhibit 2.7 and Exhibit 2.8, but we find the same results 
with the market-adjusted initial return as dependent variable. 
All models in Exhibit 2.7 and Exhibit 2.8 are tested for multicollinearity and for 
heteroscedastic residuals. The results for the multicollinearity tests are shown in the 
correlation matrix (see Exhibit 2.9) with the p-value and also with the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) in Exhibit 2.7 and Exhibit 2.8. The correlation varies between -0.52 and 1.00. According 
to Kennedy (2003) the rule of thumb for multicollinearity is 0.80, so that a correlation 
coefficient above 0.80 is interpreted as indicating a multicollinearity problem in the 
regression. The widely used threshold value for the multicollinearity problem is a VIF ≥ 10, 
suggested by Chatterjee and Price (1995). For testing the heteroscedasticity, the White test 
was applied and the results are reported in Exhibit 2.7 and Exhibit 2.8. All tests show that the 
results are unbiased by specification failure. In order to test for misspecification in the models, 
the Ramsey’s Regression Specification Errors Test (RESET) is conducted for all models in Exhibit 
2.7 and Exhibit 2.8. The results for the RESET show that there is no misspecification in any 
model. 
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Exhibit 2.7: Multiple regression analysis on the first day initial return 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
INTERCEPT 0.2257*** (3.28) 0.2571*** (3.59) 0.2224*** (3.24) 0.2124*** (3.22) 
LNPROCEEDS -0.0093** (-2.58) -0.0100*** (-2.74) -0.0093** (-2.58) -0.0086** (-2.46) 
VOLATILITY 0.7401** (2.10) 0.7465** (2.13) 0.7697** (2.16) 0.8265*** (2.42) 
LN(AGE+1) -0.0111*** (-2.75) -0.0128*** (-3.10) -0.0102** (-2.54) -0.0114*** (-2.87) 
REIT -0.0302*** (-2.68) -0.0272** (-2.41) -0.0274** (-2.30) -0.0312*** (-2.82) 
INTEGER -0.0039 (-0.34) -0.0012 (-0.10) 0.0007 (0.06)  
DIVERSIFIED 0.0122 (1.11)  0.0106 (0.98)  
RESIDENTIAL  -0.0231 (-1.56)   
OFFICE  -0.0163 (-0.68)   
INDUSTRIAL  0.0299 (1.32)   
RETAIL  -0.0302 (-1.54)   
OTHERS  -0.0023 (-0.11)   
HOT -0.0074 (-0.60) -0.0144 (-1.13)   
YEAR2005   0.0228 (1.24)  
YEAR2006   -0.0135 (-0.96)  
YEAR2007   -0.0135 (-0.85)  
YEAR2014   -0.0075 (-0.41)  
N 106 106 106 106 
R2 0.22 0.27 0.26 0.21 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.18 
AIC -3.02 -3.00 -3.01 -3.06 
Max. VIF 1.16 1.22 1.83 1.07 
White test 1.25 (0.21) 1.52 (0.07) 1.86 (0.06) 1.12 (0.35) 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistic is reported in brackets 
for each coefficient. The p-value is reported between brackets for the White test. By means of the White test, the 
following null hypothesis is assumed: H0: Var ("│x) = ) (homoscedasticity). 
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The first regression Model 1 includes all variables of equation (1), of which the coefficients of 
LNPROCEEDS, VOLATILITY, LN(AGE+1) and REIT are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% 
levels. These variables remain statistically significant in Models 2, 3 and 4 as well. Thus, the 
results are stable after controlling for specific property types in Model 2, considering the hot 
market phase in detail in Model 3, and applying a stepwise regression to verify the best model 
(Model 4). 
The hypothesis that bigger IPOs are less underpriced (H2), is supported by a negative and 
significant coefficient of LNPROCEEDS at the 5% or 10% level over Models 1-3. An increasing 
offer size leads to a decreasing initial return. This result implies that IPOs with a higher volume 
are associated with more recoverable assets and more efficient management (Braemisch et 
al., 2011), which both signify a higher professionality level. The hypothesis that older 
companies are less underpriced (H2) can be verified by a statistically significant negative 
coefficient of LN(AGE+1). Hence, older listed property companies have a longer track-record, 
which reduces the ex-ante valuation uncertainty through increased information materials. In 
sum, more information about the IPO, either due to a longer track record or high 
professionality, help potential investors to a make a better pre-IPO valuation. 
The result of the positive significant coefficient VOLATILITY supports the third hypothesis that 
a higher standard deviation of the aftermarket return is associated with a higher valuation 
uncertainty in the pre-IPO phase. Based on the general risk return relationship, this positive 
sign of VOLATILTY was expected. Hence, potential investors claim more risk compensation in 
the form of underpricing, in case of a high volatility in the aftermarket returns. 
The coefficient of DIVERSIFIED is positively related to the initial return, but not significant at 
an appropriate level. In Model 2, the different property types, except for the coefficient 
INDUSTRIAL, have a negative impact on the underpricing, but they are as well not statistically 
significant. Accordingly, H5 and the results of various statistically significant risk levels across 
different property types noted by Ling and Ryngart (1997) cannot be supported. 
A more detailed analysis of the hot market phases is given by including in Model 3, the 
variables YEAR2005, YEAR2006, YEAR2007 and YEAR2014, instead of HOT. However, no 
coefficients reach a significance level. Thus, H4 that hot market phases decrease the 
underpricing level, cannot be confirmed. 
The binary variable REIT provides evidence that the REIT-status itself is associated with a 
transparency bonus and leads to decreased IPO-underpricing of REITs. The coefficient REIT 
shows a negative sign and is highly statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. This result 
supports H1 and it is in line with the findings of Dolvin and Pyles (2009) and Ahmad-Zaluki 
and Abidin (2011). 
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Exhibit 2.8: Multiple regression analysis on the first day initial return with interaction 
variables 
 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
INTERCEPT 0.2496*** (3.49) 0.2429*** (3.45) 0.2474*** (3.42) 
LNPROCEEDS -0.0096*** (-2.63) -0.0096*** (-2.67) -0.0101** (-2.72) 
VOLATILITY 0.7511** (2.14) 1.0618*** (2.97) 0.7814** (2.20) 
LN(AGE+1) -0.0128*** (-3.13) -0.0122*** (-3.02) -0.0127*** (-3.04) 
RESIDENTIAL -0.0237 (-1.60) -0.0266* (-1.84) -0.0232 (-1.54) 
OFFICE -0.0157 (-0.65) -0.0194 (-0.82) -0.0147 (-0.60) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.0297 (1.31) 0.0308 (1.39) 0.0303 (1.32) 
RETAIL -0.0300 (-1.52) -0.0315 (-1.63) -0.0337* (-1.70) 
OTHERS -0.0022 (-0.10) -0.0036 (-0.17) -0.0034 (-0.16) 
INTEGER -0.0009 (-0.08) -0.0032 (-0.28) -0.0000 (-0.00) 
HOT -0.0145 (-1.14) -0.0129 (-1.03) -0.0053 (-0.40) 
REIT*LNPRO -0.0015** (-2.43)   
REIT*VOLA  -1.6132*** (-3.02)  
REIT*HOT   -0.0254** (-1.90) 
N 106 106 106 
R2 0.27 0.29 0.25 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.21 0.16 
AIC -3.00 -3.03 -2.98 
Max. VIF 1.22 1.20 1.24 
White test 1.52 (0.07) 1.47 (0.09) 1.55 (0.06) 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistic is reported in brackets 
for each coefficient. The p-value is reported between brackets for the White test. By means of the White test, the 
following null hypothesis is assumed: H0: Var ("│x) = ) (homoscedasticity). 
 
More insight into the IPO-pricing differences of REITs and REOCS are provided by the 
interaction variables in Models 5-7. All interaction variables, REIT*LNPRO, REIT*VOLA and 
REIT*HOT, show a negative impact on the initial return. The highest negative impact is 
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demonstrated by the coefficient of REIT*VOLA. Thus, for REITs, an increased standard 
deviation in the aftermarket decreases the IPO-underpricing. This result provides evidence that 
the negative impact of the REIT-status on the underpricing is more influential than increased 
aftermarket volatility. The transparency factor of the REIT-status outweighs the risk associated 
with the aftermarket returns. The interaction between REIT-status and the LNPROCEEDS show 
that, an increased offer size decreases the underpricing of REITs more negatively than the 
underpricing of REOCs. The size is a quite important factor for an REIT issuing company to 
leave less money on the table. Thus, REIT IPOs are more efficient for the issuer perspective, if 
a certain offer size is reached. Interestingly, the interaction between the market phase HOT 
and the REIT-status, yields a negatively significant sign at the 5% level. A REIT IPO which is 
scheduled in a year, in which 10 real estate IPOs or more take place, will mean that the REIT 
leaves less money on the table compared to REOC IPOs. Consequently, especially in a 
“booming” IPO-phase, it is profitable to get listed as a REIT. The underpricing level of REITs is 
sensitive to IPO supply per year.6 
  
                                                 
6 Country and period dummies and other interaction variables (REIT*AGE, REIT*DIVERSIFIED, REIT*YEAR2005, 
REIT*YEAR2006, REIT*YEAR2007, REIT*YEAR2014) have been tested, but we did not obtain any significant results. 
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Correlation 
Probability 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. IR1 1.00                
2. LN 
PROCEEDS 
-0.23 
(0.02) 1.00               
3. VOLATILITY 
0.20 
(0.04) 
-0.11 
(0.27) 1.00              
4. LN(1+AGE) 
-0.21 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.88) 
0.22 
(0.02) 1.00             
5. DIVERSIFIED 
0.14 
(0.16) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.62) 1.00            
6. RESIDENTIAL 
-0.14 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.19) 
-0.15 
(0.13) 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
-0.52 
(0.00) 1.00           
7. OFFICE 
-0.08 
(0.39) 
0.02 
(0.84) 
-0.02 
(0.85) 
0.06 
(0.51) 
-0.26 
(0.01) 
-0.10 
(0.32) 1.00          
8. INDUSTRIAL 
0.11 
(0.27) 
0.04 
(0.67) 
-0.05 
(0.64) 
0.10 
(0.32) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.11 
(0.27) 
-0.05 
(0.58) 1.00         
9. RETAIL 
-0.10 
(0.33) 
-0.01 
(0.94) 
-0.04 
(0.72) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.36 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.07 
(0.49) 
-0.07 
(0.45) 1.00        
10. OTHERS 
0.01 
(0.96) 
-0.13 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.89) 
0.16 
(0.11) 
-0.32 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.24) 
-0.06 
(0.55) 
-0.07 
(0.51) 
-0.08 
(0.41) 1.00       
11. INTEGER 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
0.13 
(0.20) 
-0.02 
(0.80) 
-0.02 
(0.84) 
0.19 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
-0.04 
(0.68) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.40) 1.00      
12. HOT 
0.01 
(0.91) 
-0.08 
(0.39) 
-0.02 
(0.81) 
-0.02 
(0.81) 
0.18 
(0.06) 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.24 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.70) 
0.04 
(0.69) 1.00     
13. REIT 
-0.26 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.83) 
-0.06 
(0.57) 
-0.01 
(0.96) 
-0.15 
(0.12) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
0.06 
(0.56) 
-0.06 
(0.52) 
0.11 
(0.27) 
0.00 
(0.99) 
-0.02 
(0.82) 
-0.11 
(0.26) 1.00    
14. REIT*LNPRO 
-0.27 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.76) 
-0.05 
(0.58) 
-0.01 
(0.90) 
-0.14 
(0.16) 
0.10 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.49) 
-0.07 
(0.50) 
0.11 
(0.24) 
-0.00 
(0.97) 
-0.01 
(0.94) 
-0.12 
(0.23) 
1.00 
(0.00) 1.00   
15. REIT*VOLA 
-0.22 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.92) 
0.28 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.26) 
-0.00 
(0.97) 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.89) 
-0.01 
(0.88) 
0.06 
(0.53) 
-0.01 
(0.96) 
-0.08 
(0.43) 
-0.04 
(0.68) 
0.71 
(0.00) 
0.70 
(0.00) 1.00  
16. REIT*HOT 
-0.20 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.57) 
-0.02 
(0.85) 
0.02 
(0.85) 
-0.06 
(0.53) 
0.11 
(0.28) 
0.11 
(0.25) 
-0.02 
(0.84) 
-0.07 
(0.50) 
-0.04 
(0.71) 
0.06 
(0.57) 
0.27 
(0.01) 
0.79 
(0.00) 
0.78 
(0.00) 
0.60 
(0.00) 1.00 
Notes: The p-value is reported between brackets. 
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2.6.3 Robustness of results 
In order to confirm the impact study, that the initial return is negatively influenced by the REIT 
status of a listed property company, a robustness check in the form of propensity score 
matching is conducted. This matching is used to estimate the causal link between the legal 
form REIT and the underpricing level. By comparing groups named REITs and REOCs, which 
only differ in their legal form and are similar in the other characteristics, like gross proceeds or 
offer price, the treatment effect of the REIT status on the initial return can be measured.  
For the estimation of the propensity score, a probit regression is applied with the REIT variable 
as dependent. The probit regression is favored over the logit regression due to the standard 
normal distribution assumption in probit models (Wooldrige, 2010). In order to avoid 
selection bias and to comply with the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA), all control 
variables from Model 2 are included in the probit regression (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
In the next step, the matching algorithm called radius matching is chosen, which is 
somewhere between the one-to-one matching, named nearest neighbour matching (NN), and 
the mean difference method, named kernel matching. The matching partner from the 
comparison group is chosen if the propensity score is within the caliper or radius (Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002). Comparing the NN, where the distance of the propensity scores is the decision 
criterion for the matching partner, radius matching has the big advantage of avoiding bad 
matches on the one hand and simultaneously raising the matching quality by adjusting the 
radius on the common support region, on the other hand (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). 
The region of common support of the REITs and REOCs ranges from 0.1602 to 0.4877 and 
covers 105 property companies of the sample size. Two observations are discarded from the 
analysis, because the density distribution is the highest in this abovementioned interval. In 
accordance with Long (1997), a sample above 100 observations is adequate for estimating 
the propensity scores by applying a probit regression. As our sample consists of 105 
observations, which are used in the probit regression, we fulfill this condition and ultimately 
the results are resilient. Accordingly, the overlap of both groups is sufficient, the test of 
balancing property is satisfied and the radius for the matching is set at 0.02.  
For the estimation of the treatment effect, the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) 
is applied. ATT is widely used evaluation parameter for measuring the value of difference 
between control and comparison groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Exhibit 2.10 provides 
the results of the ATT. 
Exhibit 2.10: ATT estimation with radius matching method 
No. treatment No. control ATT Std. Error t-statistic 
31 74 -0.028*** 0.010 -2.766 
Notes: Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. 
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The ATT is -0.028 and significant at the 1% level. Thus, the underpricing is lower for REIT IPOs 
compared to REOC IPOs. Consequently, this legal form in the real estate sector constitutes a 
causal treatment effect on the IPO initial return or in other words, the difference in the 
underpricing level of REITs and REOCs is caused by the legal form. Additionally, these results 
support the hypothesis that the legal business form REIT implies a transparency bonus which 
negatively affects the IPO returns (H1).  
In summary, the result of the propensity score matching analysis confirms the regression 
results, that REIT IPOs are less underpriced. 
 
2.7 Conclusion and Outlook 
This study investigated the IPO performance of REIT and REOCs in a comparative framework. 
The focus was especially on the influential pricing factors surrounding the REIT-status and the 
GFC as an extraordinary market phase.  
107 European REITs and REOCs generated an average statistically significant underpricing of 
4.63%. The gross proceeds, the volatility of aftermarket returns and the company age at the 
IPO date represent important determinants of the amount of money, which European 
property companies “left on the table”. Additionally, we provide evidence that REIT IPOs are 
less underpriced compared to REOC IPOs. The subsample REITs yield an underpricing of 
2.02%, whereas REOCs are underpriced by 5.69%. The reason for the lower underpricing of 
REITs can be attributed to their unique business form with more legal requirements, or as 
Chan et al. (2013) pointed out, REITs display a similar structure to funds combined with 
owning re-usable properties. To be specific the legal requirements, such as ex-ante fixed 
distribution rate or fixed real estate portion of the whole portfolio, contribute to reducing ex-
ante uncertainty factors and to increasing the transparency in the valuation process of REITs. 
Most influencing factors for a lower REIT underpricing, besides the REIT-status itself, are 
interaction variables with the volatility, offer size and market phase in which the IPO takes 
place. Additionally, the different regulations of the European REIT regimes also influence the 
REIT underpricing level in each investigated country. Furthermore, during the GFC (2008-
2010), the highest underpricing of 7.89% is observed, which exceeds the initial return for the 
total sample by approximately 70%, which indicates that GFC was a market phase with a 
higher uncertainty level. The causal treatment effect of the legal form (REIT) of the company 
and the underpricing is confirmed by propensity score matching as a robustness check. In 
sum, the hypothesis that the REIT-status implies a transparency bonus which negatively 
affects the IPO underpricing can be support. 
These results on REIT and REOC IPOs should be of particular interest for potential investors, 
issuing property companies and IPO managers. As the listed European real estate market is a 
growing one, potential investors gain the opportunity to earn more money on the first day of 
trading by focusing on REOC IPOs. Moreover, it is more favorable for property companies to 
go public as a REIT and “leave less money on the table”. IPO managers should balance the 
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pros and cons of going public as a REIT with regard to the transparency bonus, which impacts 
on the uncertainty factors of pricing. 
Undoubtedly, the underpricing phenomenon has not yet been investigated exhaustively. 
Therefore, future research should concentrate on examining further uncertainty factors, such 
as market sentiment, or the secondary offering of listed property companies in order to 
increase the explanatory power of underpricing. Despite these opportunities for extension, 
this present study provides a better understanding of the IPO pricing of European REITs and 
REOCs. 
  
REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market Performance: a European Perspective 
36 
2.8 References 
Ahmad-Zaluki, N. and Abidin, S. (2011), "IPO pricing in Malaysia: an analysis of REITs and 
Non-REITs", International Journal of Economics and Management, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 319-
332. 
Bairagi, R. and Dimovski, W. (2011), "The underpricing of US REIT IPOs: 1996-2010", 
Journal of Property Research, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 233-248. 
Beatty, R. and Ritter, J. (1986), "Investment banking, reputation, and the underpricing of 
initial public offerings", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15 No. 1-2, pp. 213-232. 
Braemisch, F., Rottke, N. and Schiereck, D. (2011), "IPO underpricing, signaling, and 
property returns", Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Vol. 25 No. 1, pp. 27-
51. 
Brau, J. and Fawcett, S. (2006), "Initial public offerings: an analysis of theory and practice", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 61 No. 1, pp. 399-436. 
Brobert, G. (2016), "The global REIT market: initial-day performance of IPOs", Journal of 
European Real Estate Research, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 231-249. 
Brounen, D. and Eichholtz, P. (2002), "Initial public offerings: evidence from the British, 
French and Swedish property share markets", Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, Vol. 24 No. 1/2, pp. 103-117. 
Brounen, D. and Eichholtz, P. (2001), "Going public on the European property share 
market", Real Estate Finance, Vol. 18 No. 3, pp. 55-60. 
Buttimer, R., Hyland, D. and Sanders, A. (2005), "REITs, IPO waves and long-run 
performance", Real Estate Economics, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 51-87. 
Caliendo, M., Kopeinig, S. (2008), "Some practical guidance for the implementation of 
propensity score matching", Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 22 No. 1, pp. 31-72. 
Chalk, A. and Peavy, J. (1987), "Initial public offerings: daily returns, offering types and the 
pricing effect", Financial Analysts Journal, Vol. 43 No. 5, pp. 65-69. 
Chan, S., Chen, J. and Wang, K. (2013), "Are REIT IPOs unique? The global evidence", 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 47 No. 4, pp. 719-759. 
Chan, S., Stohs, M. and Wang, K. (2001), "Are real estate IPOs different species? Evidence 
from Hong Kong IPOs", Journal of Real Estate Research, Vol. 21 No. 3, pp. 201-220. 
Chatterjee, S. and Price, B. (1995), Praxis der Regressionsanalys, 2nd edition, Oldenburg 
Verlag, München. 
Colak, G. and Wang, W. (2008), "Cycles in the IPO market", Journal of Financial 
Economics, Vol. 89 No. 1, pp. 192-208. 
REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market Performance: a European Perspective 
37 
Dehejia, R.H. and Wahba, S. (2002), "Propensity score-matching methods for 
nonexperimental causal studies", Review of Economics and statistics, Vol. 84 No. 1, pp. 
151-161. 
Dimovski, W. (2016), "Differences in underpricing of A-REIT IPOs and Australien property 
company IPOs", Journal of Property Investment and Finance, Vol. 34 No. 2, pp. 107-115. 
Dimovski, W. and Brooks, R. (2006), "The pricing of property trust IPOs in Australia", 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 32 No. 2, pp. 185-199. 
Dolvin, S. and Pyles, M. (2009), "REIT IPOs and the cost of going public", Journal of Real 
Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 39 No. 1, pp. 92-106. 
Engelen, P.-J. and van Essen, M. (2010), "Underpricing of IPOs: firm-, issue- and country-
specific characteristics", Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 34 No. 8, pp.1958-1969. 
EPRA (2016), "EPRA Reporting-Global REIT survey 2016", available at: 
http://www.epra.com/regulation-and-reporting/taxation/reit-survey/ (accessed February 
15, 2017). 
EPRA (2015), "EPRA News - Issue 50 March/April 2015", available at: 
http://de.calameo.com/read/000616185e7836b3c4f94 (accessed July 24, 2017). 
Freybote, T., Rottke, N. and Schiereck, D. (2008), "Underpricing of European property 
companies and the IPO cycle: a note", Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 26 
No. 5, pp. 376-387. 
Gokkaya, S., Highfield, M., Roskelly, K. and Steele, D. (2015), "An examination of 
primary and secondary market returns in equity REIT IPOs", Journal of Real Estate 
Research, Vol. 37 No. 1, pp. 23-64. 
Harris, L. (1991), "Stock price clustering and discreteness", The Review of Financial Studies, 
Vol. 4 No. 3, pp. 389-415. 
Hartzell, J.C., Kallberg, J.G., Liu, C.H. (2005), "The role of the underlying real asset market 
in REIT IPOs", Real Estate Economics, Vol. 33 No. 1, pp. 27-50. 
Ibbotson, R. and Jaffe, J. (1975), "Hot issue markets", Journal of Finance, Vol. 30 No. 4, 
pp. 1027-1042. 
Kennedy, P. (2003), A guide to econometrics, 5th edition, John Wiley & Sons, Cornwall. 
Kutsuna, K., Dimovski, W. and Brooks, R. (2008), "The pricing and underwriting costs of 
Japanese REIT IPOs", Journal of Property Research, Vol. 25 No. 3, pp. 221-239. 
Ling, D. and Ryngaert, M. (1997), "Valutation uncertainty, institutional involvement, and 
the underpricing of IPOs: the case of REITs", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 43 No. 
3, pp. 433-456. 
REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market Performance: a European Perspective 
38 
Ljungqvist, A. (2007), "IPO underpricing", in: Eckbo, B.E., Handbook of corporate finance, 
Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp. 375-422. 
Londerville, J. (2002), "Canadian real estate investment trust: a review of the IPO literature 
and preliminary analysis of Canadian REIT IPO pricing", Canadian Journal of 
Administrative Science, Vol. 19 No. 4, pp. 359-368. 
Long, J.S. (1997), Regression models for categorical and limited dependent variables, Sage, 
Thousand Oaks. 
Lowry, M., Officer, M. and Schwert, G. (2010), "The variability of IPO initial returns", 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 65 No. 2, pp. 425-465. 
Ritter, J. and Welch, I. (2002), "A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations", Journal 
of Finance, Vol. 57 No. 4, pp. 1795-1828. 
Rock, K. (1986), "Why new issues are underpriced", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 15 
No. 1-2, pp. 187-212. 
Rosenbaum, P.R., Rubin, D.B. (1983), "The central role of the propensity score in 
observational studies for causal effects", Biometrika, pp. 41-55. 
Rummer, M. (2006), Going Public in Deutschland. Eine empirische Analyse von 
Börsengängen auf Grundlage der Behavirol Finance, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, Band 
114, Wiesbaden. 
Schaetz, A. and Sebastian, S.P. (2009), "Immobilienaktien-Immobilien oder Aktien?", 
Immobilien & Finanzierung, Vol. 60 No. 24, pp. 842-843. 
Wang, K., Chan, S. and Gau, G. (1992), "Initial public offerings of equity securities - 
anomalous evidence using REITs", Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 31 No. 3, pp. 
381-410. 
Welch, I. (1989), "Seasoned offerings, imitation costs, and the underpricing of initial public 
offerings", Journal of Finance, Vol. 44 No. 2, pp. 421-449. 
Wong, W.-C., Ong, S.-E., Ooi, J.T.L. (2013), “Sponsor backing in Asian REIT IPOs”, Journal 
of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 46 No. 2, pp. 299-320. 
Wooldrige, J.M. (2010), Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data, 2nd edition, 
MIT Press, Cambridge. 
 
 
Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US Real Estate Companies 
39 
 
 
3 Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US 
Real Estate Companies 
 
Abstract 
 
Our paper is the first to identify the determinants that explain the presence of women on the 
board of directors, and to study the relationship between gender diversity and financial 
performance in a real estate context. Using a unique panel dataset of 116 US listed real estate 
companies over the period 2005–2015, we demonstrate that gender diversity has a positive 
and significant impact on the market-based performance measures Tobin’s Q and Price/NAV. 
Thus, stock market participants expect higher future earnings from firms with increased 
female representation. This is especially true for gender diversity in executive positions. 
Additionally, our results indicate that the gender diversity / performance relationship is non-
linear. Real estate companies with 30% women in the group of executives outperform 
homogeneous male groups by 10.5%, as measured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, a certain level of 
female representation is needed to generate an impact. However, gender diversity does not 
have an impact on accounting-based measures, neither on ROA nor on FFO/SHARE. Thus, this 
positive influence of women in leadership might be reflected more adequately in investor 
perceptions than in actual financial realities. Our results are robust after controlling for 
endogeneity as well as other board and firm characteristics. 
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3.1 Introduction  
In recent years, there has been a decisive investment trend towards socially responsible 
investments. Alongside financial returns, numerous investors seek to generate a positive social 
and environmental impact. By applying a so-called ‘Impact Investing’ strategy, investors 
support the mission and governance of the company. As one example of an impact 
investment opportunity, State Street Global Advisors created the SSGA Gender Diversity Index 
ETF (ticker: SHE) in 2016. With the aim of increasing gender diversity in companies’ senior 
leadership, this exchange-traded fund (ETF) invests exclusively in US large-cap companies with 
a relatively high proportion of women in both executive and non-executive positions. 
However, increasing the number of women in senior leadership positions has been slow in 
the United States, compared to some European countries, which have seen dramatic changes, 
due to quota legislation (e.g. Norway, Spain, France) or other regulatory disclosure 
requirements or recommendations (e.g. Austria, United Kingdom). Recent data shows that 
just 5.2% of US companies in the S&P 500 are led by a woman CEO and only 21.2% of 
corporate board seats are occupied by female directors (Catalyst, 2017). 
Yet, even with a small number of women as board members, the finance literature indicates 
that female directors influence a company’s performance, although there is no unanimous 
opinion as to whether this influence is positive (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 
2003; Terjesen et al., 2015) or negative (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Shrader et al., 1997). More 
recent studies reveal that more gender-diverse boards will only enhance financial performance 
if a certain ‘critical mass’ of female representation is reached (Joecks et al., 2013; Torchia et 
al., 2011).  
The real estate context provides a desirable setting for an investigation of this nature. First, 
there is a lack of consensus in the finance literature on how exactly gender diversity effects 
performance, which can partly be explained by examining different institutional settings or 
business sectors. Since prior research shows that listed real estate company corporate 
governance structures are different from other industry sectors (Bauer et al., 2010; Feng et 
al., 2005; Gosh & Sirmans, 2003; Kohl & Schaefers, 2012), it is likely that diversity ratios and 
women’s impact may also differ across industries. Hence, results from the car industry or 
banking sector may not apply to the real estate industry. While the financial implications of 
gender diversity have been investigated in many industry sectors such as banking (Pathan et 
al., 2013), microfinance institutions (Oystein Strom et al., 2014) or construction (Arena et al., 
2015), empirical investigations on the real estate industry are scarce. Second, publicly traded 
real estate companies provide a homogenous sample in terms of performance. By focusing on 
companies in a single industry, inter-industry heterogeneity can be reduced (Gosh & Sirmans, 
2003). Since industry factors strongly effect performance variability (Mishra & Nielsen, 2000), 
unequal performance levels across industries may prevent researchers from establishing a 
consistent effect of gender diversity on financial performance. Third, given the increasing 
numbers of women employees in various real estate property sectors (Crew Network, 2015), 
there is an obvious need to analyze the development and status quo of women within the 
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real estate industry. An in-depth real estate analysis can shed light on which property sectors 
benefit particularly from gender diversity in top management teams.  
The impact of gender diversity on financial performance is tested on a unique panel dataset of 
116 US listed real estate companies in the period 2005 - 2015. We follow previous gender 
studies that measure firm performance in terms of the accounting-based measure return on 
assets (ROA) or the market-based measure Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Campbell & 
Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Terjesen et al., 2015). The research design is 
extended to real estate performance measures, such as funds from operations per share 
(FFO/SHARE) and price per net asset value (PRICE/NAV). The central challenge for the 
empirical analysis is that the gender diversity variable is possibly endogenously determined, 
since women who are suitable for a senior management position may explicitly select better-
performing firms as their employer, or financially successful firms may be more likely to hire 
female directors (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). This sample selection or reverse causality problem is 
disentangled by the application of a two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure.  
Our results indicate that gender diversity is an endogenous variable, since the likelihood of a 
company having a female director depends on firm attributes such as board size, CEO / 
chairman duality, insider ownership, director independence and firm size. With regard to the 
gender diversity / performance relationship, we find that investors expect higher future 
earnings of firms with an increased share of female directors, since female directors are 
significantly positive related to Tobin’s Q. However, the gender diversity variables do not have 
a significant impact on the accounting-based measures, neither on ROA nor on FFO/SHARE. It 
seems that within the gender diversity / performance relationship, one has to distinguish 
explicitly between ‘objective’ accounting-based and ‘subjective’ market-based measures 
(Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski, & Atkins, 2010). In the context of gender diversity, a 
positive influence of women on the board of directors might be reflected more adequately in 
investor perceptions than in actual accounting performance data. Moreover, the theory that 
stock market participants expect higher future earnings from firms with increased female 
representation is especially true for gender diversity in executive positions. Particularly 
executives are in the spotlight of investors, since they are the company’s leaders who are 
responsible for strategic direction and therefore the subject of considerable media attention. 
Consistent with ‘tokenism theory’, we find that in the case of real estate companies, a critical 
mass is generally reached in balanced (x ≥ 30% women) executive teams. In order to provide 
an in-depth real estate analysis, we subdivided the sample into different property sectors, so 
as to examine which sectors benefit most from gender diversity. We find that a balanced 
executive team outperforms a homogeneous male group by 36.9% for the health care sector, 
15.5% for the retail sector and 12.9% for the hotel sector. This positive association stresses 
the importance of a diverse leadership team for real estate sectors, which are more consumer-
orientated or with a high proportion of female employees. 
This study extends the existing corporate governance literature by examining gender diversity 
in the board of directors in a real estate context. Taking into account the methodological 
weaknesses of previous research on the gender diversity / performance link, this study 
Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US Real Estate Companies 
42 
analyses panel data, includes an extensive set of board and firm control variables which may 
affect financial performance, and accounts for the possibility of endogeneity by employing a 
two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure. Moreover, we are the first to test the ‘tokenism 
theory’ of Kanter (1977a, 1977b) for US listed real estate companies and their different 
property focuses. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related literature and hypothesis 
Section discusses the existing research on the gender diversity / performance relationship and 
develops testable hypotheses. The methodology Section considers the sample design, 
variables from the multivariate analysis and the model specification. In the results Section, we 
report univariate statistics, present results from the multivariate analysis and discuss the 
implications of the results. The final Section concludes. 
 
3.2 Related literature and hypotheses  
A large and growing stream of research investigates how women in high-level leadership 
roles affect a firm’s financial performance, but the empirical evidence on the relationship is 
ambiguous. Several economic reasons promote the advancement of women in management 
positions. Among these arguments is the fact that only a small number of women occupy a 
corporate board seat, which implies that there is a huge, untapped pool of board candidates 
or rather underutilized female talents (Simpson et al., 2010). If almost only men are 
considered as potential board candidates, the quality of board appointments may be 
impaired, since women’s abilities and knowledge are not taken into consideration sufficiently. 
Females in senior positions may serve as role models, and thus encourage women in lower 
positions to strive for higher career levels (Burke & McKeen, 1996; Hillman et al., 2007). Thus, 
the existence of female role models is of particular importance to company mentoring and 
career-support programs for women employees. 
The advantages of having a gender-diverse board can be explained in consideration of 
decision-making and stakeholder theory. Decision making theory suggests, that with 
women’s distinct attributes, boardrooms gain an increased variety of perspectives and a 
broader range of knowledge, skills and experience, which fosters creativity and innovation as 
well as the quality of decision-making (Cox & Blake, 1991; Robinson & Dechant, 1997). Thus, 
narrow, monolithic group thinking and self-assurance, rather likely in homogeneous boards, 
can be reduced by considering women’s divergent views and their different approach to 
complex issues (Carter et al., 2003). With regard to the multifaceted problems in the real 
estate industry, a female perspective can be a valuable contrast to that of male counterparts. 
Therefore, the inclusion of varying perspectives, may be especially important for real estate 
company sectors, which are particularly consumer-orientated (e.g. retail), or for those sectors 
where women represent the majority of the workforce (e.g. heath care).  
In turn, stakeholder theory argues that firms need to cooperate with their stakeholders and 
consider stakeholder’s needs within the management decision-making process (Clarkson, 
1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Freeman, 1983). Thus, developing good relations with 
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women stakeholders and matching board composition to the diversity of customers, 
shareholders and employees, can create a competitive advantage (Carter et al., 2003). 
Appointments of the women stakeholder group, may also be an asset for the corporate 
image. The increasing popularity of socially responsible investments shows that investors do 
pay attention to companies’ ethical behaviour and gender diversity in their investment 
decisions. Bear et al. (2010) and Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017) show that by considering 
women in high-level leadership roles as a positive investment factor, investors raise the 
demand for shares of highly gender-diverse companies and ultimately raising their price. 
Based on these theories in favour of a higher female representation in top management 
positions, several studies have found a positive impact of the percentage of women on the 
board of directors on various performance measures (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter 
et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2015). However, the positive effects of gender diversity may be 
neutralized by certain disadvantages of heterogeneous teams. Greater diversity is a potential 
source of intragroup conflict (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). A clash of divergent opinions and 
more critical questioning may lead to prolonged and less efficient board meetings, resulting in 
delayed decision-making. Reduced board effectiveness may also result from reduced group 
cohesion, since the level of trust and loyalty are likely to depend on the similarity of board 
members (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998). Accordingly, female representation in top management 
teams may have no significant effect (Carter et al., 2010; Rose, 2007) or even a negative 
effect on financial performance (Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Shrader et al., 1997). 
These mixed results of previous studies can be explained in various ways. First, these studies 
differ in their sample design, such as time period, examined countries and industry sectors. 
Second, there is no uniform statistical method7 applied by all studies and third, there is no 
identical measurement of performance8 or gender9 diversity. 
Apart from the aforementioned lack of consensus, the critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977a, 
1977b) postulates that the benefits of gender diversity outweigh the disadvantages of 
heterogeneous teams, if a certain threshold of female representation is reached. In her 
studies, Kanter (1977a, 1977b) created four groups (uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced), 
which differ concerning their gender composition. A uniform group is a homogeneous one 
with exclusively male or female members. The individuals of such a group, as well as the 
group as a whole, can develop their / its own uniqueness, although all members of a uniform 
group have a salient characteristic in common, such as gender or race. Skewed groups have a 
dominant proportion of one type of person, which takes control of the group and its culture. 
The few non-integrated group members are called ‘tokens’, for example, one women in a 
group of six men. Tilted groups display a less extreme group composition in terms of gender, 
                                                 
7 The statistical methods applied in the discussed studies are mean comparison test, anova, pooled OLS, panel data 
fixed effects, 2SLS, 3SLS and GMM. 
8 The most widely used performance measures are return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), return on sales 
(ROS), return on investment (ROI), earnings before interest and tax (EBIT), stock price growth, Tobin’s Q and 
market to book value. 
9 Gender diversity is measured in terms of binary variables for the presence of at least one woman in the 
boardroom, the percentage of women in the boardroom or specific diversity indices (e.g. Blau-Index). 
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compared to skewed ones. Hence, the ‘token woman’ status changes to a female minority 
group, which can impact on the group’s culture by creating alliances. As a minority, women 
are no longer seen as representatives of their social type, but as individuals. In balanced 
groups, the minority and majority turns into subgroups, in which gender loses importance. 
In real estate companies, women in leadership positions often find themselves in a skewed 
group, where a woman’s situation can be described as ‘tokenism’. Accordingly, a ‘token 
woman’ is not seen as an individual, but rather as representing the ‘women category’. Kanter 
(1977a, 1977b) stated three typical tendencies facing ‘tokens’: hypervisibility, polarization and 
assimilation. In daily business, hypervisibility is associated with increased pressure on the 
female representative. Hence, each decision, reaction or failure receives increased and often 
excessive attention. Second, polarization refers to the sense of community and self-
consciousness of the dominating part of the group, which increases by aligning 
commonalities and differences to the ‘token’. Finally, the tendencies of hypervisibility and 
polarization may result in assimilation, which often involves ‘tokens’ being seen as mere 
stereotypes or representatives for their social type or rather their gender.  
Hypotheses 
In a male-dominated real estate sector, we assume that a sole woman on the board of 
directors does not have much influence on decision-making, since tokenism is likely to prevail. 
With an increased share of women, the quality of the decision-making process might improve 
through a broader variety of perspectives. Accordingly, firms which effectively exploit the 
advantages of heterogeneous teams may demonstrate improved performance. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that:  
H1: An increased percentage of women on the board of directors has a positive impact on 
financial performance. 
In addition to the board gender-composition analysis, we extend previous literature by 
explicitly distinguishing between executive and non-executive positions. In contrast to non-
executive directors, who are responsible for monitoring and advisory tasks, executive directors 
operate the daily business and take crucial corporate decisions. Consequently, we argue that 
the variety of perspectives which women bring into the board is especially important for the 
group of executives, since a culture of debate is crucial for thorough decision-making. 
Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: An increased share of women in executive positions has a greater impact on financial 
performance than an increased share of women in non-executive positions.  
We extend hypotheses H1 and H2 by accounting for a possible non-linear relationship 
between gender diversity and financial performance. We assume that a critical mass of female 
representation is reached when the female status changes from ‘token woman’ to a female 
minority group. In this context, we also assume that a separate analysis of executive and non-
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executives positions leads to different impacts on financial performance. With regard to the 
critical mass of female representation, we hypothesize that: 
H3: Women’s contribution in leadership teams10 has a positive impact on financial 
performance, in particular when ‘tokenism’ no longer prevails (i.e. tilted or balanced teams).  
In a further step, we run an in-depth real estate analysis to examine which property sectors 
benefit particularly from gender diversity. The reason behind our expectation of different 
performance outcomes is twofold. First, unequal performance levels and variations can be 
observed for different property sectors. Therefore, we control for companies’ specific property 
focus within the industry. Second, companies which have a strong female client base, should 
also represent their clients’ needs in its leadership structure. Thus, female consumer-
orientated companies that are matched in the sense of having management with the same 
traits (in this case gender), will perform better (Oystein Strom et al., 2014). In the analysis of 
different property sectors, we focus explicitly on company decision-makers, the group of 
executives, since they create and define the strategy. 
H4: For property sectors which are more consumer-orientated (health care, hotel, residential 
and retail), we expect a positive impact of female executives. 
We empirically examine the abovementioned hypotheses by simultaneously optimizing the 
caveats of previous analyses, and assessing the financial impacts of gender diversity in a real 
estate context. This study applies panel data fixed effects, includes an extensive set of board 
and firm control variables and accounts for the possibility of endogeneity. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample design  
We start the sample selection process, using the constituent list of the FTSE EPRA / NAREIT 
United States Index. The index’s admission criteria ensures a homogeneous sample with 
regard to the features of real estate companies (e.g. market capitalization). In order to avoid 
survivorship bias, current and historical companies of the FTSE EPRA / NAREIT United States 
Index are included in the sample. Another requirement is that the companies have been 
publicly traded for more than five contiguous years during 2005-2015. The initial sample 
consists of 206 US listed real estate companies. The dataset was developed by combining 
various sources. Accounting and stock market data are collected from Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and SNL. Data on corporate governance mechanisms is first extracted from the 
Bloomberg database and, secondly, from the company’s proxy statements (DEF 14A). The 
availability of corporate governance data restricts us to 2005 as the first year of our sample. 
After the selection process, our final sample includes 116 US publicly traded real estate 
companies, resulting in 1,276 firm-year observations. 
                                                 
10 In the context of critical mass theory, ‘teams’ refer to the board of directors, as well as the group of executives 
and non-executives. 
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3.3.2 Measures 
3.3.2.1 Performance variables 
Previous gender diversity studies can generally be divided into two groups, which either use 
accounting-based measures or market-based ones, specifically Tobin’s Q (Adams & Ferreira, 
2009; Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2010; Terjesen et al., 2015). The central 
difference between these types of performance measure is that, while accounting-based 
measures display financial realities from a backward-looking perspective, market-based 
measures represent a firm’s future earnings. Thus, market-based measures, which reflect 
investor expectations of future cash-flows, are rather ‘subjective’ in contrast to ‘objective’ 
audited accounting-based measures (Haslam et al., 2010). 
With regard to accounting-based measures, our study applies return on assets (ROA), which 
represents a company’s profitability by stating the achieved accounting income for 
shareholders. ROA is calculated by dividing net income by total assets. We also use the most 
important performance indicator for the real estate industry, namely funds from operations 
per share (FFO/SHARE). In accordance with NAREIT guidelines, this metric is calculated as 
GAAP net income excluding gains or losses from sales of properties or debt restructuring, and 
adding back real estate depreciation.  
With regard to market-based performance measures, we apply Tobin’s Q und price per net 
asset value (NAV). Tobin’s Q is defined as a ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets to the 
replacement costs of its assets (Tobin, 1969). Following Kohl and Schaefers (2012) and Perfect 
and Wiles (1994) among others, the ratio is calculated as the sum of market value of equity 
and book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets. Price per net asset value 
(NAV) represents the ratio of the market price to the book value of equity. For real estate 
companies the NAV is quite similar to the book value of equity. Specifically, the PRICE/NAV is 
calculated by the market valuation divided by the NAV. In principal, Tobin’s Q is an entire-
company-orientated measure, whereas Price/NAV is equity-orientated. 
 
3.3.2.2 Diversity variables 
The likelihood that a company has a female director is measured by WOMAN BOARD. This 
binary variable equals to 1, if at least one woman occupies a corporate board seat. In the 
performance regressions, gender diversity is measured by the percentage of female board 
directors (% WOMEN). Additionally, we examine the composition of the board in terms of its 
gender distribution. In accordance with critical mass theory (Kanter, 1977a, 1977b), we 
create the following four binary variables: 
• UNIFORM BOARD refers to a homogeneous male board. 
• SKEWED BOARD refers to a male-dominated board with less than 15% female 
directors. 
• TILTED BOARD refers to a less extreme domination of men in the board, with a female 
representation ranging from 15% to less than 30%. 
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• BALANCED BOARD refers to heterogeneous board with more than 30% female 
directors. 
This categorization approach is also applied to the group of executive and non-executive 
directors. 
 
3.3.2.3 Board and firm control variables 
We include various board and firm structure variables in our models, so as to control for their 
influence on the presence of a woman on the board of directors, as well as on the 
performance metrics. With regard to board or governance characteristics of a company, CEO 
DUALITY represents an indicator variable for the power-sharing between CEO and chairman. 
% INDEPENDENT denotes the percentage of independent directors which do not have any 
business or employment relationship with the company11. INSIDERS represents the percentage 
of equities held by current officers and directors. MAJORSHARE is a proxy for ownership 
concentration, which is defined by substantial shareholders who own at least 5% of the 
outstanding shares that are not predominantly owned by insiders. The variable BMEETING 
measures the total number of board meetings during a fiscal year, including all special 
meetings. BOARDSIZE is measured by the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the 
board. We further subdivide the board of director positions into executive and non-executive 
positions. EXECUTIVES and NON-EXECUTIVES are measured by the natural logarithm of the 
sum of executive or non-executive directors, respectively. The variables BOARDSIZE, 
EXECUTIVES and NON-EXECUTIVES represent the ‘exclusion variable’ in the first stage probit 
models of the Heckman (1976) procedure. 
Concerning the firm structure variables, FIRMAGE is measured by the years for which a 
company has been listed on the stock exchange. In order to control for the specific 
characteristics of REITs, such as distribution obligation, tax efficiency and investment 
regulations, we include the binary variable REIT. The variable FIRMSIZE is a proxy for future 
growth opportunities, which is measured by the sum of total assets. We measure firm risk 
with two different variables. First, VOLATILITY, which is the standard deviation of the stock 
return, based on the weekly values divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40, and 
secondly LEVERAGE, which is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Finally, we control for the 
liquidity, which is the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. 
 
3.3.3 Model specification 
With regard to the gender diversity / performance relationship, endogeneity problems can 
arise in different forms. 
                                                 
11 Our definition of an independent board member is in accordance with New York Stock Exchange’s 
independence requirements. 
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Omitted unobservable variables could affect the selection of women in leadership positions, 
as well as the corporate performance at the same time, which may lead to spurious 
correlations between gender diversity and firm financial performance. To address the problem 
of omitted variable bias, we apply fixed effect panel estimation with period and firm 
dummies.12 This approach accounts for time-constant firm heterogeneity, caused by 
unobserved firm characteristics (e.g. corporate culture) and for time-varying heterogeneity 
caused by omitted variables which are constant over firms, but change over time (e.g. crisis or 
changes in government regulation).  
The association between female leadership and the performance metrics may be driven be 
reverse causality. On the one hand, it is possible that financially successful firms are more 
likely to hire female directors, since they attract a higher level of public attention, and 
therefore experience more pressure to conform to a certain level of female representation in 
boardrooms. On the other hand, since female representation in top management is scarce, 
women who are suitable for a senior management position may self-select into better 
performing firms (Dezsö & Ross, 2012). Finally, sample selection bias may arise if qualified 
women do not seek a board director position, even though being as eligible as the observed 
female directors. Following current gender literature (e.g. Hutchinson et al., 2015; Oystein 
Strom et al., 2014; Srinidhi et al., 2011), we control for sample selection bias by applying a 
two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure. In a first step of this procedure, we apply probit 
estimation to predict the factors associated with female leadership. We then compute the 
inverse Mill’s ratio (MILLS) from the predicted values for the likelihood that a company has a 
female director. In a second step, MILLS is included in the performance regressions, in order 
to control for the performance between companies with and without female directors.  
  
                                                 
12 We apply the Hausmann test to determine the existence of a correlation between the unobserved effects and 
the explanatory variables. Since the unobserved heterogeneity is correlated with the observed variables, the fixed 
effects method is applied. 
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3.3.3.1 First-stage probit model 
We run the following probit regression to predict the presence of females on the board of 
directors: 
Pr,-./01	2.034,6 = 17 = Φ	9: + 		2.034	;<=>,6 + ?	@.1A3.B;,6 +	",6 	C			(1) 
In the above equation, D denotes the probit function, i the firm, t the year (2005–2015) and 
 the error term. Controls refers to a variety of board and firm structure variables as described 
in Section ‘Measures’. The two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure is especially robust in cases 
where the variables in the first and second stage equations are not the same. Therefore, we 
need to include a variable in the first stage, which has an impact on the likelihood of a 
company having a female director (first stage), but no impact on the financial performance of 
a company (second stage). Since the probability of a woman occupying a corporate board 
seat is higher for larger boards, we use the board size as an ‘exclusion variable’. We do not 
expect the size of the board to directly affect the dependent performance variables in the 
second stage. The included board and firm controls in the first stage are identical to those in 
the performance regressions in the second stage.  
 
3.3.3.2 Second-stage fixed effects model 
The proposed hypotheses are tested by estimating the following fixed effects regression 
model: 
E>3F.3/01@>,6 = 	: + 	G>14>3	4<H>3;<AI,6 + 	?	@.1A3.B;,6 +/<BB;,6 +	J +	K6 +	",6 					 
In this model, i denotes the firm, and t the year (2005-2015). Mills represents the inverse Mills 
ratio, which is estimated from the first stage probit model so as to account for sample 
selection bias. 	J refers to firm fixed effects and	K to time fixed effects for the years 2005 to 
2015 and   represents the error term. Performance refers, on the one hand, to the market-
based performance measures Tobin’s Q and Price per NAV and, on the other hand, to the 
accounting-based performance measures ROA and FFO per share. Gender diversity denotes 
either the percentage of women on board or Kanter’s critical mass board groups. Controls 
represents a broad set of firm characteristics (e.g. LEVERAGE, FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY) and 
board characteristics (e.g. INSIDERS, MAJORSHARE and CEO_DUALITY) with a potential 
impact on financial performance. 
The fixed effects specification (2) is estimated with robust standard errors, which are valid in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of arbitrary forms for panels with a 
small T and a large N (Arellano, 1987). Furthermore, a diagnostic test for multicollinearity is 
performed. All explanatory variables have variance inflation factors (VIF) below 10, suggesting 
that multicollinearity is not a problem in this regression analysis. 
 
(2)
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Exhibit 3.1 provides an overview of descriptive statistics for the whole sample. The variables 
are sorted by ‘performance variables, ‘female participation variables’ and ‘board and firm 
control variables’ and provide the key statistics: number of observations, median, mean, 
standard deviation, maxima and minima. 
On average, a US listed real estate firm yields a Tobin’s Q ratio of 1.245 and an ROA of 2.9%. 
The real-estate-specific measures provide an average Price/NAV ratio of 1.389 and a FFO per 
share ratio of 2.411. Approximately 58% of the firms have at least one woman on the board 
of directors. On average, a US listed real estate company has 9.4% female representation on 
the board of directors. The average board size comprises 8 directors, thereof 75% 
independent directors. The boards meet on average about seven times per year. More than 
half of the US listed real estate companies have separate CEO and board chair positions. 
About 7.5% of the shares are owned by insiders and about one third by major shareholders. 
Most of the companies included in the sample have REIT status and have been listed for 
about 14.9 years on the stock exchange. The average total assets of a US listed real estate 
company amount to $ 4.705 billion. The average company’s gearing is about 50%, liquidity 
about 20% and stock price volatility 5%. 
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Panel A: Performance Variables    
 Obs. Median Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
TOBINSQ 1,119 1.184 1.245 0.360 3.710 0.585 
PRICE/NAV 1,128 1.344 1.389 3.463 17.540 -76.380 
FFO/SHARE 1,054 1.950 2.411 2.534 3.114 -1.059 
ROA 1,133 0.026 0.029 0.039 0.390 -0.166 
Panel B:Female Participation Variables    
WOMAN BOARD 1,151 1.000 0.577 0.494 1.000 0.000 
% WOMEN BOARD 1,151 0.100 0.094 0.097 0.429 0.000 
Panel C: Board and Firm Control Variables      
BOARDSIZE 1,151 8.000 8.421 2.036 15.000 4.000 
CEO DUALITY 1,151 0.000 0.467 0.499 1.000 0.000 
% INDEPENDENT 1,148 0.750 0.755 0.162 4.814 0.000 
INSIDERS 1,151 0.036 0.075 0.100 0.665 0.000 
MAJORSHARE 1,134 0.350 0.345 0.147 0.895 0.000 
BMEETING 1,147 7.000 7.774 3.741 32.000 0.000 
REIT 1,276 1.000 0.883 0.321 1.000 0.000 
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 1,157 2,871,835 4,704,973 5,395,736 33,324,574 194,139 
FIRMAGE 1,276 14.000 14.864 1.086 42.000 0.000 
LEVERAGE 1,157 0.504 0.499 0.168 1.079 0.000 
LIQUIDITY 1,123 0.151 0.179 0.112 0.886 0.011 
VOLATILITY 1,152 4.073 5.021 3.150 39.248 1.000 
Exhibit 3.1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics of all variables. TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of total assets. 
PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number 
of shares outstanding. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. WOMAN BOARD is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one female director occupies a corporate board seat, 0 otherwise. % 
WOMEN BOARD represents the percentage of women in the board of directors. BOARDSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. INSIDERS represents the percentage 
of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who own 5% or more of outstanding shares. BMEETING represents the 
natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. LIQUIDITY 
represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. 
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With regard to the correlation matrix, Exhibit 3.2 presents the correlation coefficients of the 
independent variables in the second stage performance regressions. By examining the 
correlations among these variables, we run a first test of multicollinearity. A widely used 
threshold, indicating multicollinearity issues, is reached at a correlation coefficient of 0.8 
(absolute value) or above. The highest correlation coefficient of 0.829 is reported between 
the binary variable WOMAN BOARD and the percentage of women on the board (% WOMAN 
BOARD). This does not pose any problem, since these two variables are never simultaneously 
in the same regression.13 Further correlations vary from -0.264 between the percentage of 
independent directors and the percentage of insiders, to a correlation coefficient of 0.643 
between a company’s liquidity and price volatility.  
Firms which have at least one woman on the board of directors are larger, have more board 
members and a longer company history. However, these positive relations are difficult to 
interpret in one direction, as larger (correlation coefficient of 0.315) and older firms 
(correlation coefficient of 0.219) have larger boards. Thus, it is possible that the probability of 
a female board member simply be driven by the board size. In addition, companies with a 
higher rate of independent board members are more likely to have a woman on the board. 
Ownership structure is also related to the presence of a female director. Thus, firms with a 
higher percentage of major shareholders (own more than 5% of the outstanding shares), are 
more likely to have a female board member. However, an increased percentage of insiders 
may lead to less female board members. Finally, the volatility of the share price is lower if the 
firm has at least one woman on the board. 
  
                                                 
13 WOMAN BOARD is the dependent variable in the first stage probit model and % WOMEN BOARD is the 
independent variable of particular interest in the second stage performance regression.  
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 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 
1. WOMAN BOARD 1.000               
                
2. % WOMEN BOARD 0.829*** 1.000              
                
3. BOARDSIZE 0.296*** 0.118*** 1.000             
                
4. % INDEPENDENT 0.229*** 0.196*** 0.139*** 1.000            
                
5. CEO DUALITY -0.077** -0.041 0.088*** -0.004 1.000           
                
6. INSIDERS -0.155*** -0.168*** 0.111*** -0.264*** -0.079** 1.000          
                
7. MAJORSHARE 0.075** 0.021 0.008 0.121*** -0.044 -0.211*** 1.000         
                
8. BMEETING 0.068** 0.071** -0.027 0.090** -0.048 -0.113*** -0.061** 1.000        
                
9. REIT -0.023 -0.006 -0.069** -0.064** -0.076** -0.051* 0.019 0.030 1.000       
                
10. FIRMSIZE 0.315*** 0.231*** 0.414*** 0.152*** -0.102*** -0.155*** 0.087*** 0.095*** 0.013 1.000      
                
11. LEVERAGE 0.025 -0.101*** 0.236*** 0.065** 0.029 0.152*** 0.021 -0.042 0.264*** 0.194*** 1.000     
                
12. VOLATILITY -0.076** -0.091*** 0.033 -0.074** 0.011 0.014 0.029 0.035*** -0.042 0.042 0.201*** 1.000    
                
13. LIQUIDITY 0.056* 0.010 0.099*** 0.047 -0.112*** -0.171*** 0.128*** 0.020 -0.025 0.308*** 0.175*** 0.643*** 1.000   
                
14. ROA -0.030 0.027 -0.163*** -0.030 0.091*** 0.112*** -0.196*** -0.050 -0.051* -0.105*** -0.325*** -0.280*** -0.254*** 1.000  
                
15. FIRMAGE 0.219*** 0.169*** 0.226*** 0.209*** -0.008 0.038 0.013 0.010 -0.066** 0.166*** 0.055* -0.077** -0.021 0.153*** 1.000 
Exhibit 3.2 provides the correlation coefficients. WOMAN BOARD is a binary variable equal to 1 if at least one female director occupies a corporate board seat, 0 otherwise. % WOMEN BOARD represents the 
percentage of women on the board of directors. BOARDSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. 
CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). 
MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who own 5% or more of outstanding shares. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. REIT is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the 
share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. FIRMAGE is 
the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
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Exhibit 3.3 shows the results of the mean-comparison tests between firms with and without 
female directors. We test whether the mean of various characteristics differs between these 
two groups. Most of the tested variables display significant mean differences, which are 
consistent with the pattern found in the correlation table. Larger and older firms tend to have 
women on the board. Firms with a larger board and more independent board members are 
more likely to have female directors. On the one hand, the ownership structure shows that 
firms with a higher percentage of insider shareholders are less likely to have a woman on the 
board. On the other hand, a higher percentage of major shareholders increases the 
probability of female representation on the board. Moreover, if the position of CEO and board 
chair is represented by one person, firms are less likely to have female board members. An 
initial indication of a significant relationship between female directors and market-based 
performance measures is provided by a significant mean difference for TOBINSQ and 
PRICE/NAV. The mean value of those market-based measures is higher for firms with women 
on the board of directors. 
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Exhibit 3.3: Mean-comparison of firms with and without female directors 
Variable 
 
Mean for  
WOMAN 
BOARD = 1 
(n = 654) 
Mean for  
WOMAN BOARD = 0 
(n = 469) 
Difference 
 
t-
stats 
 
BOARDSIZE 8.923 7.737 -1.19*** 
-
10.19 
% INDEPENDENT 0.769 0.728 -0.04*** -6.41 
CEO DUALITY 0.426 0.524 0.10*** 3.28 
INSIDERS 0.061 0.095 0.03*** 5.68 
MAJORSHARE 0.353 0.335 -0.02** -2.05 
BMEETING 7.900 7.602 -0.30 -1.33 
REIT 0.940 0.949 0.01 0.65 
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 5,973,566 2,968,765 -3,004,801*** -9.65 
LEVERAGE 0.506 0.490 -0.02 -1.60 
VOLATILITY 4.957 5.293 0.34* 1.76 
LIQUIDITY 0.186 0.171 -0.01** -2.13 
FIRMAGE 17.620 13.552 -4.07*** -6.62 
TOBINSQ 1.292 1.181 -0.11*** -5.12 
PRICE/NAV 1.561 1.152 -0.41* -1.95 
ROA 0.027 0.031 0.00 1.48 
FFO/SHARE 2.377 2.454 0.08 0.49 
Exhibit 3.3 shows the mean differences of firms with a woman on the board (WOMAN BOARD = 1) or not (WOMAN BOARD = 
0). BOARDSIZE represents the natural logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of 
independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously 
chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including 
relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who own 5% or more of outstanding shares. BMEETING 
represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during a fiscal year. REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if 
the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and 
multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the 
firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the 
sum of the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of total assets. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the 
market valuation divided by the NAV. FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the 
company) divided by the number of shares outstanding. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 
and p-value<0.1, respectively. 
 
3.4.2 Main regression results 
3.4.2.1 Impact of women on the board of directors 
Exhibit 3.4 shows the first stage regression results for the likelihood that a firm has a woman 
on the board of directors. Models 1 and 2 merely differ in their proxy for profitability; Model 
1 includes ROA, Model 2 Tobin’s Q. We follow the gender literature in determining the board 
and firm variables that may impact on the likelihood that a company has a female director 
(Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Carter et al., 2003; Dimovski et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 
2007). With regard to the number of director position, more leadership positions being 
available may increase the likelihood of females occupying those positions (BOARDSIZE). 
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Moreover, larger companies may face more societal pressure to increase their boardroom 
diversity, so that we control for organizational size (FIRMSIZE). The special regulatory 
requirements that are associated with the REIT status, may also impact on the likelihood of 
female representation. If women choose to work in a more transparent environment, we 
assume a positive impact of the REIT variable. Furthermore, women are often associated with 
risk aversion (Faccio et al., 2016). If women are indeed more risk averse, they would be less 
likely to occupy a board seat of a high-risk firm. Therefore, we include LEVERAGE and 
VOLATILITY as proxies for firm risk. We also control for the liquidity of a company 
(LIQUIDITY), and include firm age (FIRMAGE) in our models. Older firms may have more 
conservative structures with boardrooms that might resemble an ‘old boys network’. 
Assuming that firms with deep-rooted conservative structures are not inclined to appoint 
female directors, we expect a negative relationship between FIRMAGE and WOMAN BOARD. 
Based on the premise that women do not yet belong to this ‘old boys network’, they conform 
more to independent director characteristics. Therefore, we expect an increased female 
representation in firms with a high percentage of independent directors (% INDEPENDENT). 
Since institutional shareholders increasingly emphasize diversity, we expect major 
shareholders (MAJORSHARE) to have a positive impact on female board appointments. 
Additionally, board diversity can be influenced by powerful insider ownership concentration 
(INSIDERS). Since most of the insider shareholders are men, a high percentage of insider 
equity owner may lead to a decreased number of female directors. Once again, we assume 
that company insiders are more likely to appoint boardroom candidates from within their ‘old 
boys network’. The impact of CEO DUALITY on the variable WOMAN BOARD is not clearly 
determined in advance. On the one hand, the availability of leading board positions increases 
the probability of a female board appointment. On the other hand, a CEO who also holds the 
board chair position, is powerful in enforcing strategic decisions, in this context, a diversity 
policy. We include market-based (TOBINSQ) and accounting-based (ROA) performance 
metrics, since it may be that performance precedes diversity. If women choose to serve on the 
boards of more profitable companies with higher future cash flows, ROA and TOBINSQ 
should have a positive impact on the presence of female directors.  
In most cases, our coefficients show the expected sign. Thus, larger real estate companies 
with a larger board and a higher share of independent directors are more likely to employ 
female directors. The coefficient of CEO DUALITY is negative and statistically significant. Thus, 
the probability of female board members decreases if the CEO is simultaneously the board 
chair. Additionally, firms with a high insider ownership concentration are more likely to have a 
male-dominated board, which supports our prediction. Model 2 may support the theory of 
women being more risk averse, since LEVERAGE has a negative impact on the presence of 
women on boards. However, in Model 1, the coefficient on LEVERAGE is not significant and 
the coefficient on VOLATILITY is not significant in both models. Interestingly, in Model 1 the 
probability of female representation on the board increases for older companies. This result 
contradicts our prediction, although the significance level of 10% is low. We find a positive 
and significant relationship between TOBINSQ and WOMAN BOARD, which implies that 
profitable firms in terms of market performance are more attractive for female board 
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members. However, the accounting-based measure ROA does not influence the likelihood of 
female representation on the board. 
Exhibit 3.4: Heckman procedure: 1st-stage analysis 
 WOMAN BOARD 
 1  2 
BOARDSIZE 1.342*** (6.35)  1.559*** (7.33) 
% INDEPENDENT 1.870*** (4.19)  1.573*** (3.50) 
CEO DUALITY -0.196** (-2.28)  -0.240*** (-2.77) 
INSIDERS -1.563*** (-3.29)  -1.911*** (-4.02) 
MAJORSHARE 0.103 (0.34)  0.256 (0.86) 
REIT -0.119 (-0.37)  -0.278 (-0.85) 
FIRMSIZE 0.299*** (5.41)  0.272*** (4.88) 
LEVERAGE -0.391 (-1.32)  -0.679** (-2.32) 
VOLATILITY -0.030 (-1.54)  -0.002 (-0.08) 
LIQUIDITY -0.208 (-0.39)  -0.197 (-0.37) 
FIRMAGE 0.094* (1.73)  0.015 (0.27) 
ROA 0.039 (0.03)   
TOBINSQ   0.944*** (4.82) 
INTERCEPT -8.007*** (-9.00)  -7.640*** (-8.69) 
Observations 1,061  1,062 
Pseudo R² 0.15  0.17 
LR 222.53***  246.90*** 
Exhibit 3.4 provides the results of the first stage Heckman procedure (pooled probit regression) for the likelihood 
of a company having a woman on the board of directors. WOMAN BOARD is a binary variable equal to 1 if at 
least one female director occupies a corporate board seat, 0 otherwise. BOARDSIZE represents the natural 
logarithm of the sum of directors on the board. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on 
the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the 
board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders 
(including relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who own 5% or more of 
outstanding shares. REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the 
standard deviation of the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 
40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock exchange. ROA is the ratio of net 
income to total assets. TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity plus debt, 
divided by the book value of total assets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-
value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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Exhibit 3.5 presents the estimation results for the second-stage regressions (2) with the 
market-based performance measures (TOBINSQ, PRICE/NAV), as well as the accounting-based 
performance measures (ROA, FFO/SHARE) as the dependent variables. With regard to our 
main hypothesis H1, we include the percentage of women on the board of directors 
(%WOMEN BOARD) as our independent variable of primary interest. We control for potential 
endogeneity by including the inverse mills ratio (MILLS) in all four models, which is not 
significant in any model except for the FFO/SHARE regression. In principle, the regressions do 
not suffer from sample selection bias.  
With regard to our four models, we only find a significant and positive association between 
women on the board of directors and the financial performance measure TOBINSQ. A positive 
link between gender diversity and Tobin’s Q indicates that the stock market expects higher 
future earnings from firms with an increased share of women. Thus, investors believe the 
economic advantages of board gender diversity to outweigh the disadvantages. Additionally, 
our results support the arguments of Bear et al. (2010) and Reguera-Alvarado et al. (2017), 
that investors pay attention to companies’ ethical behavior in their investment decisions. 
Considering women in the boardroom as a positive investment variable, socially responsible 
investors increase the demand for those companies’ shares and ultimately their market values. 
With regard to the accounting-based measures, board gender diversity may not influence 
actual financial performance data like FFO/SHARE or ROA, because other financial factors, 
such as a company’s total assets or capital structure, are more suitable for explaining these 
financial realities. In sum, these results shows that within the gender diversity / performance 
relationship, it is necessary to distinguish explicitly between ‘objective’ accounting-based and 
‘subjective’ market-based measures (Haslam et al., 2010). Thus, market-based measures are 
probably the more appropriate performance measures in the context of gender diversity, since 
the positive influence of female directors might relate more to investor perceptions than to 
financial realities. Therefore, we focus exclusively on market-based measures as dependent 
variables in our further analysis. 
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Exhibit 3.5: Heckman procedure: 2nd-stage analysis 
 
Market-based performance 
 measures 
 
Accounting-based performance 
measures 
 TOBINSQ PRICE/NAV 
 
FFO/SHARE ROA 
% WOMEN BOARD 0.281* (1.91) 0.221 (0.79) 
 
0.147 (0.52) -0.020 (-1.01) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.123 (0.62) 0.121 (0.33) 
 
0.009 (0.03) -0.002 (-0.11) 
CEO DUALITY 0.017 (0.36) -0.003 (-0.04) 
 
-0.000 (-0.00) -0.000 (-0.05) 
INSIDERS -0.124 (-0.59) -0.443 (-1.03) 
 
-0.436 (-1.00) 0.052** (2.07) 
MAJORSHARE -0.122 (-1.49) -0.173 (-1.16) 
 
-0.200 (-1.54) -0.020** (-2.24) 
BMEETING -0.023 (-1.51) -0.046 (1.57) 
 
-0.061 (-1.33) 0.004 (0.92) 
REIT 0.177*** (2.60) 0.241* (1.88) 
 
0.377*** (5.76) 0.037*** (6.10) 
FIRMSIZE -0.127*** (-3.27) -0.273*** (-3.37) 
 
0.682*** (9.44) 0.002 (0.42) 
LEVERAGE 0.260*** (2.76) 1.168*** (5.65) 
 
0.080 (0.38) -0.101*** (-5.96) 
VOLATILITY -0.011*** (-4.04) -0.047*** (-8.71) 
 
-0.006 (-0.64) -0.001 (-1.35) 
LIQUIDITY -0.080 (-0.82) 0.073 (0.32) 
 
-0.310 (-1.19) -0.003 (-0.16) 
FIRMAGE 0.097*** (3.14) 0.166*** (3.09) 
 
0.092 (-1.30) 0.002 (0.56) 
ROA 0.925*** (3.06) 1.434** (2.42) 
 
  
TOBINSQ   
 
1.077*** (8.78) 0.066*** (6.51) 
MILLS 0.082 (0.63) 0.135 (0.56) 
 
0.212* (1.70) 0.002 (0.21) 
INTERCEPT 1.479** (2.11) 3.289*** (2.27) 
 
-9.736*** (-8.11) -0.006 (-0.06) 
Observations 1,060 1,052 
 
972 1,060 
R² 0.85 0.86 
 
0.84 0.57 
Adj. R² 0.83 0.84 
 
0.81 0.51 
Exhibit 3.5 shows the results of the second stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects). The dependent performance measures are represented by market-based (TOBINSQ and PRICE/NAV) and accounting-
based measures (FFO/SHARE and ROA). TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity plus debt, 
divided by the book value of total assets. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. 
FFO/SHARE is the natural logarithm of the funds from operations (as reported by the company) divided by the number of shares 
outstanding. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. % WOMEN BOARD represents the percentage of women in the 
board of directors. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of 
outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who 
own 5% or more of outstanding shares. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all board meetings during 
a fiscal year. REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on 
the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares 
outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the stock 
exchange. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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3.4.2.2 Impact of women in executive and non-executive positions 
We extend the board gender-composition analysis by explicitly distinguishing between 
executive and non-executive positions. Exhibit 3.6 summarizes the first-stage regression 
results for the likelihood that a company has a female executive or female non-executive 
director. The two-stage Heckman (1976) procedure requires an ‘exclusion variable’ in the first 
stage, which has no impact on the financial performance measures in the second stage. We 
assume that the number of executive directors (# EXECUTIVES), as well as the number of non-
executive directors (# NON-EXECUTIVES), has a positive impact on the likelihood of a female 
executive director and a female non-executive director, respectively. We do not expect both 
# EXECUTIVES and # NON-EXECUTIVES to directly affect the dependent performance variables 
in the second stage. 
The detailed analysis of women in executive (Model 3) and non-executive (Model 4) positions 
confirms the preceding probit model results for the presence of women on the board of 
directors. Model 3 shows that the number of executives has a positive significant impact on 
the likelihood of a female executive director. The availability of more leading positions enables 
higher female representation in the group of executives. The same applies to women in non-
executive positions (Model 4). 
Interestingly, major shareholders have a positive impact on the presence of a female executive 
director, but a negative impact on a female non-executive director. Thus, the assumption that 
institutional shareholders demand boardroom diversity, holds especially for executive 
positions. The size of a firm displays ambiguous results. In order to conform to societal 
pressure to increase gender diversity, larger firms appoint females rather to non-executive 
positions than to executive ones. With regard to ROA, we observe that the likelihood of 
having a female executive director increases with higher company profitability. However, this 
accounting-based performance measure has no impact on the presence of female non-
executive directors. Since the group of executives has an immediate effect on financial 
realities, suitable women for executive positions may deliberately choose companies that are 
performing well, as their employer. The Mills ratios calculated from Models 3 and 4 are used 
in the second-stage performance regressions to control for the performance between 
companies with and without female executive directors or female non-executive directors. 
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Exhibit 3.6: Heckman procedure: 1st-stage analysis for the group of executives and 
non-executives 
 WOMAN EXECUTIVES  WOMAN NON-EXECUTIVES 
 3  4 
# EXECUTIVES 1.265*** (9.61)   
# NON-EXECUTIVES   0.494*** (2.79) 
% INDEPENDENT 1.337*** (3.02)  2.006*** (4.27) 
CEO DUALITY 0.141* (1.68)  -0.488*** (-5.70) 
INSIDERS -1.167** (-2.29)  -2.025*** (-4.10) 
MAJORSHARE 0.932*** (3.09)  -0.716** (-2.36) 
REIT 0.102 (0.38)  -0.744** (-2.21) 
FIRMSIZE -0.212*** (-4.32)  0.420*** (7.67) 
LEVERAGE -0.194 (-0.68)  0.340 (1.11) 
VOLATILITY -0.002 (-0.13)  -0.018 (-0.94) 
LIQUIDITY -0.300 (-0.56)  -0.799 (-1.47) 
FIRMAGE 0.184*** (3.41)  0.002 (0.04) 
ROA 2.388*** (1.99)  -2.329 (-1.64) 
INTERCEPT -1.091 (-1.37)  -7.169*** (-8.06) 
Observations 1,061  1,061 
Pseudo R² 0.11  0.17 
LR 151.12***  248.86*** 
Exhibit 3.6 provides the results of the first-stage Heckman procedure (pooled probit regression) for the group of executives 
and non-executives. WOMAN EXECUTIVES is a binary variable equal to 1 if a company has at least one female executive 
director, 0 otherwise. WOMAN NON-EXECUTIVES is a binary variable equal to 1 if a company has at least one female non-
executive director, 0 otherwise. # EXECUTIVES represents the natural logarithm of the sum of executive directors. # NON-
EXECUTIVES represents the natural logarithm of the sum of non-executive directors. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of 
independent directors on the company's board. CEO DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously 
chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders 
(including relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority shareholders who own 5% or more of outstanding shares. 
REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of the share price, based on 
the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of traded shares to shares 
outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years since listing on the 
stock exchange. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-
value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
Turning to our second hypothesis H2, we examine the performance effects of women in the 
board of directors in detail. To do so, we distinguish explicitly between the female 
proportions in executive, as well as in non-executive positions (Exhibit 3.7). Consistent with 
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our findings in the board-composition analysis, we do not find any significant results for the 
accounting-based measures ROA and FFO/SHARE. Moreover, our results show that female 
executives (% WOMEN EXE) have a significant positive impact on TOBINSQ (at 1% level) as 
well as PRICE/NAV (at 5% level). However, we could not find any significant results for the 
percentage of female non-executive directors (% WOMEN NON-EXE) on financial 
performance. Consequently, the theory that stock market participants expect higher future 
earnings from firm’s with increased female representation is especially true for gender 
diversity in executive positions. This might be explained by the fact that executives bear the 
responsibility for strategic corporate decisions and the day-to-day business. Thus, they are 
highly visible and the subject of considerable media attention, leading to coverage of market 
analysts and interest of investors. Furthermore, in comparison to women in less visible 
leadership positions, female executive directors especially qualify as role models. In such a role 
model function, successful female executives may encourage female employees to strive for 
higher career levels, therefore increasing the pool of female talents and board candidates 
(Hillman et al., 2007). Since executive diversity is a strong signal of company commitment to 
diversity, it might be especially appreciated by socially responsible investors. 
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Exhibit 3.7: Heckman procedure: 2nd-stage analysis for the group of executives and 
non-executives 
 Executives 
 
Non-Executives 
 TOBINSQ PRICE/NAV  TOBINSQ PRICE/NAV 
% WOMEN EXE 0.243*** (3.22) 0.318** (2.37)    
% WOMEN NON-EXE    0.140 (1.21) 0.030 (0.14) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.006 (0.05) -0.100 (-0.55)  0.138 (0.68) 0.128 (0.34) 
CEO DUALITY 0.029 (0.95) 0.014 (0.35)  0.014 (0.30) -0.005 (-0.06) 
INSIDERS 0.087 (0.55) -0.063 (-0.20)  -0.134 (-0.62) -0.444 (-1.01) 
MAJORSHARE -0.142** (-2.32) -0.231** (-2.05)  -0.126 (-1.51) -0.174 (-1.16) 
BMEETING -0.024* (-1.66) -0.049* (-1.74)  -0.022 (-1.47) -0.046 (-1.56) 
REIT 0.180*** (5.44) 0.251*** (3.79)  0.172** (2.50) 0.238* (1.85) 
FIRMSIZE -0.157*** (-6.05) -0.320*** (-6.17)  -0.128*** (-3.13) -0.276*** (-3.31) 
LEVERAGE 0.229** (2.29) 1.130*** (5.37)  0.260*** (2.68) 1.166*** (5.59) 
VOLATILITY -0.011*** (-4.27) -0.045*** (-9.35)  -0.011*** (-4.21) -0.047*** (-8.78) 
LIQUIDITY -0.033 (-0.45) 0.175 (0.91)  -0.085 (-0.88) 0.068 (0.29) 
FIRMAGE 0.080*** (2.62) 0.136** (2.52)  0.095*** (3.08) 0.165*** (3.07) 
ROA 0.910*** (3.24) 1.347*** (2.59)  0.913*** (2.94) 1.433** (2.38) 
MILLS -0.087*** (-2.74) -0.191*** (-3.37)  0.088 (0.66) 0.135 (0.55) 
INTERCEPT 2.205*** (5.44) 4.52*** (5.24)  1.594*** (3.20) 3.363** (2.25) 
Observations 1,060 1,052  1,060 1,052 
R² 0.85 0.86  0.85 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.84 0.84  0.83 0.84 
Exhibit 3.7 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects) for women in the group of executives and non-executives. TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market 
value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of total assets. PRICE/NAV is the natural logarithm of the market valuation 
divided by the NAV. % WOMEN EXE and % WOMEN NON-EXE represents the percentage of women in the group of executives 
and non-executives, respectively. % INDEPENDENT is the percentage of independent directors on the company's board. CEO 
DUALITY is a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm’s CEO is simultaneously chair of the board, 0 otherwise. INSIDERS represents the 
percentage of outstanding shares currently held by insiders (including relatives). MAJORSHARE is the percentage of majority 
shareholders who own 5% or more of outstanding shares. BMEETING represents the natural logarithm of the number of all 
board meetings during a fiscal year. REIT is a binary variable equal to 1 if the company has REIT status, 0 otherwise. FIRMSIZE is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. LEVERAGE is the ratio of total debt to total assets. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of 
the share price, based on the weekly values, divided by the mean price and multiplied by 40. LIQUIDITY represents the ratio of 
traded shares to shares outstanding. FIRMAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm’s age, whereby age is measured by the years 
since listing on the stock exchange. ROA is the ratio of net income to total assets. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from 
the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 
and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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3.4.3 Alternative test 
3.4.3.1 Impact of different gender compositions in the group of executives 
and non-executives 
With regard to the ‘tokenism theory’ of Kanter (1977a, 1977b), it may be that the gender 
diversity / performance relationship is non-linear. Thus, we expect uniform (0% women) and 
skewed (0% < x < 15% women) groups to show a non-significant or negative impact on the 
market performance. In contrast, within tilted (15% ≤ x < 30% women) or balanced (x ≥ 30% 
women) groups, a certain critical mass of female representation is reached, whereby the 
benefits of diverse groups outweigh the disadvantages of heterogeneous teams. To address 
this issue, we rerun both stages of the Heckman (1976) procedure for both the group of 
executives and non-executives, including four groups that vary in their gender composition. 
The results of the ‘tokenism’ analysis are displayed in Exhibit 3.8, with uniform groups 
representing the reference category. We include the usual set of firm and board controls and 
the inverse Mill’s ratio as estimated from the probit model in Exhibit 3.6 in all regression 
models. In accordance with our previous results, the Kanter categorization for the group of 
non-executive directors shows that women in non-executive positions do not seem to 
influence market-based performance (TOBINSQ and PRICE/NAV). However, with regard to the 
gender composition in the group of executives, we find that firms with a balanced executive 
team outperform homogeneous male groups by 10.4%, as measured by Tobin’s Q (at 1% 
level) and by 10.9%, as measured by Price/NAV (at 5% level). The coefficients for the two 
other executive groups (SKEWED and TILTED) are not statistically different from zero. Thus, 
we verify H3 that a female ‘token’ has no impact on the market performance. Even a female 
minority group does not contribute to higher market performance. Hence, our analysis for the 
group of executives verifies the ‘token woman theory’, that a certain female representation is 
needed to generate an impact. In the case of real estate companies, a critical mass of female 
executives is reached in balanced groups (> 30% women). 
  
Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence from US Real Estate Companies 
65 
Exhibit 3.8: Heckman procedure: 2nd-stage analysis for 'tokenism' 
 Executives  Non-Executives 
 TOBINSQ PRICE/NAV  TOBINSQ PRICE/NAV 
SKEWED  -0.005 (-0.24) -0.019 (-0.47)  0.024 (1.14) 0.026 (0.61) 
TILTED  0.024 (1.35) 0.035 (0.93)  0.033 (1.31) 0.027 (0.59) 
BALANCED  0.104*** (2.98) 0.109** (2.06)  0.060 (1.51) 0.015 (0.17) 
Observations 1,060 1,052  1,060 1,052 
Controls included included  included included 
MILLS included included  included included 
R² 0.86 0.86  0.85 0.86 
Adj. R² 0.84 0.84  0.83 0.84 
Exhibit 3.8 shows the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed 
effects) with a focus on different gender compositions in the group of executives and non-executives. TOBINSQ is the natural 
logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of total assets. PRICE/NAV is the natural 
logarithm of the market valuation divided by the NAV. UNIFORM is a binary variable equal to 1 for homogeneous male groups, 0 
otherwise and represents the reference category in all regressions. SKEWED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of 
women varies from 1% to less than 15%, 0 otherwise. TILTED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women varies 
from 15% to less than 30%, 0 otherwise. BALANCED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women is at least 30%, 
0 otherwise. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * 
denote statistical significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. Heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 
3.4.3.2 Impact of different gender compositions in real estate property sectors 
Exhibit 3.9 provides an in-depth analysis of real estate companies’ different property sectors. 
Panel A shows the results of the mean-comparison test for the average percentage of female 
executives, classified by different property sectors. In our sample, women occupy on average 
9.2% of executive positions. With 14.75% and 14.17% of women in the group of executives, 
the property sectors health care and residential, respectively, show a significantly higher 
female representation than the sample’s average percentage of women in the group of 
executives. The sectors office, hotel and industrial account for the smallest mean percentage 
of female executives in comparison the overall sample average. 
Panel B displays the regression results for the performance effects of female executives in 
different property sectors. The group of executives is subdivided by its gender composition 
into uniform, skewed, tilted and balanced groups, whereas uniform represents the reference 
category. As hypothesized in H4, it is important for profitable companies to consider 
customer needs through the management team. In the regressions of the health care, retail 
and hotel subsample, the coefficients for the balanced group of executives show the expected 
positive signs. A balanced executive team outperforms a homogeneous male group by 36.9% 
(health care), 15.5% (retail) and 12.9% (hotel), as measured by Tobin’s Q. This positive 
association stresses the importance of a diverse leadership team for real estate sectors which 
are more consumer-orientated. Furthermore, these findings are also of particular interest for 
real estate sectors with a diverse workforce, e.g. the health care sector, where women 
account for the majority of employees. Interestingly, companies with a residential property 
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focus do not seem to benefit particularly from gender-diverse management. This might be 
explained by the fact that the consumer base for housing is relatively equally distributed 
between women and men. Interestingly, the subsample industrial shows a positive 
performance effect for skewed (0% < x < 15% women) executive teams. However, this 
subsample becomes small and loses its significance for more than 30% female representation 
in the group of executives. Moreover, with only 92 observations in the industrial subsample, 
extreme values may bias the results. In conclusion, female leadership connects the firm to its 
customers and employees, which is then rewarded by investors. 
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Panel A: Mean-comparison for different property sectors concerning the percentage of women in the group of executives (% WOMEN EXE)  
        
 Health care Residential Retail Industrial Office Hotel Mixed 
 14.75*** (-5.10) 14.17*** (-5.15) 9.09 (0.12) 5.44*** (2.98) 7.12** (2.41) 6.14*** (3.01) 7.93 (1.41) 
    
Panel B: Heckman procedure – 2nd-stage analysis for different gender compositions in the group of executives  
  
 TOBINSQ 
 Health care Residential Retail Industrial Office Hotel Mixed 
SKEWED -0.002 (-0.03) -0.001 (-0.05) -0.011 (-0.35) 0.326*** (2.78) -0.054 (-1.19) 0.053 (1.52) 0.031 (0.47) 
TILTED 0.105 (1.45) 0.029 (1.39) 0.040 (1.22) -0.061 (-1.04) 0.010 (0.26) 0.104** (2.21) 0.053 (1.25) 
BALANCED 0.369*** (2.83) 0.027 (0.90) 0.155*** (2.88) 0.079 (0.54) 0.022 (0.42) 0.129** (2.24) 0.126** (2.20) 
Observations 118 140 259 92 179 129 143 
Controls included included included Included included included included 
Mills included included included Included included included included 
R² 0.89 0.92 0.89 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.92 
Adj. R² 0.84 0.89 0.87 0.88 0.80 0.88 0.89 
Exhibit 3.9 provides a mean-comparison test for real estate companies’ different property sectors (Panel A) and the results of the second-stage Heckman procedure (panel regression with period and cross-section fixed effects) 
for different gender compositions in the group of executives with Tobin’s Q as dependent variable (Panel B). TOBINSQ is the natural logarithm of the sum of the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the book value of 
total assets. The property sectors are defined by following the SNL classification: ‘health care’; ‘office’; ‘hotel’; ‘residential’ (multi-family and manufactured homes); ‘retail’ (shopping center, regional malls and other retail); 
‘industrial’ (logistics and self-storage); ‘mixed’ (miscellaneous). UNIFORM is a binary variable equal to 1 for homogeneous male groups, 0 otherwise and represents the reference category in all regressions. SKEWED is a binary 
variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women varies from 1% to less than 15%, 0 otherwise. TILTED is a binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women varies from 15% to less than 30%, 0 otherwise. BALANCED is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the percentage of women is at least 30%, 0 otherwise. MILLS is the inverse mills ratio estimated from the probit model to account for sample selection bias. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at p-value<0.01, p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1, respectively. For Panel A, the t-statistics are shown in parentheses. For Panel B heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-corrected t-statistics are shown in 
parentheses. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study extends the current corporate governance literature by demonstrating that 
investors pay increased attention to gender diversity in their investment decisions. We offer 
new insights into the relationship between gender diversity in boardrooms and firm financial 
performance by focusing on the US real estate industry. Using a sample of 116 US publicly 
traded real estate companies from 2005 till 2015, this study is the first to examine the 
development and status quo of women in real estate leadership roles, and their contribution 
to performance. Whereas in 2005, the percentage of women on the board of directors 
accounted for 7.64%, in 2015, female representation in the board reached 11.55%. The real 
estate sector, although traditionally male-dominated, has shown a gradual improvement in 
the inclusion of women on boards over the last few years.  
We test several hypotheses to determine whether real estate companies benefit from a 
diversified board of directors. To control for endogeneity within this relationship, we first 
need to investigate the factors that impact on a real estate company’s female representation. 
We find that the likelihood of having a female director increases for larger firms with larger 
boards, and with an increased share of insiders and independent board members. Moreover, 
if the CEO is simultaneously board chair, the probability of female board members decreases.  
The results also demonstrate that the gender diversity / performance relationship depends on 
the measure of performance. More specifically, the hypothesis proposed above, that women 
have a positive impact on financial performance, is not supported by the accounting-based 
performance measures. Gender diversity evidently does not have an impact, neither on ROA 
nor on FFO/SHARE. However, we find a significant and positive association between the 
percentage of women in the board of directors and the market-based performance Tobin’s Q. 
In addition, by explicitly distinguishing between the female proportions in the group of 
executives and non-executives, we find that the positive association between women and 
market-based performance is driven by females in executive, rather than non-executive 
positions. Since executive diversity is a strong signal of company commitment to diversity, it 
might be appreciated and valued particularly by socially responsible investors. Finally, our 
results reveal that the gender diversity / performance relationship is non-linear. Real estate 
companies with a balanced executive team (x ≥ 30% women) outperform homogeneous male 
teams by 10.4%, as measured by Tobin’s Q or 10.9%, as measured by PRICE /NAV. These 
findings are consistent with the ‘tokenism theory’ that a certain level of female representation 
is needed to generate an impact. In the case of real estate companies, 30% of women in the 
group of executives represents the critical mass. Our results are of particular interest to real 
estate sectors with a strong consumer orientation and a high proportion of women in the 
workforce, such as retail, hotel and health care. 
In conclusion, we suggest that real estate companies promote more women into executive 
positions, since the results of the present study show that companies with a diverse 
leadership increase their shareholder value. A strong commitment to diversity ultimately leads 
to an improved corporate image. Especially investors who apply an ‘impact investing strategy’ 
create a demand for the shares of such companies. 
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Future research could extend the diversity analysis to women participation at the middle 
management level. It would be interesting to examine how women in middle management 
positions affect financial performance. Moreover, the real estate corporate governance 
literature would also benefit from an investigation of further diversity dimensions, such as 
race, religion, age and education. 
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4 The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: 
Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines whether executive compensation packages within the real estate industry 
are determined merely by performance or also by CEO power mechanisms that have an 
essential influence on board-level negotiations. We offer original into management 
compensation arrangements during and after the financial crisis. The relative importance of 
bonuses within CEO compensation contracts has been more than halved after the crisis. 
Simultaneously, after the financial crisis, equity-based compensation became increasingly 
important. Concerning the pay-for-performance link our results show no relationship during 
the financial crisis. However, after the crisis, we show a strong significant link between 
remuneration packages and corporate success. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007/2008 revealed that managers had been rewarded for excessive 
short-term risk-taking (Clementi et al., 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010). The devastating 
consequences of the financial crisis have triggered a heated debate on executive 
compensation, and especially on the effectiveness of performance based compensation. In 
2011, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted amendments to its disclosure 
rules (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2011). The ‘Say-on-Pay’ rule now provides 
shareholders with an advisory vote on executive compensation. Hence, through regulation, 
the SEC is attempting to strengthen shareholder engagement in listed companies, provide a 
framework for effective pay-for-performance arrangements and finally, increase transparency. 
However, the practical implementation of pay-for-performance arrangements after the 
financial crisis has so far not been assessed systematically. This paper aims to fill this void by 
empirically examining C-level compensation packages in the US real estate industry. Previous 
research on compensation has built upon the arguments of agency theory (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Bloom and Milkovich, 1998) and/or managerial power theory (Bebchuk et 
al., 2002). The former proclaims that CEO/executive compensation is primarily determined by 
company performance. Managerial power theory, however, considers the significant influence 
of CEO’s on board member’s decisions, and ultimately on the level of their own compensation 
and pay sensitivity to performance. The question then is which of these two theories apply to 
real estate companies. 
A large number of studies have examined the pay-for-performance relationship empirically in 
the context of REITs. The literature, however, provides ambiguous findings, with evidence 
that agency theory and managerial power theory both play a valuable role in explaining 
distinct compensation patterns within the real estate industry. For example, Ghosh and 
Sirmans (2005) find that independent directors - a determinant in monitoring CEO power - are 
associated with higher remuneration packages, whereas Feng et al. (2010) find an 
insignificant relationship between independent directors and compensation, while other 
studies do not even control for this monitoring variable (e.g., Pennathur et al., 2005; Griffith 
et al., 2011). Hence, a thorough assessment of the compensation determinants within the 
real estate industry is needed, taking into consideration the explanatory validity of agency 
theory and managerial power theory in the context of compensation levels and its sensitivity 
to firm performance. We extend the current literature by investigating the pay-performance 
relationship with respect to the entire group of executive directors, alongside a detailed 
analysis of CEO compensation. Additionally, we show that after the financial crisis the 
relevance of cash and value-driven performance ratios, such as FFO and Tobin’s Q increase. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews the theoretical 
reasoning and relevant literature on this topic, followed by the methodology of the panel 
data analysis in the third Section. The data are described in Section four. The results are 
displayed in Section five and the conclusion in Section six. 
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4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Theoretical background 
Agency problems arise due to the separation of company ownership (stockholders) and 
control (managers). Since listed real estate companies commonly have dispersed stockholders, 
company owners cannot efficiently control the daily operations of the company. Thus, from 
an agency perspective, the central challenge is to align the manager’s objectives of achieving 
maximum compensation, while simultaneously mitigating personal losses to the owner’s 
interest of maximizing performance (Bloom and Milkovich, 1998).  
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the structure of the compensation contract should 
provide appropriate incentives for the manager to make decisions that maximize stockholder 
wealth. Therefore, the board of directors engages in arm’s-length negotiations with CEO and 
executives over compensation policies, in order to mitigate agency problems. Based on 
agency theory, executive compensation is determined primarily by company performance. 
This view is challenged by the managerial power theory of Bebchuk et al. (2002). They argue 
that boards of directors cannot be expected to bargain at arm’s length with managers, 
because a powerful CEO significantly impacts on board member decisions, especially in 
circumstances where the board of directors is relatively less independent. Since directors’ 
positions are associated with reputation, networks, and compensation, directors generally 
prefer to retain their position, and thus may negotiate compensation contracts that are more 
favourable to executives. CEOs exert a powerful influence on this re-election process and if, in 
addition, such tendencies as loyalty and collegiality prevail within boards, directors may 
comply with the CEO and approve substantial pay arrangements. (Main et al., 1995; O’Reilly 
and Main, 2010) Consequently, executives exert considerable influence on the amount of 
their own remuneration and the level of sensitivity to performance (fixed vs. variable 
compensation).  
Real estate companies provide a desirable setting for analysing both theories, since REITs are 
heavily regulated. Particularly the fact that a single shareholder cannot own more than 10 
percent of REIT shares results in predominantly dispersed ownership within REITs. Thus, the 
role of institutional shareholders or independent directors in monitoring the company’s 
management can be accorded more importance than in other industries. Moreover, by 
focusing on a single industry, we significantly reduce firm heterogeneity in terms of variability 
in performance, risk and board characteristics. In this way, examining real estate companies 
provides an interesting and valuable setting for examining the relationship between 
compensation and both performance and board characteristics. 
 
The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
77 
4.2.2 Determinants of CEO and executive compensation within the real estate 
industry 
There is a growing body of literature on the determinants of REIT CEO and executive 
compensation. Most work focuses on the pay-for-performance relation, although recent 
studies also deal with the monitoring role of the board of directors. 
Hardin (1998) finds senior executive cash compensation to be determined by REIT firm size, 
senior management’s stock ownership, the amount of dividends paid to the senior executive 
and the number of years since the initial public offering. Chopin et al. (1995) model executive 
compensation as a function of size, revenue and unexpected profit, and find a positive 
relationship between REIT revenue and size, and CEO compensation. Scott et al. (2001) 
examine the impact of the market-based performance measure total shareholder return on 
REIT executives’ base salary and incentive compensation. Their findings indicate that size, 
more so than performance, is a significant determinant of the base salary, although incentive-
based compensation is highly elastic to performance. In contrast to prior research which 
applies the OLS method, Pennathur et al. (2005) apply the Tobit method to estimate the 
determinants of CEO compensation. They find that REIT CEOs who increase FFO and earnings 
per share receive larger option awards. Moreover, CEOs are rewarded with larger stock-based 
compensation schemes for riskier investments, measured by variability in returns. 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005) are the first to test the role of board-of-director characteristics on 
REIT CEO compensation. Applying a simultaneous equation model, they find that CEOs 
receive higher compensation schemes in REITs where the board monitors only weakly, due to 
its large size, the presence of older directors and absence of blockholders. Consistent with 
prior research, firm size and performance, as measured by return on assets, are significant 
explanatory variables in explaining CEO compensation. Using a REIT sample from 2001, Feng 
et al. (2007) similarly include board-independence monitoring variables to investigate the 
determinants of director compensation. Their results show that higher equity-based director 
compensation is associated with improved performance. Moreover, larger firms with an 
independent nomination committee award more equity-based compensation to directors. 
However, they find no relationship between director compensation and board size, the 
presence of outside directors, CEO duality, or CEO tenure and ownership. Similarly, Feng et al. 
(2010) focus on the relationship between the presence of institutional shareholders and CEO 
compensation. They find evidence that institutional ownership is associated with greater CEO 
option awards. Thus, institutional shareholders incentivize CEOs by establishing a pay-for-
performance link, but they also pay higher CEO cash compensation (salary + bonus). 
Using a REIT sample from 2000 till 2006, Griffith et al. (2011) are the first to apply panel 
fixed-effects regression to study the impact of performance and CEO power on changes in 
CEO compensation. They find that performance, measured by shareholder total return, 
Tobin’s q and changes in FFO, does not influence CEO salary, while CEO power variables, such 
as CEO tenure and age, CEO duality, CEO stock ownership, all have significant effects. 
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However, performance in addition to CEO power affects CEO option awards and finally, CEO 
bonuses are determined predominantly by performance. 
This study extends the REIT literature on executive compensation by answering the following 
research questions: First, current literature does not specify the most appropriate indicator of 
REIT management performance with regard to C-Level compensation. Do REITs apply 
contingent payment contracting relying on market-based or specific real estate performance 
measures? Second, do certain board-of-director characteristics allow CEOs to bargain for 
higher compensation levels?  
This paper adds to the literature by examining both the REIT CEO pay-for- performance 
relationship, and the validity of managerial power theory in a real estate context. We extend 
prior research by adding further corporate governance variables, such as the number of 
compensation committee meetings, a dummy indicating whether the CEO is also the founder 
of the company or the tenure of the longest-serving board member. These variables consider 
the power of different participants in the pay-setting process. Furthermore, we not only focus 
on CEO compensation, but also investigate the determinants of different types of executive 
director compensation. We are the first to investigate whether cash, long-term and equity 
compensation is adequately linked to different performance time horizons. Specifically, we 
extend the literature by using a post-financial-crisis sample, as one could argue that the 
extent of board monitoring and the pay-for-performance sensitivity changed after the crisis.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Data 
As primary inclusion criteria for this study, sample companies had to be listed in the FTSE 
EPRA / NAREIT United States Index, which ensures a homogeneous real estate sample with 
regard to the listing criteria of size and income composition. The initial sample consists of 116 
US publicly traded real estate companies. The dataset for this study was created by using 
various sources. The CEO and executive compensation information was provided by 
ExecuComp. Firm and financial performance data are from Compustat, SNL and Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Data on the corporate governance mechanisms were collected primarily 
from Bloomberg, and secondly from the company’s proxy statement (DEF 14A). Our dataset 
was limited by the availability of corporate governance information. In total, the final sample 
comprises 83 US listed real estate companies over the sample period 2006 to 2015, resulting 
in 830 firm-year observations. 
 
4.3.2 Variables 
4.3.2.1 Compensation variables 
Previous pay-for-performance research commonly focuses on total CEO compensation and its 
distinct components (see Ghosh and Sirmans, 2005; Feng et al., 2010; Griffith et al., 2011). 
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This study investigates both CEO compensation and that of the entire group of executive 
directors, as executives are crucial participants in daily company decision-making processes 
and therefore part of the agency problem. To analyse the pay-performance relationship from 
different time-horizon perspectives, we distinguish between short-term and long-term 
compensation components. Additionally, we construct a variable for equity compensation to 
evaluate incentive-based components. This approach yields three sets of estimates each, for 
CEO and executive directors. Natural logarithm is applied for all compensation variables.  
With regard to short-term compensation, this study investigates total current cash 
compensation (TCC CEO and TCC EXE), which is the sum of base salary and cash bonus for a 
fiscal year. The base salary is a fixed component of total compensation, whereas the cash 
bonus is generally dependent on previous-year performance. The second compensation 
measure includes long-term compensation components (TDC CEO and TDC EXE), and is 
calculated by the sum of base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock options 
granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all other total. The LTIP are determined by 
company’s long-term growth plan, which generally sets performance goals for a long-term 
time horizon of 3 years or more. For each year going forward, potential rewards will be paid 
out in cash or stock, contingent on achieving the stipulated goals. The “all other” total 
represent the most inclusive component in long-term compensation, comprising fringe 
benefits, other personal benefits such as company car, severance pay or relocation benefits 
and countervailing benefits. Finally, incentive-based equity compensation (EQUITY CEO and 
EQUITY EXE) is defined as the value of stocks and options granted, as reported in the 
company’s financial statements. According to ASC 718 (formerly FAS 123R), companies are 
required to disclose their equity grants at fair value. 
 
4.3.2.2 Performance measures 
Company performance is measured using five different variables. First, we apply the 
accounting-based measure funds from operations (FFO).14 In this way, FFO might be the most 
appropriate performance measure in the real estate industry, since it serves as an improved 
approximation of cash flows by not deducting depreciation, amortization, non-recurring 
revenue and expenses (Ben-Shahar et al., 2011). 
The second measure of performance is Tobin’s q (TOBINSQ), which is defined as the ratio of 
the market value of firm assets to the replacement costs of its assets (Tobin, 1969). Tobin’s q 
is calculated as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of debt, divided 
by the book value of total assets. Hence, a Tobin’s q ratio greater than 1.0 indicates higher 
future growth opportunities (Feng et al., 2010). 
To capture the influence of current and past performance on our compensation measures, we 
apply total return to shareholders, measured in different time-horizons. Specifically, the 
                                                 
14 Following the NAREIT guidelines, FFO is calculated as GAAP net profits excluding gains or losses from sales of 
properties or debt restructuring, and adding back real estate depreciation and amortization. 
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average total return to shareholders over one, three or five years (TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR) 
might have a mixed relationship with short-term, long-term and equity compensation.  
Following previous literature on agency theory, the link between CEO/executive compensation 
and firm performance should align management goals, such as maximizing compensation, 
with those of shareholder’s, such as creating sustainable firm performance. Hence, in pay-for-
performance contracts, CEO or executive compensation is a positive increasing function of 
firm performance. Based on agency theory, we predict that a better performing company 
rewards the CEO and executive directors with higher compensation levels, especially equity 
compensation. 
 
4.3.2.3 Corporate Governance variables 
In order to control for the distinct power mechanisms within the pay-setting process, we 
include a broad set of corporate governance variables in our model. Generally, corporate 
governance variables can be categorized either according to CEO entrenchment mechanisms 
(CEO/chairman duality, CEO/founder duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO ownership) or board 
control mechanisms (longest board member tenure, blockholders and institutional investors, 
independent shareholders, size of the board, number of compensation committee meetings). 
We predict that these mechanisms influence the ability of CEO’s and executives to negotiate 
higher compensation arrangements. 
CEO DUALITY is a proxy for the CEO being simultaneously chairman of the board. This power 
clustering in the CEO position may increase the CEO’s influence in pay negotiations and the 
nomination process of new directors (Main et al., 1995; O’Reilly and Main, 2010). A similarly 
powerful position for enforcing strategic decisions is CEO FOUNDER, which captures a dual 
role as CEO and founder of the company. We predict that CEO DUALITY as well as CEO 
FOUNDER, are positively associated with CEO/executive compensation.  
The age of the CEO and executive directors, as well as their length of tenure, may also be a 
determinant of strengthening managerial power. Therefore, we include CEO AGE, EXE AGE, 
CEO TENURE, as well as the tenure of the longest serving board member (BOARD MEMBER 
TENURE), in our regression models. The age of the CEO or executive directors can either be a 
proxy for working experience or an indicator of the length of time to retirement (Linck et al., 
2008; Fernandes et al., 2013). Thus, the effect of CEO or executive age on the firm 
performance can be ambiguous. We use the CEO’s time in office (CEO TENURE) to control for 
the CEO’s managerial entrenchment. As collaboration and collegiality among board members 
intensify over time, longer tenured CEOs are expected to have more influence over board 
members (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Thus, we expect a positive 
impact of CEO tenure on compensation. We also control for the tenure of the longest-serving 
board member, which can be an underestimated counterpart to the CEO tenure. Hence, a 
long-serving board member may have seniority status and be capable of convincing other 
board members to contradict CEO decisions.  
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Concerning the effects of ownership variables, CEO OWN, EXE OWN, MAJORSHARE and 
INSTITUTIONALS are employed. Increased share ownership empowers CEOs or executives with 
voting rights and greater control of the company. Thus, higher CEO/executive shareholdings 
might impede external control and monitoring, which could lead to excessive managerial 
compensation packages (Ozkan, 2011). Therefore, we include the percentage of shares 
owned by the CEO and executives (CEO OWN and EXE OWN) and expect a positive 
association with CEO/executive compensation. Ozkan (2011), as well as Griffith et al. (2011), 
find a significant non-monotonic relation between CEO/executive ownership and 
compensation. Consequently, we also include the quadratic model of these variables (CEO 
OWN², EXE OWN²) to control for a non-linear relationship.  
A key structural governance feature in constraining the power of CEOs is blockholder 
ownership. Therefore, we include MAJORSHARE to control for the percentage of substantial 
shareholders who own more than 5% percent of company’s shares. In comparison to 
dispersed shareholders, large, concentrated owners have considerable wealth at stake. Hence, 
they are motivated to actively monitor management decisions and exert influence in cases of 
poor governance. 
However, the unique regulatory structure of REITs inhibits the formation of large 
blockholders, since a single shareholder cannot own more than 10 percent of REIT shares. 
Thus, the role of institutional shareholders in monitoring the company’s management is likely 
to be more important than in other industries. We include INSTITUTIONALS, which represents 
the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors. On the one hand, since 
institutional investor portfolios are closely tied to the performance of firms they invest in, they 
may act as active monitors by limiting managerial power through their voting rights and 
hostile takeover threats. On the other hand, institutional investors may act as momentum 
traders by “voting with their feet”, instead of imposing disciplinary actions on management 
(Feng et al., 2010). We predict that higher levels of concentrated, or rather institutional 
ownership, in the case of REITS, are negatively associated with CEO/executive compensation. 
In the real estate sector, the presence of independent directors is also likely to be a critical 
determinant of monitoring the company’s management. By including %INDEPENDENT, we 
control for the share of independent directors on the board. Directors are considered 
independent if they are not currently employed by the company and have no other affiliations 
with it. A board composed of independent directors is supposed to ensure effective internal 
monitoring and enhanced corporate governance, since company outsiders should be less 
sensitive to the influence of corporate insiders, and free of conflicts of interest (Dalton et al., 
1998). However, independent directors may be less willing to challenge the CEO, as 
tendencies like loyalty and collegiality between board members evolve over time and directors 
generally prefer to retain their position within the re-election procedure (Main et al., 1995; 
O’Reilly and Main, 2010). Nevertheless, we hypothesize that independent directors act as 
efficient monitors in setting market-conform executive compensation arrangements and 
expect a negative association with CEO/executive compensation. 
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The number of directors within the board (BOARDSIZE) is also likely to raise CEO power. 
Larger boards might be ineffective in monitoring, due to a lack of mutual interaction, as well 
as internal coordination and communication problems, which may require more time and 
effort to build consensus (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Yermack, 1996; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). 
Therefore, we expect these collective-action problems of larger boards to provide CEOs with 
more power, resulting in higher CEO/executive compensation. 
The last corporate governance variable is COMPMEETINGS, which is measured by the natural 
logarithm of the total number of compensation committee meetings during a fiscal year. A 
larger number of compensation-committee meetings might imply disagreements on the level 
of compensation and a varying level of performance sensitivity among participants within the 
pay-setting process. Thus, we expect a negative impact of COMPMEETINGS on CEO/executive 
compensation. 
 
4.3.2.4 Firm control variables 
Given the well-documented relationship between the size of a firm and compensation (e.g. 
Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995; Sapp, 2008), we expect a positive association 
between FIRMSIZE, measured by the natural logarithm of total company assets value, and the 
compensation level. We also include the volatility of stock returns (VOLATILITY), calculated as 
the standard deviation of weekly stock returns, in order to control for firm risk. More volatile 
companies may invest in riskier assets in the hope of higher returns. If CEOs or executive 
directors are rewarded for taking risks, we expect the impact of volatility on CEO/executive 
compensation to be positive. Finally, control variables for the company’s specific property 
type are added, since there may not only be returns variability, but also differences in the 
compensation level between various property types. These binary variables equal 1, if the 
investment focus of the company is either one of the following: RESIDENTIAL, RETAIL, 
INDUSTRIAL, OFFICE, HOTEL, HEALTH CARE or DIVERSIFIED. 
 
4.3.3 Model specification 
Apart from corporate governance and performance variables, distinct observable and 
unobservable firm, board, industry and country characteristics influence the pay-setting-
process and ultimately the C-level compensation contract. As a result, compensation 
arrangements can be determined endogenously by firm performance, or both dependent and 
independent variables can be effected by omitted unobservable characteristics at the same 
time (Frydman and Jenter, 2010). 
First, we account for this potential endogeneity problem by using lagged performance 
variables in the regressions. Second, we apply a panel data fixed-effects methodology with 
year and property-type dummies. Two estimation procedures, fixed-effects model and 
random effects model, enable us to address the problem of omitted unobservable variable 
bias. The application of one of the two models depends on the existence of a correlation 
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between the unobserved effects and the explanatory variables. While fixed effects should be 
applied if unobservable heterogeneity is correlated with the observed explanatory variables, 
random effects is the appropriate model if there is no correlation between the unobserved 
effects and the observed independent variables. After applying the Hausman test, the use of 
fixed-effects models is approved. 
To investigate the determinants of CEO and executive compensation, the following panel 
data fixed-effects model is estimated:  
./E>1;0A<.1,6 = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@>,6L	 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@>,6 + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;,6 +
	J +	K6 +	",6, 
where i denotes the firm, and t the year (2006-2015). The dependent variable Compensation 
refers to the distinct compensation types of CEO’s and executives: TCC CEO, TCC EXE, TDC 
CEO, TDC EXE, EQUITY CEO and EQUITY EXE. Performance denotes either TOBINSQ, the 
average shareholder total return over one, three and five years (TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR) or 
the real-estate-specific measure FFO. Corporate Governance represents a broad set of CEO 
power variables (e.g. CEO DUALITY, CEO TENURE, CEO OWN) and board control variables (e.g. 
MAJORSHARE, INSTITUTIONALS, %INDEPENDENT). Firm controls refers to FIRMSIZE and 
VOLATILITY. The models include property type dummies J to control for differences in 
compensation level between companies with a distinct property focus. K	 refers to the time 
fixed-effects for the period of 2006 to 2015 and " is the error term. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
In Exhibit 4.1, we provide the summary statistics of performance measures in Panel A, CEO’s 
and executive’s distinct compensation types in Panel B, corporate governance variables in 
Panel C and firm control variables in Panel D. Comparing the one, three and five-year total 
shareholder returns, the one-year return yields the highest average TSR1YR of 12.1%. The US 
listed real estate companies in the sample generate on average an FFO of $277.75 million and 
a Tobin’s q ratio of 1.28. Average cash compensation is $963.5 thousand for CEO’s and 
$3.1 million for the group of executives. Boards’ average number of executive directors is 
5.81, so that an average executive director is rewarded with a total cash compensation of 
$536.9 thousand. The CEO’s long-term compensation totals on average $4.40 million, which 
is more than double an average executive director’s long-term compensation of $1.90 million. 
The same pattern is evident within equity compensation arrangements (fair value of stocks 
and options granted), which values on average $2.50 million for CEO’s and $1.07 million for 
an average executive director. Approximately 16.4% of the CEOs have a dual-role as CEO, 
and board chair and 26.4% of the CEOs are simultaneously the company founder. The board 
consists of independent directors to the extent of two-thirds. On average, compensation 
committees meet five times per year. The CEO is on average 56 years old. The longest tenured 
board member serves approximately 18 years, which is more than double the CEO’s tenure of 
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8.3 years. The boards of US listed real estate companies comprise 8.5 members on average. 
The percentages of shares owned by the CEO and executive directors are negligibly small at 
1.5% and 0.9%, respectively. Blockholders who own more than 5% of company’s shares, 
represent one third of all shareholders. Moreover, at approximately 82% share ownership, 
institutional investors are the largest shareholder group. The average total assets of the 
sample companies amount to $5.340 billion. The stock price volatility oscillates around 4.9%. 
Concerning the sample property types, retail companies comprise the largest subsample at 
27.7%. 
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Exhibit 4.1: Summary Statistics 
 Median Mean Std. Dev. 
Panel A: Performance variables  
TSR1YR 0.128 0.121 0.393 
TSR3YR 0.117 0.104 0.173 
TSR5YR 0.114 0.106 0.133 
FFO (in $000) 163,757 277,748 372,054 
TOBINSQ 1.209 1.276 0.353 
Panel B: Compensation variables  
TCC CEO (in $000) 719.616 963.503 891.176 
TCC EXE (in $000) 2,351.965 3,119.184 2,563.317 
TDC CEO (in $000) 3,159.223 4,462.725 6,531.393 
TDC EXE (in $000) 8,345.042 11,384.211 11,865.399 
EQUITYCOMP CEO (in $000) 1,500.000 2,585.002 5,586.868 
EQUITYCOMP EXE (in $000) 3,909.335 6,217.971 8,620.947 
Panel C: Corporate governance variables  
CEO DUALITY 0.000 0.164 0.499 
CEO FOUNDER 0.000 0.264 0441 
CEO AGE 54.000 55.733 8.511 
EXE AGE 52.000 52.268 4.700 
CEO TENURE 7.000 8.292 6.143 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE 16.000 17.760 9.588 
CEO OWN 0.008 0.015 0.029 
EXE OWN 0.003 0.009 0.024 
MAJORSHARE 0.347 0.341 0.141 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.844 0.817 0.220 
BOARD SIZE 8.000 8.483 2.044 
% INDEPENDENT 0.750 0.752 0.103 
COMPMEETINGS 5.000 5.041 2.552 
Panel D: Firm control variables    
FIRMSIZE (in $000) 3,220,826 5,340,497 5,953,524 
VOLATILITY 4.065 4.922 2.723 
RETAIL 0.000 0.277 0.448 
RESIDENTIAL 0.000 0.145 0.352 
INDUSTRIAL 0.000 0.084 0.278 
OFFICE 0.000 0.169 0.375 
HOTEL 0.000 0.096 0.295 
HEALTH CARE 0.000 0.120 0.326 
DIVERSIFIED 0.000 0.108 0.311 
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for the sample of 830 observations over the period of 2006-
2015. Panel A comprises the performance measures, Panel B the compensation measures, Panel C the 
corporate governance variables and Panel D the firm control variables. 
 
Exhibit 4.2 depicts the development of CEO and executive director long-term compensation 
(TDC) from 2006 to 2015. Over the whole sample period, the mean of a CEO’s TDC is far 
above an average executive director’s TDC, which is not surprising, given that the CEO bears 
more responsibility. From 2008 to 2009, both TDCs decrease as a consequence of the global 
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financial crisis. After 2009 and until 2015, the data show a positive trend for both TDCs. 
However, there is a huge increase in CEO TDC from 2009 to 2011, whereas the long-term 
compensation of an executive director remains moderate at roughly the same level. A more 
detailed breakdown of the different compensation components is given in Exhibit 4.3. 
 
Exhibit 4.2: Development of Long-Term Compensation 
 
Notes: The exhibit shows the development of long-term compensation from 2006 to 2015. TDC represents long-
term compensation components, and is calculated by the sum of base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, 
stock options granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all other total. 
 
 
Exhibit 4.3 represents the main compensation components (salary, cash bonus, all others, 
stocks grants and option grants) and their relative importance during the sample period. In 
order to compare the main compensation components of a CEO’s and an average executive 
director, the compensation of the group of executive directors is divided by the average 
number of executives. The salary proportion of both CEO and an average executive director 
varies between 12% and 26%, although changes over time are marginal. Thus, this 
compensation component is not sensitive to changing market conditions or crises. 
Interestingly, for executive directors, the salary component represents a larger proportion of 
the whole compensation package than for the CEO, implying that for CEO’s, more than for 
executives, incentive-based compensation is a crucial component for aligning management 
with shareholder interests. The relative importance of a cash bonus within CEO compensation 
contracts has been more than halved from 13% in 2006 to 5% in 2015. The same pattern 
can be observed within the executive director compensation packages. The bonus decrease 
can be explained by the simultaneously fundamental increase in stock grants within 
compensation arrangements. Over the whole sample period, stock grants comprise the 
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largest component within compensation contracts. This finding shows that equity 
compensation is the most influential part in current C-level remuneration packages, 
suggesting that within the real estate industry, compensation packages align management 
interests with those of the company shareholders.  
Exhibit 4.3: Main Components of CEO and Executive Compensation 
 
Notes: The exhibit decomposes compensation of CEOs and executives into salary, bonus, all others, stocks and 
options for the period 2006-2015. 
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Property Types Health care Residential Retail Industrial Office Hotel Diversified 
CEO TCC 719,737*** (2.77) 652,909*** (4.14) 1,029,951 (-1.33) 1,162,955** (-1.99) 1,484,548** (-7.86) 726,712** (2.35) 654,960*** (3.42) 
CEO TDC 4,116,211 (0.53) 3,517,401* (1.70) 4,930,990 (-1.27) 4,708,294 (-0.33) 6,008,710*** (-3.09) 4,009,745 (0.61) 2,566,954*** (2.86) 
CEO EQUITY 2,583,291 (0.00) 2,068,336 (1.05) 2,967,089 (-1.20) 2,236,609 (0.54) 3,337,293* (-1.71) 2,357,275 (0.35) 1,521,474* (1.83) 
        
EXE TCC 328,797*** (4.82) 417,739*** (3.20) 575,941 (-1,57) 629,656* (-1.87) 839,742*** (-9.35) 379,490*** (3.17) 380,186*** (3.51) 
EXE TDC 1,528,906** (2.13) 1,688,188 (1.57) 2,018,127 (-0.50) 2,202,081 (-1.05) 2,701,383*** (-4.76) 1,843,963 (0.50) 1,332,395*** (3.03) 
EXE EQUITY 891,212 (1.21) 879,728 (1.47) 1,091,979 (-0.25) 1,145,937 (-0.44) 1,472,245*** (-3.45) 1,084,196 (-0.08) 741,228** (2.13) 
Notes: The table provides a compensation comparison by property types for CEOs and an average executive director. TCC is the total current cash compensation, which is the sum of base salary and cash 
bonus for a fiscal year. TDC is the long-term compensation, and is calculated by the sum of base salary, cash bonus, restricted stock grants, stock options granted, long-term incentive pay-outs (LTIP) and all 
other total. EQUITY is the value of stocks and options granted, as reported in the company’s financial statements. Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. 
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Exhibit 4.4 provides an in-depth analysis of real estate companies’ different property sectors 
by displaying the mean-comparison results for average cash, long-term and equity 
compensation for CEO’s and for an average executive director. In our sample, the largest 
remuneration packages for CEOs as well as executive directors, are provided by companies 
with an office focus. The cash, long-term and equity compensation in the office sector is 
significantly different to the average sample compensation. Hence, in the office sector, a CEO 
earns on average $1,484,548 cash compensation and an executive director on average 
$839,742. Over all three compensation categories, CEO remuneration is approximately twice 
that of an average executive director. This result emphasizes the outstanding responsibility 
position of CEO’s in the group of executives. Similar patterns in the compensation level can be 
found within all other property-type subgroups. The second highest cash compensation, 
which is significantly different from the sample average, is paid to CEOs and executive 
directors in industrial real estate companies. Companies in the hotel sector pay the third 
highest CEO cash compensation and residential real estate companies reward the third largest 
executive cash compensation packages. CEOs hired by diversified real estate companies earn 
less, than the other property types. 
 
4.4.2 Main regression model 
The results of the panel fixed-effects regression with regard to the distinct compensation 
types for the CEO’s and executive directors’ are displayed in Exhibit 4.5 - Exhibit 4.10. To 
ensure that our coefficient estimates are not affected by multicollinearity, the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is calculated. All VIF are below 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a 
problem in our models. To analyse the pay-performance relationship from different time 
horizon perspectives, we distinguish between short-term and long-term compensation 
components. Additionally, we construct a variable for equity compensation, in order to 
evaluate incentive-based compensation components. This approach yields three sets of 
estimates each for CEO and executive directors. All models show high explanatory power with 
an R² ranging from 0.49 to 0.74. 
 
4.4.2.1 Total current cash compensation 
Exhibit 4.5 and Exhibit 4.6 contain the results for cash compensation regressions TCC CEO and 
TCC EXE, respectively. The impact of performance measures shows a similar pattern for CEO’s 
and executives cash compensation. Short-term compensation arrangements are primarily 
driven by the average total return to shareholders over one year (TSR1YR). As expected, the 
maximization of shareholder wealth in the short-term is a key determinant in explaining the 
cash salary and bonus of CEO’s and the whole group of executives. In contrast to Griffith et 
al. (2011), we find that FFO and TOBINSQ do not influence the total cash compensation, 
neither CEO’s nor the executives’. Most of the CEO entrenchment mechanisms show high 
power in explaining CEO and executive cash compensation. Interestingly, CEO TENURE reveals 
no impact on CEO cash compensation, but a positive impact on executive cash compensation. 
As collegiality among board members may intensify over time, longer tenured CEOs tend to 
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negotiate higher short-term cash compensation for the group of executives than merely for 
themselves. The tenure of the longest serving board member is only marginally significant 
within the CEO cash compensation regressions. The negative coefficient of BOARD MEMBER 
TENURE implies that the seniority status of a long serving board member enables directors to 
fulfil an active monitoring role within the pay-setting process. CEO DUALITY displays an 
unexpected result, since the dual-role as CEO and chairman affects both CEO and executive 
cash compensation adversely. Thus, CEO’s who similarly occupy the chairman position do not 
exploit their power position in pay negotiations. However, an equally powerful position is CEO 
FOUNDER, which has a positive influence on CEO as well as executive cash compensation. 
Thus, within the real estate industry, a founder’s influence over cash compensation packages 
is significantly strong. In line with the findings of Pennathur and Shelor (2002), older CEO’s 
are associated with significantly less cash compensation. Such CEOs are probably wealthier, 
and thus less dependent on negotiating high cash compensation packages (Ghosh and 
Sirmans, 2005). However, the average age of executive directors does not influence 
executives’ cash compensation. In line with Griffith et al. (2011), the positive coefficient on 
CEO ownership (CEO OWN), along with the negative coefficient for the quadratic term CEO 
OWN², suggest that CEO ownership positively affects cash compensation at a declining rate. 
In contrast to Hardin (1998), who finds a positive relationship between director stock 
ownership and compensation, our coefficients on EXE OWN and EXE OWN² are insignificant. 
Surprisingly, the increase in the number of board members does not result in ineffective 
monitoring and higher CEO cash compensation, in contrast to what was demonstrated by 
Ghosh and Sirmans (2005). Our findings for BOARDSIZE show just the opposite - monitoring 
requires capacity and a less familiar environment. Group cohesion and loyalty are more likely 
to prevail in smaller boards. Therefore a small board is less motivated to curb generous cash 
compensation packages within the C-Suite. Contrary to our expectations, the number of 
compensation committee meetings has a significant positive impact on CEO/executive 
compensation, implying that compensation contracts might have been renegotiated upwards. 
Inconsistent with our expectations, but in line with Feng et al. (2010), independent directors 
have no impact on CEO or on executive cash compensation, therefore neither enhancing nor 
impairing monitoring. The impact of blockownership and institutional investors on the 
executive cash compensation is insignificant. However, contrary to our expectations, but in 
line with Feng et al. (2010), MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS are positively associated with 
CEO cash compensation. Implying that institutional shareholders are willing to pay higher 
cash compensation to retain CEOs (Feng et al., 2010). Moreover, the results indicate that our 
firm controls FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY do indeed positively influence CEO’s as well as 
executives’ cash compensation. This result confirms past empirical studies that larger firms 
attract the best talents and reward management for taking risks. 
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.172* (1.66) 
TSR3YR 0.131 (0.62) 
TSR5YR 0.002 (0.01) 
FFO -0.058 (-1.25) 
TOBINSQ -0.024 (-0.32) 
CEO DUALITY -0.157*** (-3.18) -0.159*** (-3.04) -0.154*** (-3.02) -0.131*** (-2.63) -0.147*** (-2.78) 
CEO FOUNDER 0.116* (1.93) 0.152** (2.37) 0.174*** (2.73) 0.128** (2.14) 0.161** (2.48) 
CEO AGE -0.338* (-1.90) -0.449** (-2.34) -0.427** (-2.26) -0.335* (-1.87) -0.513*** (-2.68) 
CEO TENURE 0.030 (1.00) 0.042 (1.29) 0.047 (1.49) 0.036 (1.15) 0.013 (0.40) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.082* (-1.69) -0.053 (-0.95) -0.050 (-0.84) -0.044 (-0.90) -0.068 (-1.37) 
CEO OWN 7.892*** (4.53) 6.407*** (3.41) 4.335** (2.33) 7.767*** (4.41) 8.953*** (4.83) 
CEO OWN² -18.53*** (-3.56) -13.058** (-2.36) -8.447 (-1.56) -18.222*** (-3.48) -20.214*** (-3.63) 
MAJORSHARE 0.449*** (2.64) 0.508*** (2.78) 0.410** (2.28) 0.484*** (2.77) 0.492*** (2.71) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.105 (0.93) 0.180 (1.53) 0.212* (1.78) 0.029 (0.25) 0.205* (1.71) 
BOARD SIZE -0.465*** (-4.04) -0.699*** (-5.56) -0.825*** (-6.54) -0.569*** (-4.84) -0.587*** (-4.78) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.086 (0.37) 0.003 (0.01) -0.142 (-0.57) 0.110 (0.46) 0.164 (0.66) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.164*** (3.38) 0.216*** (4.12) 0.219*** (4.28) 0.164*** (3.41) 0.162*** (3.19) 
FIRMSIZE 0.335*** (12.04) 0.369*** (12.47) 0.382*** (13.02) 0.398*** (7.04) 0.372*** (12.31) 
VOLATILITY 0.025** (2.03) 0.025* (1.89) 0.016 (1.19) 0.023* (1.87) 0.022* (1.75) 
RETAIL 0.406*** (5.01) 0.439*** (5.04) 0.432*** (4.99) 0.392*** (4.82) 0.423*** (4.79) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.018 (0.20) 0.069 (0.74) 0.082 (0.89) 0.032 (0.36) 0.037 (0.39) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.338*** (3.57) 0.355*** (3.49) 0.349*** (3.46) 0.355*** (3.73) 0.381*** (3.74) 
OFFICE 0.504*** (5.50) 0.51*** (5.24) 0.499*** (5.12) 0.5*** (5.38) 0.518*** (5.28) 
HOTEL 0.241** (2.30) 0.242** (2.11) 0.183 (1.55) 0.161 (1.48) 0.250** (2.26) 
HEALTH CARE 0.377*** (4.09) 0.355*** (3.55) 0.364*** (3.65) 0.374*** (4.07) 0.367*** (3.71) 
INTERCEPT 7.65*** (8.36) 7.631*** (7.81) 7.721*** (7.95) 7.106*** (6.44) 7.663*** (7.78) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 14.09 15.45 16.59 14.01 14.77 
R² 0.50 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.51 
Adj. R² 0.46 0.50 0.53 0.47 0.48 
Notes: 
	<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"< ,A 
TCC CEO is the total current cash compensation for 	< in year t. >3F.3/01@> is measured by five variables: TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR, FFO and TOBINSQ. TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR are the average 
shareholder total return over one, three and five years. FFO is the accounting-based measure funds from operations. TOBINSQ is calculated as the ratio of the sum of market value of equity and book value of 
debt, divided by the book value of total assets. .3E.30A>	.H>3101@> is measured by: CEO DUALITY is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is simultaneously chairman of the board; CEO 
FOUNDER is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is simultaneously founder of the company; CEO AGE is the age of the CEO. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in office; BOARD MEMBER TENURE is 
the tenure of the longest serving board member; CEO OWN is the percentage of shares owned by the CEO; MAJORHSARE is the percentage of substantial shareholders who own more than 5% percent of 
company’s shares; INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors within the board; % INDEPENDENT is the share of independent directors 
on the board; COMPMEETINGS is the natural logarithm of the total number of compensation committee meetings during a fiscal year. FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY are the	<3/	.1A3.B;. FIRMSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of total company assets value. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns.J represents property type dummies. K	 represents time dummies for the years 2006 to 2015. Coefficients 
of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.192** (2.00) 
TSR3YR 0.302 (1.63) 
TSR5YR 0.326 (1.32) 
FFO -0.041 (-0.97) 
TOBINSQ 0.003 (0.04) 
CEO DUALITY -0.126*** (-2.79) -0.130*** (-2.81) -0.126*** (-2.69) -0.108** (-2.37) -0.119*** (-2.62) 
CEO FOUNDER 0.109** (2.00) 0.105* (1.87) 0.116** (1.99) 0.120** (2.21) 0.110** (2.01) 
EXE AGE 0.235 (0.85) 0.317 (1.09) 0.414 (1.38) 0.232 (0.85) 0.207 (0.76) 
CEO TENURE 0.056** (2.04) 0.064** (2.24) 0.063** (2.19) 0.059** (2.09) 0.052* (1.85) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.060 (-1.28) -0.036 (-0.69) -0.031 (-0.52) -0.031 (-0.66) -0.060 (-1.32) 
EXE OWN 1.652 (0.63) 0.274 (0.10) -1.328 (-0.46) 1.476 (0.56) 2.158 (0.82) 
EXE OWN² -5.169 (-0.55) -0.131 (-0.01) 4.843 (0.49) -4.570 (-0.49) -6.867 (-0.74) 
MAJORSHARE 0.052 (0.33) 0.085 (0.53) 0.011 (0.07) 0.066 (0.41) 0.033 (0.21) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.067 (0.65) 0.040 (0.39) 0.069 (0.63) 0.015 (0.14) 0.073 (0.71) 
BOARD SIZE -0.094 (-0.90) -0.141 (-1.28) -0.202* (-1.76) -0.181* (-1.71) -0.103 (-0.99) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.188 (-0.86) -0.168 (-0.74) -0.197 (-0.83) -0.207 (-0.94) -0.190 (-0.88) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.110** (2.47) 0.129*** (2.76) 0.134*** (2.84) 0.114** (2.58) 0.102** (2.34) 
FIRMSIZE 0.306*** (12.41) 0.309*** (12.17) 0.317*** (12.08) 0.351*** (6.92) 0.309*** (12.45) 
VOLATILITY 0.031*** (2.77) 0.035*** (2.97) 0.034*** (2.76) 0.028** (2.49) 0.025** (2.35) 
RETAIL 0.327*** (4.43) 0.304*** (3.94) 0.289*** (3.64) 0.317*** (4.29) 0.325*** (4.28) 
RESIDENTIAL -0.003 (-0.04) -0.014 (-0.17) -0.016 (-0.19) 0.008 (0.09) -0.002 (-0.02) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.095 (1.10) 0.064 (0.71) 0.056 (0.60) 0.109 (1.25) 0.104 (1.19) 
OFFICE 0.666*** (8.08) 0.634*** (7.51) 0.632*** (7.22) 0.664*** (7.96) 0.663*** (8.01) 
HOTEL 0.107 (1.12) 0.063 (0.62) 0.008 (0.08) 0.043 (0.43) 0.129 (1.37) 
HEALTH CARE 0.102 (1.20) 0.084 (0.94) 0.087 (0.95) 0.099 (1.17) 0.103 (1.20) 
INTERCEPT 6.908*** (6.37) 6.493*** (5.78) 6.085*** (5.32) 6.591*** (5.51) 7.024*** (6.47) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 16.42 15.76 15.72 16.51 16.32 
R² 0.54 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 
Adj. R² 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.50 
Notes: 
	O<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A 
TCC EXE is the total current cash compensation for the group of	>P>@QA<H>	4<3>@A.3;< in year t. >3F.3/01@> is measured by five variables: TSR1YR, TSR3YR, TSR5YR, FFO and TOBINSQ. TSR1YR, TSR3YR, 
TSR5YR are the average shareholder total return over one, three and five years. FFO is the accounting-based measure funds from operations. TOBINSQ is calculated as the ratio of the sum of market value of 
equity and book value of debt, divided by the book value of total assets. .3E.30A>	.H>3101@> is measured by: CEO DUALITY is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is simultaneously chairman 
of the board; CEO FOUNDER is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the CEO is simultaneously founder of the company; EXE AGE is the average age of executive directors. CEO TENURE is the CEO’s time in 
office; BOARD MEMBER TENURE is the tenure of the longest serving board member; EXE OWN is the percentage of shares owned by the executive directors; MAJORHSARE is the percentage of substantial 
shareholders who own more than 5% percent of company’s shares; INSTITUTIONALS is the percentage of shares held by all institutional investors; BOARD SIZE is the number of directors within the board; % 
INDEPENDENT is the share of independent directors on the board; COMPMEETINGS is the natural logarithm of the total number of compensation committee meetings during a fiscal year. FIRMSIZE and 
VOLATILITY are the	<3/	.1A3.B;. FIRMSIZE is the natural logarithm of total company assets value. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of weekly stock returns.J represents property type dummies. K	 
represents time dummies for the years 2006 to 2015. Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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4.4.2.2 Total long-term compensation 
Exhibit 4.7 and Exhibit 4.8 present the results for the long-term compensation measures TDC 
CEO and TDC EXE. As expected, long-term remuneration packages are linked to the long-
term-orientated performance ratio TSR5YR. Besides this highly significant (p-value<0.01) long-
term relationship between pay and performance, we similarly found a positive impact of the 
operative company profit FFO and the market-based performance measure TOBINSQ on long-
term payments to CEOs and executive directors. However, these metrics have no impact on 
short-term cash payments, as measured by TCC CEO and TCC EXE (see Exhibit 4.5 and Exhibit 
4.6). As these measures should reflect a long-term and sustainable company-performance 
perspective, it makes good economic sense to link long-term compensation contracts of CEOs 
and executive directors to long-term performance. Hence, greater future growth 
opportunities and a higher market valuation are positively linked to CEO’s and executive 
directors’ long-term compensation. 
Some CEO entrenchment mechanisms change their impact with regard to the long-term 
compensation components TDC CEO and TDC EXE. The two dual-role variables, CEO DUALITY 
and CEO FOUNDER lose their explanatory power when considering CEO and executive 
director long-term compensation. However, the tenure of the CEO has a positive impact on 
TDC CEO and TDC EXE. Hence, in comparison to short-term compensation, it appears that 
CEOs use their long trajectory in the C-Suite to negotiate higher long-term compensation 
packages for themselves as well as for fellow executives. We found a consistently negative 
impact of BOARD MEMBER TENURE on TDC CEO and TDC EXE, suggesting that the longest-
serving board member plays an important role in monitoring excessive compensation 
arrangements. Unlike the results for cash compensation, we found a positive significant link 
between share ownership by executive directors (EXE OWN) and long-term compensation 
contracts. Through an increased amount of shares, executive directors use their voting rights 
and strategic power to bargain for higher long-term remuneration packages. Interestingly, 
there is no significant non-monotonic relationship for executive shareholdings and TDC EXE. 
The positive impact of institutional investors, either as a major blockholder or not, tends to be 
stronger on TDC CEO and TDC EXE. This result is in line with Feng et al. (2010), suggesting 
that institutional investors, rather than constraining generous compensation contracts, 
motivate management by paying higher long-term compensation alongside higher cash 
compensation. The explanatory power of BOARDSIZE, FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY remains 
unchanged, compared to TCC CEO and TCC EXE. 
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.224 (1.58) 
TSR3YR 0.348 (1.26) 
TSR5YR 1.120*** (3.01) 
FFO 0.110*( 1.78) 
TOBINSQ 0.177* (1.89) 
CEO DUALITY -0.064 (-0.94) -0.064 (-0.93) -0.074 (-1.04) -0.024 (-0.36) -0.068 (-0.98) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.083 (-1.01) -0.065 (-0.78) -0.008 (-0.09) -0.079 (-0.99) -0.049 (-0.58) 
CEO AGE -1.341*** (-5.55) -1.265*** (-5.04) -1.301*** (-4.98) -1.405*** (-5.87) -1.542*** (-6.22) 
CEO TENURE 0.091** (2.19) 0.098** (2.28) 0.081* (1.83) 0.075* (1.81) 0.072* (1.68) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.173*** (-2.59) -0.141* (-1.91) -0.135 (-1.61) -0.177*** (-2.71) -0.175*** (-2.68) 
CEO OWN 12.807*** (5.39) 12.028*** (4.87) 11.403*** (4.42) 14.122*** (6.00) 13.207*** (5.51) 
CEO OWN² -19.499*** (-2.73) -17.284** (-2.35) -15.062** (-1.99) -23.063*** (-3.28) -18.622** (-2.56) 
MAJORSHARE 0.619*** (2.65) 0.681*** (2.82) 0.763*** (3.04) 0.748*** (3.20) 0.606** (2.57) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.526*** (3.50) 0.499*** (3.30) 0.568*** (3.52) 0.418*** (2.80) 0.617*** (4.05) 
BOARD SIZE -0.442*** (-2.84) -0.498*** (-3.05) -0.431** (-2.50) -0.517*** (-3.33) -0.391** (-2.47) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.491 (1.55) 0.505 (1.55) 0.515 (1.49) 0.457 (1.46) 0.435 (1.37) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.298*** (4.64) 0.312*** (4.66) 0.317*** (4.60) 0.298*** (4.75) 0.33*** (5.13) 
FIRMSIZE 0.65*** (17.08) 0.652*** (16.71) 0.656*** (16.07) 0.53*** (7.02) 0.664*** (17.02) 
VOLATILITY -0.012 (-0.71) -0.017 (-0.95) -0.013 (-0.74) -0.012 (-0.73) -0.010 (-0.61) 
RETAIL 0.612*** (5.50) 0.629*** (5.46) 0.628*** (5.19) 0.575*** (5.27) 0.591*** (5.16) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.140 (1.15) 0.167 (1.34) 0.140 (1.08) 0.173 (1.45) 0.100 (0.81) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.36*** (2.77) 0.374*** (2.77) 0.391*** (2.77) 0.338*** (2.64) 0.327** (2.46) 
OFFICE 0.37*** (2.94) 0.4*** (3.10) 0.487*** (3.57) 0.308** (2.47) 0.37*** (2.89) 
HOTEL 0.484*** (3.36) 0.563*** (3.70) 0.525*** (3.18) 0.329** (2.25) 0.431*** (2.99) 
HEALTH CARE 0.451*** (3.64) 0.392*** (3.01) 0.285** (2.08) 0.443*** (3.66) 0.371*** (2.92) 
INTERCEPT 5.332*** (4.24) 4.971*** (3.83) 4.727*** (3.48) 7.182*** (4.85) 5.502*** (4.29) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 29.99 29.03 29.99 28.87 31.69 
R² 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.67 0.69 
Adj. R² 0.65 0.66 0.67 0.65 0.66 
 
Notes: 
	<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A  
TDC CEO is the total long-term compensation for 	< in year t. See Exhibit 4.5 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.135 (1.41) 
TSR3YR 0.271 (1.22) 
TSR5YR 0.993*** (3.37) 
FFO 0.115** (2.58) 
TOBINSQ 0.242*** (3.75) 
CEO DUALITY -0.019 (-0.41) -0.039 (-0.69) -0.044 (-0.77) -0.008 (-0.16) -0.054 (-1.12) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.104* (-1.92) -0.034 (-0.50) 0.017 (0.25) -0.094 (-1.63) -0.085 (-1.47) 
EXE AGE -0.248 (-0.91) -1.247*** (-3.65) -1.286*** (-3.66) -0.628** (-2.20) -0.548* (-1.92) 
CEO TENURE 0.090*** (3.24) 0.084** (2.44) 0.064* (1.83) 0.075** (2.48) 0.073** (2.47) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.160*** (-3.38) -0.116* (-1.82) -0.089 (-1.23) -0.174*** (-3.48) -0.159*** (-3.31) 
EXE OWN 5.858** (2.23) 8.256** (2.50) 7.044** (2.07) 7.622*** (2.72) 5.997** (2.16) 
EXE OWN² -11.461 (-1.23) -13.194 (-1.14) -9.830 (-0.83) -14.702 (-1.48) -7.876 (-0.80) 
MAJORSHARE 0.354** (2.26) 0.328* (1.69) 0.391** (1.97) 0.493*** (2.89) 0.397** (2.40) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.106 (1.05) 0.518*** (4.26) 0.513*** (4.04) 0.197* (1.82) 0.265** (2.50) 
BOARD SIZE -0.215** (-2.08) -0.081 (-0.62) 0.002 (0.01) -0.264** (-2.37) -0.140 (-1.29) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.112 (-0.52) -0.404 (-1.49) -0.263 (-0.94) -0.419* (-1.81) -0.333 (-1.47) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.101** (2.33) 0.283*** (5.22) 0.258*** (4.70) 0.169*** (3.70) 0.168*** (3.73) 
FIRMSIZE 0.523*** (21.34) 0.627*** (20.69) 0.615*** (19.64) 0.465*** (8.71) 0.571*** (22.09) 
VOLATILITY -0.008 (-0.71) -0.003 (-0.18) 0.002 (0.14) -0.008 (-0.66) -0.005 (-0.44) 
RETAIL 0.444*** (6.02) 0.618*** (6.70) 0.587*** (6.17) 0.491*** (6.27) 0.436*** (5.47) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.145* (1.81) 0.153 (1.55) 0.115 (1.14) 0.187** (2.19) 0.094 (1.10) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.257*** (2.96) 0.304*** (2.81) 0.303*** (2.72) 0.271*** (2.93) 0.202** (2.19) 
OFFICE 0.453*** (5.47) 0.534*** (5.23) 0.587*** (5.55) 0.476*** (5.35) 0.486*** (5.54) 
HOTEL 0.381*** (3.94) 0.461*** (3.77) 0.417*** (3.19) 0.259** (2.45) 0.369*** (3.69) 
HEALTH CARE 0.395*** (4.74) 0.138 (1.31) 0.069 (0.63) 0.342*** (3.87) 0.302*** (3.38) 
INTERCEPT 5.613*** (5.16) 6.362*** (4.72) 6.406*** (4.68) 7.156*** (5.63) 5.243*** (4.57) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 31.03 37.39 37.53 35.46 36.94 
R² 0.68 0.73 0.74 0.71 0.72 
Adj. R² 0.66 0.71 0.72 0.69 0.70 
 
Notes: 
	O<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A  
TDC EXE is the total long-term compensation for the group of	>P>@QA<H>	4<3>@A.3;< in year t. See Exhibit 4.6 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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4.4.2.3 Total equity compensation 
Finally, the results for incentive-based equity compensation (EQUITY CEO and EQUITY EXE) are 
displayed in Exhibit 4.9 and Exhibit 4.10. Generally, incentive-based compensation should 
motivate CEOs and executive directors to create value over a long time horizon. 
Consequently, we expect stock and option grants to be positively linked to long-term and 
value-driven growth. Our findings confirm this expectation by demonstrating that the market-
based performance measures TSR5YR and TOBINSQ are positively related to EQUITY CEO and 
EQUITY EXE. Additionally, medium-term performance, measured by TSR3YR, has a similarly 
positive impact on EQUITY EXE, however, the influence is marginal. Consequently, equity 
compensation is a reward for creating long-term company value. Interestingly, the proxy for 
CEO entrenchment (CEO FOUNDER) shows a negative impact on EQUITY CEO. If a CEO is 
simultaneously the company founder, it might be likely that he/she already owns a sufficient 
amount of company shares. Therefore, a CEO FOUNDER may not bargain for higher equity 
compensation for himself/herself. The impact of CEO TENURE, BOARD MEMBER TENURE, CEO 
OWN, CEO OWN², EXE OWN and EXE OWN² remains unchanged compared to TDC CEO and 
TDC EXE. Contrary to Feng et al. (2010), who find that institutional investors use greater pay-
performance sensitivity to align their interests with those of shareholders, we find no impact 
of MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS on equity compensation.  
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.257 (1.32) 
    
TSR3YR 
 
0.462 (1.16) 
   
TSR5YR 
  
1.423*** (2.69) 
  
FFO 
   
0.091 (0.93) 
 
TOBINSQ 
    
0.270** (2.18) 
CEO DUALITY 0.022 (0.24) 0.044 (0.46) 0.014 (0.14) 0.061 (0.64) 0.017 (0.19) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.348*** (-3.04) -0.335*** (-2.87) -0.317** (-2.58) -0.317*** (-2.75) -0.296** (-2.56) 
CEO AGE -1.023*** (-3.00) -0.889** (-2.53) -0.887** (-2.41) -1.177*** (-3.36) -1.174*** (-3.41) 
CEO TENURE 0.16*** (2.79) 0.164*** (2.78) 0.147** (2.44) 0.151** (2.58) 0.140** (2.44) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.421*** (-4.47) -0.382*** (-3.69) -0.366*** (-3.07) -0.408*** (-4.27) -0.398*** (-4.39) 
CEO OWN 16.505*** (4.90) 15.699*** (4.52) 15.423*** (4.23) 18.178*** (5.27) 16.475*** (4.89) 
CEO OWN² -26.472*** (-2.72) -24.287** (-2.44) -23.603** (-2.29) -30.361*** (-3.07) -24.942** (-2.56) 
MAJORSHARE 0.080 (0.25) 0.234 (0.71) 0.388 (1.13) 0.198 (0.59) 0.137 (0.43) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.151 (0.71) 0.100 (0.47) 0.001 (0.00) 0.130 (0.59) 0.194 (0.91) 
BOARD SIZE -0.061 (-0.28) -0.144 (-0.62) 0.035 (0.14) -0.146 (-0.64) -0.015 (-0.07) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.167 (-0.39) -0.137 (-0.31) -0.031 (-0.07) -0.164 (-0.37) -0.173 (-0.40) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.156* (1.69) 0.178* (1.87) 0.172* (1.75) 0.164* (1.76) 0.184** (1.99) 
FIRMSIZE 0.723*** (13.98) 0.72*** (13.60) 0.687*** (12.28) 0.649*** (5.63) 0.714*** (13.65) 
VOLATILITY -0.017 (-0.74) -0.022 (-0.93) -0.016 (-0.66) -0.021 (-0.91) -0.016 (-0.72) 
RETAIL 0.528*** (3.56) 0.506*** (3.31) 0.429*** (2.66) 0.504*** (3.36) 0.458*** (3.05) 
RESIDENTIAL -0.001 (-0.01) -0.003 (-0.02) -0.090 (-0.52) 0.021 (0.13) -0.062 (-0.38) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.151 (0.85) 0.139 (0.76) 0.136 (0.71) 0.148 (0.82) 0.083 (0.47) 
OFFICE 0.488*** (2.83) 0.503*** (2.87) 0.527*** (2.86) 0.427** (2.41) 0.459*** (2.67) 
HOTEL 0.483** (2.55) 0.608*** (3.06) 0.593*** (2.74) 0.369* (1.85) 0.426** (2.28) 
HEALTH CARE 0.145 (0.87) 0.014 (0.08) -0.083 (-0.45) 0.121 (0.72) 0.076 (0.45) 
INTERCEPT 2.977* (1.72) 2.521 (1.42) 2.752 (1.47) 4.274* (1.96) 3.289* (1.90) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 18.11 17.89 17.17 17.29 18.36 
R² 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.58 0.59 
Adj. R² 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.56 
 
Notes: 
R#	<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A  
EQUITY CEO is the total equity compensation for 	<  in year t. See Exhibit 4.5 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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 Model I  Model II  Model III  Model IV  Model V 
TSR1YR 0.266 (1.61) 
TSR3YR 0.658* (1.89) 
TSR5YR 1.258*** (2.66) 
FFO 0.119 (1.47) 
TOBINSQ 0.285** (2.45) 
CEO DUALITY 0.087 (1.12) 0.082 (0.93) 0.075 (0.83) 0.124 (1.58) 0.061 (0.70) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.147 (-1.55) -0.140 (-1.32) -0.097 (-0.86) -0.121 (-1.28) -0.146 (-1.37) 
EXE AGE -1.196** (-2.57) -1.412*** (-2.65) -1.465*** (-2.63) -1.288*** (-2.78) -1.386*** (-2.68) 
CEO TENURE 0.124*** (2.61) 0.131** (2.45) 0.115** (2.07) 0.103** (2.13) 0.116** (2.15) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.244*** (-2.96) -0.197** (-1.98) -0.168 (-1.46) -0.254*** (-3.07) -0.296*** (-3.34) 
EXE OWN 14.857*** (3.20) 15.81*** (3.01) 15.019*** (2.72) 16.642*** (3.55) 16.625*** (3.19) 
EXE OWN² -31.116* (-1.92) -30.892* (-1.7) -29.052 (-1.53) -36.63** (-2.25) -30.334* (-1.67) 
MAJORSHARE 0.170 (0.63) 0.345 (1.14) 0.410 (1.30) 0.340 (1.22) 0.365 (1.21) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.029 (0.17) -0.064 (-0.34) -0.117 (-0.58) -0.011 (-0.06) -0.017 (-0.09) 
BOARD SIZE -0.288 (-1.61) -0.265 (-1.29) -0.139 (-0.64) -0.394** (-2.16) -0.230 (-1.14) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.275 (-0.74) -0.270 (-0.64) -0.175 (-0.39) -0.415 (-1.10) -0.505 (-1.22) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.147* (1.92) 0.203** (2.34) 0.201** (2.24) 0.161** (2.10) 0.282*** (3.34) 
FIRMSIZE 0.696*** (16.61) 0.711*** (15.06) 0.688*** (13.76) 0.583*** (6.21) 0.702*** (14.89) 
VOLATILITY -0.023 (-1.21) -0.0120(-0.55) -0.012 (-0.53) -0.028 (-1.46) -0.007 (-0.32) 
RETAIL 0.346*** (2.71) 0.337** (2.32) 0.272* (1.77) 0.338*** (2.64) 0.320** (2.20) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.005 (0.04) -0.021 (-0.14) -0.089 (-0.55) 0.055 (0.40) -0.038 (-0.24) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.062 (0.42) 0.036 (0.21) 0.001 (0.01) 0.063 (0.42) 0.019 (0.11) 
OFFICE 0.547*** (3.74) 0.599*** (3.66) 0.624*** (3.62) 0.528*** (3.54) 0.541*** (3.30) 
HOTEL 0.388** (2.39) 0.452** (2.40) 0.457** (2.22) 0.224 (1.32) 0.344* (1.92) 
HEALTH CARE 0.182 (1.28) -0.003 (-0.02) -0.100 (-0.58) 0.158 (1.10) 0.064 (0.40) 
INTERCEPT 5.387*** (2.89) 5.566*** (2.65) 5.912*** (2.71) 7.196*** (3.46) 5.602*** (2.69) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 19.60 18.66 17.80 19.10 18.40 
R² 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.57 
Adj. R² 0.56 0.55 0.55 0.56 0.54 
 
Notes: 
R#	O<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A  
EQUITY EXE is the total equity compensation for the group of	>P>@QA<H>	4<3>@A.3;< in year t. See Exhibit 4.6 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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4.4.3 Alternative tests 
The global financial crisis began in late 2007 and revealed severe shortcomings in corporate 
governance mechanisms, especially the rewarding of managers for excessive short-term risk 
taking. The listed real estate sector provides an optimal setting for comparing time-varying 
pay-performance sensitivities, given that particularly the bursting of the real estate bubble 
was the crucial trigger for the crisis, which led to the most disastrous price falls in history. The 
timeframes are subdivided into one period displaying the core effects of the crisis from 2007-
2010 and another period from 2012-2015, which covers the recovery years after the crisis. 
The year 2011 is not included, because, as of this year, new laws induced by the crisis became 
effective, e.g. the SEC “Say-on-Pay” rule. Hence, we provide time-balanced sub-samples. 
Exhibit 4.11 and Exhibit 4.12 show the results of pay-performance sensitivity during and after 
the financial crisis for long-term and equity compensation components of executive directors. 
The results are the same for CEO’s long-term and equity compensation (not reported).15 
Consistent with the main model, we apply a fixed-effects panel approach and control for 
potential endogeneity by using lagged performance ratios. During the financial crisis, the 
results show no significant relationship between compensation and performance. For the 
post-crisis period, we find a positive significant impact for the performance metrics FFO and 
TOBINSQ on both executive remuneration types, either long-term or equity compensation. 
Compared to a non-significant pay-performance link for the crisis period 2007-2010, the 
post-crisis results demonstrate an intensified pay-for-performance relationship. Astute 
investment decisions by a company’s management lead to enhanced firm performance, and 
ultimately to increased long-term and equity compensation. Hence, contemporary long-term 
and equity remuneration packages are more closely linked to corporate success, either cash 
(FFO) or value-driven (TOBINSQ) ratio, than during the crisis. 
The results for corporate governance variables and firm controls are predominately stable for 
the sub-periods. However, for equity compensation (see Exhibit 4.12) the differential impact 
of certain variables during and after the crisis is clearly observable. Apparently, CEO FOUNDER 
as well as EXE AGE only have a significant impact during the crisis, whereas CEO TENURE 
gains explanatory power in the post-crisis period. We find that institutional investors have a 
positive influence on EQUITY EXE exclusively in the post-crisis sub-period. Thus, institutional 
investors may have recognized that, by allowing higher equity compensation, executives 
behave rather like shareholders, aligning the interests of management and company owners. 
The central monitoring role, either during or after the crisis, is assumed by the longest-serving 
board member. BOARDSIZE exclusively displays a negative sign in the post-crisis sub-period; 
hence a CEO-friendly atmosphere tended to prevail in small boards during the crisis. The 
significant coefficient of COMPMEETINGS during the crisis period suggests that there was 
certainly a sufficient need for discussion concerning the negotiation and arrangement of 
compensation contracts. 
                                                 
15 Tables can be provided on request. 
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Model I 
 
Model II 
 
During 
2007-2010 
After 
2012-2015  
During 
2007-2010 
After 
2012-2015 
FFO 0.069 (0.92) 0.281*** (2.92) 
TOBINSQ -0.188 (-1.25) 0.351*** (3.73) 
CEO DUALITY -0.096 (-1.00) 0.046 (0.58) -0.122 (-1.38) 0.004 (0.05) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.182 (-1.56) 0.124 (1.31) -0.207* (-1.88) 0.095 (1.02) 
EXE AGE -1.327** (-2.20) -0.925** (-2.02) -1.086* (-1.94) -0.646 (-1.40) 
CEO TENURE -0.057 (-0.74) 0.069 (1.59) 0.000 (0.65) 0.069 (1.58) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.302*** (-2.71) -0.234*** (-2.95) -0.278*** (-2.81) -0.209*** (-2.76) 
EXE OWN 14.437*** (2.95) 24.753* (1.66) 11.85*** (2.64) 12.866 (0.88) 
EXE OWN² -29.016* (-1.82) -76.428 (-0.18) -24.092 (-1.65) 224.902 (0.54) 
MAJORSHARE 0.714** (2.01) 0.316 (1.18) 0.467 (1.48) 0.281 (1.08) 
INSTITUTIONALS 0.481** (2.18) 0.706*** (4.31) 0.437** (2.23) 0.697*** (4.35) 
BOARD SIZE -0.070 (-0.32) -0.135 (-0.72) -0.010 (-0.05) -0.067 (-0.37) 
% INDEPENDENT -0.315 (-0.68) -0.306 (-0.78) 0.024 (0.06) -0.270 (-0.69) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.250 *** (2.89) 0.302*** (3.86) 0.201** (2.56) 0.336*** (4.30) 
FIRMSIZE 0.494*** (5.18) 0.409*** (3.68) 0.567*** (11.28) 0.650*** (14.9) 
VOLATILITY 0.027 (1.48) -0.049 (-1.45) 0.018 (1.04) -0.046 (-1.37) 
RETAIL 0.894*** (5.28) 0.474*** (3.95) 0.875*** (5.45) 0.441*** (3.66) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.383** (2.25) -0.031 (-0.24) 0.364** (2.28) -0.096 (-0.73) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.323 (1.56) 0.303** (2.24) 0.348* (1.88) 0.224 (1.63) 
OFFICE 0.768*** (4.31) 0.266* (1.86) 0.818*** (4.96) 0.327** (2.34) 
HOTEL 0.139 (0.48) 0.336** (2.24) 0.468* (1.95) 0.413*** (2.90) 
HEALTH CARE 0.523*** (2.79) 0.005 (0.04)   0.62*** (3.54) -0.015 (-0.11) 
INTERCEPT 8.90*** (3.31) 7.041*** (3.27) 7.045*** (3.05) 3.33* (1.83) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 18.16 22.95 19.18 23.80 
R² 0.76 0.74 0.76 0.74 
Adj. R² 0.72 0.71 0.72 0.71 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the two sub-periods during (2007-2010) and after (2012-2015) the financial crisis.  
	O<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"<,A  
TDC EXE is the total long-term compensation for the group of	>P>@QA<H>	4<3>@A.3;< in year t. See Exhibit 4.6 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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Model I 
 
Model II 
 
During 
2007-2010 
After 
2012-2015  
During 
2007-2010 
After 
2012-2015 
FFO -0.054 (-0.41) 0.484*** (3.81) 
TOBINSQ -0.009 (-0.03) 0.532*** (4.11) 
CEO DUALITY 0.151 (1.05) 0.154 (1.49) 0.089 (0.51) 0.077 (0.72) 
CEO FOUNDER -0.403** (-2.31) 0.191 (1.48) -0.544** (-2.53) 0.128 (0.97) 
EXE AGE -2.945*** (-3.30) -0.584 (-0.95) -3.071*** (-2.80) -0.207 (-0.32) 
CEO TENURE -0.038 (-0.34) 0.122** (2.12) 0.000 (0.28) 0.142** (2.39) 
BOARD MEMBER TENURE -0.372** (-2.20) -0.419*** (-3.99) -0.537*** (-2.70) -0.375*** (-3.60) 
EXE OWN 24.719*** (3.35) 55.178*** (2.72) 30.372*** (3.38) 32.585 (1.57) 
EXE OWN² -59.044** (-2.50) -509.361 (-0.92) -70.483** (-2.46) 39.09 (0.07) 
MAJORSHARE 0.630 (1.17) 0.297 (0.84) 0.745 (1.16) 0.162 (0.45) 
INSTITUTIONALS -0.322 (-0.98) 0.337 (1.56) -0.471 (-1.23) 0.390* (1.78) 
BOARD SIZE 0.203 (0.60) -0.534** (-2.15) 0.191 (0.48) -0.430* (-1.71) 
% INDEPENDENT 0.155 (0.23) 0.011 (0.02) 0.010 (0.01) -0.059 (-0.11) 
COMPMEETINGS 0.240* (1.79) 0.105 (0.99) 0.439*** (2.74) 0.159 (1.44) 
FIRMSIZE 0.553*** (3.58) 0.358** (2.42) 0.526*** (5.35) 0.810*** (13.41) 
VOLATILITY -0.002 (-0.09) -0.054 (-1.19) 0.015 (0.44) -0.050 (-1.08) 
RETAIL 0.899*** (3.63) 0.155 (0.97) 0.946*** (3.07) 0.142 (0.85) 
RESIDENTIAL 0.262 (1.04) -0.176 (-1.00) 0.149 (0.48) -0.272 (-1.48) 
INDUSTRIAL 0.077 (0.26) 0.092 (0.51) 0.089 (0.25) -0.007 (-0.04) 
OFFICE 1.035*** (3.82) 0.226 (1.14) 0.945*** (2.90) 0.351* (1.74) 
HOTEL 0.503 (1.22) 0.019 (0.09) 0.705 (1.56) 0.197 (1.01) 
HEALTH CARE 0.531* (1.92) -0.095 (-0.53)   0.395 (1.16) -0.128 (-0.68) 
INTERCEPT 14.675*** (3.71) 5.360* (1.88) 15.222*** (3.38) -1.279 (-0.51) 
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-statistic 8.37 15.94 7.19 16.09 
R² 0.61 0.68 0.56 0.67 
Adj. R² 0.54 0.63 0.48 0.63 
Notes: This table reports the regression results for the two sub-periods during (2007-2010) and after (2012-2015) the financial crisis.  
R#	O<,A = 	: + 	>3F.3/01@><,A−1 + 	?	.3E.30A>	.H>3101@><,A + 	M	<3/	.1A3.B;<,A +	J< +	KA +	"< ,A  
EQUITY EXE is the total equity compensation for the group of	>P>@QA<H>	4<3>@A.3;< in year t. See Exhibit 4.6 for variable definitions. 
Coefficients of statistical significance at: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1% levels. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
 
E
x
h
ib
it 4
.1
2
: C
o
m
p
a
riso
n
 o
f E
x
e
cu
tiv
e
 D
ire
cto
rs' E
q
u
ity C
o
m
p
e
n
sa
tio
n
 
D
u
rin
g
 a
n
d
 A
fte
r th
e
 C
risis 
The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
102 
4.5 Conclusion 
This paper examines whether compensation packages within the real estate industry are 
determined merely by performance or also by CEO power mechanisms that have an essential 
influence on board-level negotiations about executive compensation. Especially the 
arrangement of compensation contracts after the financial crisis has so far not been assessed 
systematically. This paper aims to fill this void by analysing a comprehensive set of 
performance, CEO entrenchment as well as board-control variables, some of which have 
never been covered for the US real estate industry. Compensation arrangements were 
analysed for a sample of 83 US listed real estate companies between 2006 and 2015, the 
most comprehensive US sample to date. After controlling for a possible endogenous 
determination of compensation arrangements by applying a panel data fixed-effects 
methodology and using lagged performance variables, our findings can be summarized as 
follows: 
Total cash compensation of CEOs and executive directors is primarily driven by the 
performance ratio of total return to shareholders over one year (TSR1YR). Furthermore, several 
CEO-entrenchment and board-control proxies such as CEO DUALITY, CEO OWN, CEO OWN², 
MAJORSHARE, BOARD SIZE, COMPMEETINGS give explanatory power to TCC CEO and TCC 
EXE. Total cash compensation is similarly driven by FIRMSIZE and VOLATILITY, which confirms 
past empirical studies that larger firms attract the best talents and rewards the C-Suite for 
taking risks. 
Principally, the performance ratios of total return to shareholders over five years (TSR5YR), 
operative company profit (FFO) and future growth opportunities proxy TOBINSQ have a 
significant positive impact on TDC CEO and TDC EXE. Hence, long-term compensation 
packages for CEOs and executive directors are tied to long-term company performance. With 
regard to our CEO entrenchment mechanisms, we find that CEOs exploit their long experience 
within the firm (CEO TENURE) to negotiate higher long-term pay for themselves, as well as for 
fellow executive directors. In contrast to institutional investors or major blockholders, the 
longest-serving board member assumes a leading role in monitoring excessive pay 
arrangements. In line with Feng et al. (2010), we find that institutional investors motivate and 
retain management by paying higher long-term compensation together with higher cash 
compensation. 
We also show that incentive-based compensation, such as stock and option grants, are 
positively linked to long-term and value-driven growth performance ratios (TSR5YR and 
TOBINSQ). Consequently, equity compensation is a reward for creating long-term company 
value. Results concerning the CEO entrenchment mechanisms remain the same as for TDC 
CEO and TDC EXE, except for the variable CEO FOUNDER, which yields a negative impact on 
EQUITY CEO. A CEO who is simultaneously the company founder, may not bargain for higher 
equity compensation for himself/herself, since he/she might already own a sufficient amount 
of company shares. Contrary to Feng et al. (2010), who find that institutional investors use 
incentive-based compensation to align management interests to those of shareholders, we 
find no impact of MAJORSHARE and INSTITUTIONALS on equity compensation.  
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The analysis of two different time sub-samples subdivided into ‘during financial crisis’ (2007-
2010) and ‘after financial crisis’ (2012-2015) demonstrates impressively that the 
implementation of pay-for-performance contracts is an essential consequence of the crisis.  
In conclusion, our results reveal that the U.S. listed real estate sector has learned its lessons 
from the dramatic disaster of the financial crisis, a period of exaggerated remuneration 
packages with regard to economic incentives and short-term risk taking. CEO’s and executive 
directors’ compensation contracts should be closely linked to both short- and long-term 
performance measures, in order to align management interests with those of company 
owners. 
Further research may extend this study by investigating a sample which comprises a longer 
timeframe after the global financial crisis in order to validate whether the pay-performance 
link is sustainable. Additionally, it would be interesting to examine whether the pay-
performance link can also be found in the compensation arrangement of the middle 
management within real estate companies. 
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5 Conclusion 
In the following section, each executive summary provides an overview of one paper within 
this dissertation, including the research purpose and design, data framework and key 
findings. The dissertation concludes with final remarks and an outlook for further research on 
the performance of listed real estate companies. 
 
5.1 Executive Summary 
Paper 1: REITs and REOCs and their Initial Stock Market 
Performance: a European Perspective 
 
The main aim of this study is to examine the initial return on the IPO date, by explicitly 
distinguishing between the two business forms in the real estate sector, namely REOC and 
REIT. Within this comparative framework, the research question is considered as to whether 
the REIT-status, with its legal requirements, impact the initial return on the first trading day. 
Given these fixed requirements in the REIT business form, investors desire a more certain 
investment due to the legal framework, which provides basic information to potential 
investors about the business form in general. In accordance with the ex-ante uncertainty 
theory of Beatty and Ritter (1986), who showed that the underpricing level can be decreased 
by providing as much information as possible about the upcoming IPO, several uncertainty 
proxies were tested. Applied to the real estate sector, the REIT-status may implicitly have a 
transparency bonus, which is negatively linked to the initial return on the first trading day.  
In order to provide insight into the IPO performance of REITs and REOCs, a pan-European 
sample comprising 107 listed real estate companies from 9 European countries over the 
period of 2000-2015 is used. For the cross-section analysis, a multiple regression model is 
applied to identify influential pricing factors surrounding REIT-status, such as ex-ante 
uncertainty factors, IPO and firm characteristics. In order to verify the empirical finding of the 
OLS regression, a propensity score matching (PSM) algorithm – a new type of empirical 
method in real estate research – is conducted to create a REIT and REOC subsample with 
comparable initial return levels. Additionally, this study sheds light into the pricing mechanism 
in high uncertaintly market phases by investigating the IPO performance during the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC). 
The study contributes to the existing underpricing literature in the real estate sector by 
providing additional information on IPO pricing differences based on an intra-sector analysis. 
The pricing variances of REITs and REOCs during the short-term horizon of the initial return on 
the first trading day can be a decisive factor in the preparatory phase of an IPO. First, the 
most striking finding is that the REIT-status constitutes a transparency bonus which leads to a 
lower underpricing level for REIT IPOs compared to REOCs and hence to leaving less money 
on the table in the case of a REIT IPO. That is, potential investors can make more money by 
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investing in REOC IPOs, whereas from an issuing company perspective, the REIT business form 
is the better choice for a successful IPO. Secondly, besides the REIT-status itself, characteristics 
such as price volatility, issuing volume and company age have to be taken into account. Third, 
the results support the timing hypothesis, meaning that the market phase is a decisive 
influencing factor in the IPO pricing of real estate companies. In sum, given that the European 
listed real estate market is growing, these findings are of particular importance for potential 
investors, the issuing company and IPO managers. 
 
Paper 2: Gender Diversity and Financial Performance: Evidence 
from US Real Estate Companies 
 
The second paper of this dissertation investigates whether female directors, either executive 
or non-executive, influence a company’s financial performance or value. In recent years, there 
has been an upcoming trend for investors to include social responsibility characteristics in 
their investment decisions and therefore to dovetail the positive social impact and profitability 
of their investments. Some European countries support this investment trend by passing new 
laws which obligate companies to impose quotas, e.g. Germany, Norway, Spain and France. 
Compared to European countries, there are no similar regulatory disclosure requirements in 
the largest real estate market, that of the US, which render this market particularly 
appropriate for investigating the influence of female board members on the company’s 
performance, without any bias due to legal quotas. Additionally, the current finance literature 
presents ambiguous results, with, for example, Campbell & Mínguez-Vera (2008) and Terjesen 
et al. (2015) providing a positive link, whereas Adams & Ferreira (2009) and Shrader et al. 
(1997) found a negative gender diversity / performance relationship. 
The homogeneous real estate sample for this present research is based on the constituent list 
of the FTSE EPRA / NAREIT United States Index for the period 2005-2015. The final sample 
comprises 116 US listed real estate companies, resulting in 1,276 firm-year observations for 
the panel analysis. The relationship between gender diversity and financial performance is 
analyzed with varying gender-diversity and firm-performance proxies. Gender diversity is 
either measured by a dummy variable taking the value 1 if there is at least one woman on the 
board of directors, by the percentage of female directors on the board or by dummy variables 
created on the critical mass theory following Kanter (1977a, 1977b). For firm performance, 
either accounting-based measures, such as return on assets (ROA), market-based ones, such 
as Tobin’s Q or a real-estate-specific-one, such as funds from operations per share 
(FFO/SHARE) and price per net asset value (PRICE/NAV), are used.  
Fixed-effects panel estimation with period and firm dummies is applied in order to control for 
omitted unobservable variables. The second potential issue which may arise from 
investigating the relationship between the presence of women on the board and firm 
performance is reverse causality. In order to control for this association, the two-stage 
Conclusion 
108 
Heckman (1976) procedure is applied, which is an innovative approach in the real estate 
research. 
The results of the first stage in the Heckman procedure indicate that the woman dummy 
variable is endogenous and that the likelihood of female presence on the board is influenced 
by firm characteristics such as board size, CEO / chairman duality, insider ownership, director 
independence and firm size. The results in the second stage of the Heckman procedure show 
that there is a significant positive link between gender diversity on boards and the market-
based performance measures Tobin’s Q and Price/NAV. These findings indicate that stock 
market participants expect higher future earnings from real estate companies with an 
increased share of female board members, which is especially true for executive positions. 
However, these findings also reveal that ‘objective’ accounting-based measures, such as ROA 
or FFO/SHARE, are not affected by board gender diversity and hence, a distinction between 
‘subjective’ market-based and ‘objective’ accounting-based performance is essential in this 
context (Haslam et al., 2010). This real estate study was the first to investigate the gender 
diversity / performance relationship from a non-linear perspective by examining the ‘tokenism 
theory’ of Kanter (1977a, 1977b). The critical mass for positively impacting on the financial 
performance of a real estate company is reached at 30% or more women on the board. An 
in-depth real estate analysis showed that the property sectors of hotel, retail and health-care 
benefit more than average from female executive directors. 
In sum, these results stress the importance of gender diversity on leadership teams for the real 
estate sectors in the US, which is especially true in consumer-orientated property sub-sectors, 
and is reflected in investor perceptions. 
 
 
Paper 3: The Determinants of Executive Compensation in US 
REITs: Performance vs. Corporate Governance Factors 
 
The third section of this dissertation examines the pay-performance relationship, by 
simultaneously controlling for the CEO power mechanism, which can exert an essential 
influence on the CEO and executive director compensation packages. This study is the first to 
consider these essential corporate governance variables, such as CEO entrenchment proxies or 
board / firm ownership, in an in-depth investigation of the whole C-level compensation, 
differentiating between short-, long-term and equity incentive compensation components. In 
the financial literature, there are studies showing that managers were rewarded for excessive 
risk-taking in the short-term, before the financial crisis of 2007/2008. (Bebchuk et al., 2010; 
Acharya et al., 2016) However, linking remuneration packages to timely and appropriate 
performance measures should be any company’s aim. In order to provide insight into whether 
similar patterns can be found in the real estate sector or whether pay-performance sensitivity 
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has changed over time, the sample period of this study comprises timeframes during and after 
the financial crisis. 
Based on a panel dataset, including 830 firm-year observations, the influencing factors of C-
level compensation arrangements of US listed real estate companies during the period of 
2006 to 2015 are analyzed. As the compensation contracts can be determined endogenously 
by financial performance, or omitted unobservable factors can effect dependent or 
independent variables, (Frydman and Jenter, 2010) potential endogeneity issues can arise. 
Potential endogeneity problems are controlled for first by using one-year lagged performance 
variables in the multiple regression analysis and second, by applying the fixed-effects method 
with year and property-type dummies.  
This study sheds light onto management compensation arrangements in the real estate sector 
after the financial crisis, which has so far not been systematically addressed and investigated. 
In the pre- and post-crisis investigation, a descriptive analysis shows that the relative 
importance of cash bonuses in CEO compensation arrangements has been more than halved 
after the financial crisis, by a simultaneously increasing importance of equity-based 
compensation components. In an in-depth empirical analysis, the results show that the cash 
compensation is driven primarily by the total shareholder return of one year and also by the 
certain CEO entrenchment and board control proxies. Second, in contrast to cash 
compensation, the long-term CEO and executive director compensation is linked to total 
shareholder return over five years, the real-estate-specific ratio of operative profit FFO and the 
market-based performance measure Tobin’s Q. Additionally, CEOs with long tenure use their 
experience to negotiate significantly higher long-term compensation for themselves and the 
group of executive directors. In the analysis of equity compensation, a positive link between 
CEO and executive director incentive-based compensation and the total shareholder return of 
five years and the Tobin’s Q, can be provided. 
To sum up, it should be noted that in the US real estate sector, short-term and long-term 
remuneration packages - long-term in general and equity-based compensation- in particular, 
are temporally appropriately linked to performance measures with a similar time horizon. This 
finding is impressively supported by the alternative test, which shows that there was no pay-
for-performance link during the financial crisis, whereas after the crisis, a strong significant 
relationship can be found. Thus, the implementation of pay-performance sensitivity for C-level 
remuneration is a consequence of the financial crisis, and the link between remuneration 
packages and corporate success is essential for management incentive schemes. 
 
5.2 Final Remarks and Further Research 
This present dissertation contributes, with its three sections, to a better understanding of 
facets of corporate success in the context of listed real estate companies. The significant 
worldwide growth of the listed real estate sector constitutes a considerable asset class for 
institutional investors, which supports the relevance of analyzing omnipresent determinates of 
company performance. In particular, the first performance investigation of IPO initial return 
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serves as a major starting point for listed real estate companies, either as a REOC or REIT. 
However, REOC IPOs are more profitable for investors, due to greater initial returns. 
Furthermore, it is shown that corporate governance and social responsibility are an upcoming 
topic impacting on company performance and investor perceptions. In this context, the 
examination of the gender diversity / performance relationship shows that investors expect a 
positive performance impact originating from increased female presence on management 
boards. The final section of this dissertation demonstrates that managers have to obtain 
adequate compensation incentives in order to decide in shareholders’ best interest. In 
addition, the remuneration packages changed in two ways after the financial crisis, first from 
a cash-bonus orientation towards equity-based compensation, and second, ensuring a 
stronger link between remuneration packages and corporate success after the crisis. 
This dissertation addresses an important aspect of company performance in the context of 
listed real estate companies. However, useful and indeed interesting research topics still 
remain in this field. Further research on initial IPO return could comprise examining further 
uncertainty factors, such as market sentiment, and extending the investigation by applying 
textual analysis to IPO prospects. This new technical application in research could help further 
insight into IPO pricing and answer the question of why the underpricing phenomenon has 
not yet been solved. With regard to further equity-raising on the capital market, which is 
especially important for REITs with legal requirements on firm leverage, a comparison of IPO 
return and returns at a secondary offering, might be useful. In terms of the two corporate 
governance topics, a research extension of gender diversity and pay-performance 
remuneration could be conducted by analyzing middle management positions, which, besides 
the C-level, is the most influential part of daily business. In particular, the diversity literature 
would benefit from an investigation including other dimensions, such as race, religion, age or 
education. In sum, this present dissertation and the existing related literature investigate 
performance and performance relationships of listed real estate companies quit 
comprehensively, but further research is most certainly needed. 
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